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5Foreword
In 1969, at the height of the Second Indochinese War (alternatively 
known as the Vietnam War or American War), Sweden formed dip-
lomatic relations with Vietnam and soon thereafter started a large 
program of official development co-operation. This was a politically 
controversial move internationally, but also nationally it did not go 
unquestioned. Sweden had already been providing humanitarian 
assistance to Vietnam since 1967. In 2007, Vietnam was chosen as 
one of the countries Sweden would phase out development co-opera-
tion with.  By this time Vietnam had joined the WTO, had impres-
sive economic growth along with an impressive record of reducing 
poverty. It is foreseen that the country will reach most of the Millen-
nium Development Goals by 2015.
This report is one of three reports commissioned by Sida to an independ-
ent team to review the development co-operation to countries in Asia, (also Sri 
Lanka and Laos), where Sweden is, or has, phased out. It summarises experi-
ences and lessons of this co-operation. This report was predated by an earlier, 
preparatory phase in 2009 that was to comprehensively document and 
describe this co-operation. It is also complemented by a synthesis report, 
which not only compiles the lessons and summarises the three country 
reports, but also comparatively analyses the conclusions and lessons.
The relationship between Sweden and Vietnam, which has evolved over 
more than 40 years, has very much been based on development co-operation. 
This evaluation provides an overview of the years between 1969 and 2011. 
Sweden has been involved in many areas during this time, from the early 
years in health, humanitarian support and forestry to research, human rights 
and democracy and anti-corruption in the later years. 
The evaluators conclude that Swedish development co-operation contrib-
uted to lifting millions of Vietnamese out of poverty. This is a bold statement, 
but important here are the lessons that allow the consultant to make such a 
statement. This includes co-operation with the government, which also trust-
ed Sweden to lead the work in anti-corruption, but also initiate other politically 
sensitive democracy programs. The evaluators highlight Sweden’s “special” 
relationship with Vietnam as decisive in forging what they consider to be a 
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successful development co-operation program, that was responsive to the 
development needs of the country, effective and efficient delivery of aid, and 
that assisted in providing the conditions for sustained poverty reduction, as 
demonstrated especially by Sweden’s support to Vietnam’s extensive econom-
ic reforms. The report clearly shows that Sweden has been appreciated for 
this.
For many Vietnamese, Sweden is known as the first Western nation 
friendly to an independent and struggling Vietnam. Olof Palme (the Swedish 
politician and prime minister), the National Paediatric hospital Uong Bi hospi-
tal and the Bai Bang paper mill are most often mentioned. Another thing that 
comes out very clearly from the report is the need for long-term objectives. 
The best example of this is Bai Bang, which was more costly than calculated, 
had a number of short-comings, but is now not only a successful private com-
pany, but also one of the biggest in Vietnam producing and also exporting 
high-quality paper. 
Since 2009, Sweden has changed the modality of development co-opera-
tion from traditional development aid to partner-driven co-operation. This 
modality has worked very well, and perhaps one reason is that it is based on 
this unique friendship the evaluators focus on and the infinite number of rela-
tionships that have been forged between institutions and individuals over 40 
years. 
The lessons from this evaluation study may seem obvious and not very 
novel but in retrospect they took years to achieve. It is now time to test their 
viability and value in informing not only Swedish development co-operation 
in other countries but perhaps even that by other donors. 
The views in the report are those of the independent evaluators and not 
the views of Sida.
Annika Nordin Jayawardena
Head of the Unit for Monitoring & Evaluation
Department for Organisational Development
Sida
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Preface
The overall goal of the Swedish International Development Coop-
eration Agency (Sida) is to contribute to making it possible for poor 
people to improve their living conditions. 
In 2007 the Swedish Government decided to reduce the number of 
countries with which Sweden carried out development co-operation. 
This included cessation of development co-operation with Laos, Sri Lan-
ka, and Vietnam, and in accordance with Swedish development co-oper-
ation strategies, Sida and the embassies/country teams of those three 
countries initiated an evaluation study to document these long periods of 
development co-operation and assess results and experiences. Part One 
of this exercise was documentation to provide an historical account of the 
development co-operation with Laos, Sri Lanka and Vietnam. This was 
undertaken in 2009 – 2010.
In 2010, via an international competitive bidding process, Sida awarded 
a contract to GHD Pty Ltd from Australia to undertake Part Two: an evalua-
tion study of long-term development co-operation between Sweden and the 
three countries. This report covers the evaluation results for Vietnam, with 
separate reports being provided for Laos and Sri Lanka.
The Evaluation Team included the following key members:
•	 Prof	Mark	McGillivray,	Team	Leader:	Prof	McGillivray	is	a well-
recognised international development economist with experience 
as Chief Economist for the Australian International Development 
Assistance Agency (AusAID) as well as Deputy Director for the 
United Nations World Institute for Development Economics 
Research (WIDER).
•	 Dr	David	Carpenter,	Deputy	Team	Leader:	Dr	Carpenter	has	
evaluation and research experience across several countries while 
working with AusAID. He was manager of AusAID’s Australian 
Research Development Program and the ASEAN-Australian 
Development Cooperation Program.
•	 Mr	Andrew	Laing,	Senior	Evaluation	Specialist:	Mr	Laing	is	an	
international development economist recognised for his work in 
public financial management analysis and reporting for agencies 
such as the World Bank, DfID, AusAID and the UN.
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•	 Mr	Stewart	Norup,	M&E	Advisor:	Mr	Norup	has	experience	as	
a M&E Advisor on international projects for Hassall & Associates 
International and then GHD for the last 10 years.
•	 Dr	Sango	Mahanty,	Senior	Research	Specialist/Gender	Adviser:	
Dr Mahanty has over 15 years of experience in development co-
operation working as an academic, a consultant and an NGO 
coordinator. Dr Mahanty has extensive experience in social 
research and multidisciplinary research methodologies.
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Executive Summary
This report assesses the contribution Sweden has made to development 
and poverty reduction in Vietnam over 45 years of development 
 co-operation, from the inception of the program in 1967 to its end  
in 2011.
The overall purpose of this evaluation is to provide: 
1. An historical account of the development co-operation between 
Sweden and Vietnam by documenting and recording what has 
taken place and been achieved over the years; and
2. A summary of the experiences and lessons-learned from the co-
operation in order to guide the Government of Vietnam as well 
as other donors and international partners that may step in after 
Sida, regarding the possible continuation of the different projects 
or programs, but also future development co-operation per se.
The primary aim of this evaluation is to provide Sida with an under-
standing of how its development activities have supported poverty 
reduction in Vietnam over time. Specific objectives include analys-
ing the background and development context for interventions, ana-
lysing the reported results and impacts, and formulating conclusions 
and general lessons learned.
Evaluating 45 years of development co-operation is a complex 
task. An informative and rigorous methodological approach is 
required. This evaluation employs qualitative and quantitative 
methods in a complementary way to interrogate different types of 
evidence about the context, evolution and outcomes of Swedish 
development co-operation with Vietnam. This approach is ground-
ed in the understanding that adopting different but complementary 
lines of enquiry invariably leads to more robust and credible 
research studies. In the spirit of complementarity this evaluation 
does not emphasise one line of enquiry over another but uses the 
insights arising from quantitative analysis to inform qualitative 
investigation and vice versa.
In accordance with contemporary international development 
thinking this evaluation adopts a multidimensional 
17
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conceptualisation of poverty. This conceptualisation is based on the 
recognition that quality of life or well-being depends not only on 
income, but on levels of health, education, participation, personal 
security, political participation and many other factors. It is also 
based on the recognition that high levels of income do not necessar-
ily always closely correlate with high levels of health, education and 
other dimensions of well-being.
Such an evaluation also requires a comprehensive and rigorous 
evaluation framework. This evaluation relies heavily on an Aid Quality 
Evaluation Framework (AQEF). The AQEF is a conceptual tool that 
can be applied to almost any development aid activity. This framework 
is based on cutting edge knowledge of drivers of aid effectiveness. 
Under this framework aid effectiveness is defined in terms of the impact 
of aid on multidimensional poverty reduction. The AQEF consists of 
five components, against which the quality of aid is assessed. They are: 
(1) absorptive capacity; (2) quality of public sector financial manage-
ment; (3) consistency with Paris Declaration principles; (4) consistency 
of aid delivery with partner country sectoral priorities; and (5) consist-
ency of aid delivery with donor country program strategies.
Consistent with the evaluation’s objective, the primary question 
addressed is as follows. 
How, and to what extent, did Swedish development co-operation 
contribute to poverty reduction in Vietnam? 
The reference to ‘contribution’ in the primary evaluation ques-
tion highlights the focus on exploring the plausible associations 
between Sida’s aid and changes in poverty, rather than supplying 
definitive proof of any causal relationship between the two. This 
report does not attempt to go further than speculate whether certain 
associations might be causal. 
The evaluation also addresses four other (sub-) questions: 
(1)  To what extent did Sida’s aid respond to pressing multidimen-
sional development needs in Vietnam? 
(2)  To what extent has Sida’s development co-operation program in 
Vietnam been effectively and efficiently delivered? 
(3)  How and to what extent did Sida’s development co-operation 
nurture an enabling environment for poverty reduction in 
Vietnam? 
(4)  What lessons can be learned from Sweden’s development co-
operation with Vietnam to improve development effectiveness in 
the future? Answering the fourth sub-question draws together the 
18
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analysis in sub-questions one to three to identify the most salient 
lessons for development co-operation programs.
The report notes that Sweden provided $US3.46 billion dollars, in 
constant 2008 prices, in official development assistance (ODA) to 
Vietnam during the period 1967 to 2008. Sweden was the second 
largest ODA donor to Vietnam in the 1970s, the largest in the 1980s 
and the fourth largest in the 1990s. Indeed Sweden dominated Viet-
namese ODA receipts in the 1980s, providing 64 percent of total 
bilateral ODA to Vietnam during this decade. This represents 36 
percent of total (bilateral and multilateral) ODA flowing to Vietnam 
during this decade. These numbers do not include aid from the 
Soviet Union and other former Eastern Bloc countries owing to 
a lack of comparable data.
The report’s quantitative analysis found that: 
•	 After	suffering	extensive	damage	during	the	Second	Indo-Chinese	
War, Vietnam has achieved extremely impressive multidimensional 
development and poverty reduction outcomes since the early 1990s;
•	 Vietnam	has	achieved	very	high	levels	of	economic	growth	since	
the early 1980s;
•	 Doi	Moi	appears	to	have	been	extremely	successful	and	is	associ-
ated with these levels of economic growth; 
•	 Vietnam	has	received	reasonably	high	levels	of	aid	relative	to	
population and GDP, and also relative to other foreign inflows;
•	 Year-on-year	increases	in	Vietnamese	aid	receipts	have	not	been	
as stable as could have possibly otherwise been the case;
•	 There	has	been	significant	proliferation	and	fragmentation	of	aid	
financed activities in Vietnam;
•	 The	level	of	aid	to	Vietnam	has	been	such	that	it	would	be	rea-
sonable to look for attribution between these inflows and national 
development outcomes in this country;
•	 The	total	aid	to	Vietnam	has	not	been	at	a level	that	was	too	high	
for its economy to efficiently absorb; and
•	 Public	financial	management	quality	has	trended	upward	in	
Vietnam since the 1970s.
With the exception of the finding regarding proliferation and frag-
mentation, these characteristics are pleasing from a development 
effectiveness perspective. While alone they clearly do not provide 
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sufficient evidence that aid to Vietnam has been effective, they do 
paint an optimistic view of development effectiveness in the country. 
The picture was enhanced by analysis presented in the report, which 
showed a very high correlation between the overall donor country 
effort in Vietnam and the levels of human development in Vietnam. 
Specifically, this analysis found that the total annual levels of ODA to 
Vietnam, relative to its population, predicted 91 percent of the yearly 
variation in Vietnam’s human development index during 1980 to 
2008. Such a high level of prediction is most uncommon, based on 
similar statistical investigation for other aid receiving countries. 
What might these findings imply for Swedish development co-
operation in Vietnam? Sweden has been a major donor of ODA to 
Vietnam. While this does not ensure that Swedish aid has had 
national level impacts in Vietnam, it does provide grounds for inves-
tigating whether such impacts have occurred, especially if it can be 
shown that Sweden supported highly strategic, pivotal activities that 
were efficiently delivered. 
This question, among others, was addressed in the case studies 
discussed in the report. The case studies were selected in consulta-
tion with Sida. The principal case selection criterion was the expect-
ed value of the case study in fulfilling the overall aim of the evalua-
tion and, in so doing, responding to the above questions. Also taken 
into account was the likely richness of information in to key time 
periods, people, and events. Judgement calls are unavoidable in 
selecting from a large number of potential case studies.
The case studies were examined in the context of key phases of the 
history of development co-operation between Sweden and Vietnam. 
These phases and the case studies are as follows:
Phase I: Rebuilding Infrastructure and Supporting Economic 
Development: 1969 to 1986
 Case Study 1 – Sweden’s Early Support to the Health Sector
 Case Study 2 - Bai Bang and the side-projects
Phase II: Supporting Reform and Building Institutions: 1986 to 1999
 Case Study 3 – Sweden’s Support to Economic Reform
 Case Study 4 – ‘From FCP to MRDP’: Towards Participatory 
Rural Development
20
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Phase III: Tackling Poverty, Supporting Democracy and Human 
Rights: 1999 – 2011
 Case Study 5: Chia Se Poverty Alleviation Program
 Case Study 6: Swedish Support to Public Administration Reform 
in Quang Tri Province
 Case Study 7: Swedish Support to the Media
 Case Study 8: Access to Justice Project
 Case Study 9: Partner-Driven Co-operation
More than 200 key informants were interviewed for these case stud-
ies, both in Vietnam and Sweden.
Three overall, self-reinforcing, characteristics of Swedish aid were 
identified in these case studies. The first is the ‘special relationship’ 
between Sweden and Vietnam. The latter show the former as an espe-
cially close and trusted friend. This label has been frequently applied to 
development co-operation between Vietnam and Sweden. Neverthe-
less, it resonates throughout the case studies. The significance of the 
relationship is that it places Sweden in a position where it can potential-
ly influence pivotal development outcomes, achieving more than what 
might be expected given the amount of aid it provides. The second 
characteristic is a long-term approach. Sweden’s tendency to apply 
a long-term perspective has both contributed to, and arises from, the 
special relationship that grew between the two countries. Sweden’s 
development assistance to Vietnam during Phase I, the Bai Bang Pro-
ject in particular, should be seen in this context. While this assistance 
does not score well against components of the AQEF, the long-term 
approach it embodied helped build a special relationship between Swe-
den and Vietnam, providing a platform for future achievements. The 
third characteristic is flexibility and openness to new ideas. This char-
acteristic is supportive of a long-term approach since they enable exist-
ing projects to evolve and adapt to emerging realities in Vietnam. 
With respect to the first evaluation sub-question, there is clear 
evidence that, on balance, Sida responded to important multidimen-
sional development needs in Vietnam. 
Vietnam faced many significant development challenges in 1975, 
with one of the most pressing being the need to rebuild infrastructure 
following the damage done during the Indo-Chinese War. Address-
ing health was also a pressing need. Both the Bai Bang Project and 
support for constructing the Children’s Hospital in Hanoi and the 
General Hospital in Uong Bi were, broadly speaking, consistent with 
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these needs. However, closer examination of the development situa-
tion in Vietnam at the time would suggest that other economic infra-
structure and health initiatives would have been more appropriate. 
It was clear in the early to mid-1980s that Vietnam’s economy 
was running into trouble and that reform was required. Growth and 
productivity was low, various economic targets had not been met 
and income poverty was extremely high. Sweden’s support for Doi 
Moi from 1986 onwards was fully consistent with these pressing 
needs. This includes the need to reduce poverty, given links between 
poverty reduction and economic growth. Vietnam’s post-1986 eco-
nomic reforms undoubtedly helped lift many millions of Vietnamese 
out of poverty. The number of people benefitted in this way is diffi-
cult to quantify precisely, but it is certainly in the millions, given that 
the number of Vietnamese living in extreme income poverty fell by 
42 percentage points between 1993 and 2006. 
Throughout the mid- to late-1990s it was increasingly recognised in 
international development circles that in all countries economic growth 
alone is insufficient to eradicate poverty. It was also increasingly recog-
nised that what was also needed were improvements in human rights, 
democracy and government accountability. The shifts in emphasis of 
the Swedish development co-operation with Vietnam in the third 
phase, from 1999 to 2011, were fully consistent with this thinking.  
They were consistent with pressing development needs in Vietnam. 
This is clearest in the case of poverty. Despite the reductions in the 
number of people living in extreme income poverty, some 78 percent of 
the  Vietnamese people still lived on less than two dollars per day in 
1998. A more direct approach to poverty was required, and this is pre-
cisely what Sweden’s Chia Se poverty alleviation program provided.
With respect to the second evaluation question, the evidence of 
effective and efficient delivery of Swedish development co-operation 
in Vietnam is mixed.
Evidence of effective and efficient delivery is scarcest during the 
first phase of development co-operation. While it seems that Sida’s 
priorities were aligned with those of the Vietnamese government, 
there is evidence of significant aid tying. There is also evidence of 
a lack of capacity in the health sector, which adversely impacted on 
the effectiveness of Swedish support to that sector.
The second and third phases clearly saw much more effective and 
efficient Swedish aid delivery in Vietnam. There was strong Vietnamese 
government ownership of the activities supported by Sida. Also these 
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activities were very closely aligned to Vietnamese government 
priorities. 
With respect to the third evaluation question, there is clear evi-
dence that Sida’s development co-operation nurtured such an envi-
ronment in Vietnam, or put differently, that it provided the pre-con-
ditions for sustained poverty reduction. Nothing demonstrates this 
more clearly than Swedish support for Doi Moi. Dr Le Dang 
Doanh, Former Senior Economic Adviser to Prime Minister Pham 
Van Dong, was a key informant for this evaluation. In response to 
a question on this issue, his response was as follows:
‘You ask about the role of Sweden in the Doi Moi reform process. We would 
have done it ourselves of course, we would not have collapsed, their help was not 
that vital, but it would have been at a higher cost for us. It would have been dif­
ficult for us and would have been slower’. (Dr Le Dang Doanh, Former 
Senior Economic Adviser to Prime Minister Pham Van Dong, 
Hanoi, March 23, 2011)
With respect to respect to the fourth evaluation question, there 
are three lessons learned, which if acted upon can improve future 
development effectiveness. These are: 
1. To recognise the importance of relationships; 
2. To adopt a long term approach - pursue an effective balance 
between principles and pragmatism; and 
3. Be flexible and open to new ideas.
If there is a single observation that stands above all others not only 
from this evaluation, it is of the importance of relationships. Swedish 
achievements in Vietnam are disproportionate to the financial vol-
ume of its development activities in this partner country. To use 
a somewhat crude term, Sweden has achieved enormous “bang for 
its buck” in Vietnam.
Madam Pham Chi Lan, Former Director General, Vietnam 
Chamber of Commerce, who was also quoted in Chapter 4, made 
the following observation:
‘Money is important, but what is more important is the support across our 
entire history with Sweden, this has nothing to do with money, other countries 
give us more money but we don’t have the same relationship with them’. (Mad-
am Pham Chi Lan, Former Director General, Vietnam Chamber of 
Commerce, Hanoi, March 23, 2011)
Madam Lam refers to the ‘entire history’ between Sweden and 
Vietnam. On this point it is appropriate to make one final comment 
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on the Bai Bang Project. Less than positive comments were made 
about this project, on specific technical criteria, above. The true sig-
nificance of this project, along with support for building hospitals 
early in the first phase of development co-operation between Sweden 
and Vietnam, is that they provided a basis for building an extremely 
productive relationship between the two countries, providing a basis 
for much more effective interventions that followed.
The clear message to the international donor community from this 
evaluation is that the nature of the relationship is an important prereq-
uisite for effective development co-operation. The relationship needs to 
be supportive, understanding and honest, in which potentially difficult 
issues can be discussed and acted upon in a pro-development manner. 
This is what has characterised Swedish co-operation with Vietnam.
The primary evaluation question - how, and to what extent, did 
Sida’s development assistance contribute to poverty reduction in 
Vietnam? – is rarely easy to answer for any development co-opera-
tion	program.	Yet	the	evidence	examined	in	this	report	points	to	
Swedish development co-operation with Vietnam having strong 
poverty reducing impacts.
While the exact extent to which Swedish development assistance 
has reduced poverty is a matter for speculation, it would appear to 
be beyond doubt that Sweden has worked with the Government of 
Vietnam to lift many millions of Vietnamese out of income poverty. 
The benefits of this assistance are almost certainly not limited to 
income dimension poverty alone, but to gains in other dimensions. It 
is a general rule, based on the findings of international research, that 
higher growth facilitates gains in health and education. There is no 
reason to believe that this rule does not apply in Vietnam. It can rea-
sonably be concluded, therefore, the Swedish development co-opera-
tion has improved the health, education and overall human develop-
ment levels of millions of Vietnamese citizens.
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Part One – Swedish 
Development Co-operation With 
Vietnam: Setting The Context
1.  PurPOSE, SCOPE AnD METhOD 
OF EVALuATiOn
1.1 Introduction
Swedish development co-operation with Vietnam commenced in 
1967. The period from the late-1960s to mid-1970s was a very diffi-
cult time for Vietnam. During this time the country was still divided 
into South Vietnam and North Vietnam. The Second Indo-Chinese 
war was at its height, ending with the fall of Saigon (now Ho Chi 
Minh City) to the North Vietnamese forces in 1975. Both North and 
South Vietnam had suffered tremendous economic and human losses 
during the war. Intense aerial bombardment had extensively dam-
aged economic infrastructure and, in Vietnam as a whole, it is esti-
mated that there were up to 1.5 million civilian and military deaths, 
360,000 people made invalids, and one million people widowed. It is 
difficult to imagine how difficult and complex the operating environ-
ment for any aid donor must have been during these years.
With the end of the War in 1975 came political re-unification and 
the spread of communism throughout the country. As a result of these 
economic policies many donors either suspended or substantially scaled 
back their aid. It was at this time that Sweden became the largest 
OECD DAC donor in terms of volume of funds. Sweden retained this 
status for every year until 1991, providing 64 per cent of Vietnam’s total 
OECD DAC bilateral aid during the 1980s. It was one of only three 
OECD DAC donors not to substantially scale back its aid to Vietnam, 
following the latter’s invasion of Kampuchea (now Cambodia) in 1978. 
Swedish aid to Vietnam reached its highest annual level of $US309 mil-
lion in 2008. Sweden is the second largest provider of aid to Vietnam, in 
dollar terms, since the end of the Indo-Chinese War, following Japan.
Swedish development co-operation with Vietnam has been charac-
terised by long-term partnerships around key activities. The nature of 
these activities has changed over time, in part due to changes in inter-
national thinking on development assistance but also due to changing 
needs in Vietnam owing to its economic and social transition over 
25
PArT oNe – SweDISh DeVeloPmeNT Co-oPerATIoN wITh VIeTNAm: SeTTINg The CoNTexT
time. In the early years Swedish development co-operation focused on 
supporting health, on strengthening physical infrastructure and on 
humanitarian support. In the 1980s Sweden shifted to capacity build-
ing and supporting economic reform. Swedish aid was instrumental in 
supporting Doi Moi - the sweeping reforms intended to facilitate the 
transition from a socialist command economy to a more market-orient-
ed economy. Doi Moi had a significant impact on economic growth 
and lifted millions of Vietnamese people out of income poverty. 
From the late 1990s Sweden became increasingly involved in 
democracy, human rights, and anti-corruption – all highly sensitive 
areas in which few other donors were able to work. Sweden was able 
to move into these areas given its long-term relationship as a trusted 
friend of Vietnam.
This report assesses the contribution Sweden has made to devel-
opment and poverty reduction in Vietnam over the 45 years of 
development co-operation, from the inception of the program in 
1967 to 2011. It is one of three evaluation reports commissioned by 
Sida in countries where it is, or has, phased out official development 
co-operation. The other two reports focus on Sri Lanka and Laos. 
This chapter outlines the purpose and scope of this evaluation and 
introduces the evaluation questions, as well as briefly discussing the 
methodological approach used in this report.
1.2 Purpose and Scope
The overall purpose of this evaluation is to provide: 
1. An historical account of the development co-operation between 
Sweden and Vietnam by documenting and recording what has 
taken place and been achieved over the years; and
2. A summary of the experiences and lessons-learned from the 
 co-operation in order to guide the Government of Vietnam as well 
as other donors and international partners that may step in after 
Sida, regarding the possible continuation of the different projects 
or programs, but also future development co-operation per se.
The primary aim of this evaluation is to provide Sida with an under-
standing of how its development activities have supported poverty 
reduction in Vietnam over time. Specific objectives include analys-
ing the background and development context for interventions, ana-
lysing the reported results and impacts, and formulating conclusions 
and general lessons-learned.
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Efforts and achievements were assessed against the context pre-
vailing at the time when decisions were made, and the overall devel-
opment objective of poverty reduction as formulated in national 
development plans, poverty reduction strategies and Swedish devel-
opment plans, policies and strategies.
This evaluation does not seek to attribute in any quantitative way 
a causal link between Swedish development co-operation and pov-
erty reduction, or other high level development outcomes in Viet-
nam. Such an exercise requires precise knowledge of development 
outcomes that would have arisen in the absence of Swedish develop-
ment co-operation. This is an extremely complex and highly specu-
lative task, and one that is beyond the scope of this evaluation. This 
evaluation does, however, point to various stylised facts or statistical 
associations between development co-operation and development 
outcomes in Vietnam. The report speculates about whether these 
associations might be causal, but goes no further than that. The 
evaluation uses a multidisciplinary, mixed method approach to 
assess the impact of Swedish aid, as discussed below.
Further, this report does not exhaustively document the full suite 
of development interventions funded by Sweden over the 45-year 
history of engagement as this task was undertaken as part of Phase 1 
of this broader project (see Nordic Consulting Group, 2010). Instead 
this report uses a case study approach to discuss particular themes 
underlying Swedish aid in critical periods of Vietnam’s history, and 
situates that within the broader political and economic context exist-
ing at the time, with reference to key policy shifts in development co-
operation between Vietnam and Sweden.
1.3 Evaluation Methods and Conceptual Framework
1.3.1 Methods
This evaluation employs qualitative and quantitative methods in 
a complementary way to interrogate different types of evidence 
about the context, evolution and outcomes of Swedish development 
co-operation with Vietnam. This approach is grounded in the 
understanding that adopting different but complementary lines of 
enquiry invariably leads to more robust and credible research. In the 
spirit of complementarity this evaluation does not emphasise one line 
of enquiry over another but uses the insights arising from quantita-
tive analysis to inform qualitative investigation and vice versa.
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Much of the quantitative analysis in this report is used to set the 
broader context of development achievement in Vietnam and ODA 
allocation by Sweden over time. These data are used to track changes 
in quality of life - poverty in particular. Information is presented on 
indicators such as per capita income, annual rates of growth, life expec-
tancy, adult literacy, child and infant mortality, maternal mortality and 
the percentage and absolute number of people living below the income 
poverty line. Changes over time in variables are examined and infer-
ences about aid effectiveness are made. A challenge for the analysis was 
data availability, especially in the early years of Swedish development 
co-operation. Further details are provided in Appendix A.
The qualitative component of this evaluation focused on the flex-
ible exploration of the evaluation questions through the use of semi-
structured interviews, focus groups and the analysis of existing docu-
mentation. Over 200 key informants were interviewed in Vietnam 
and Sweden (see Appendix B for more details), and hundreds of doc-
uments collected during Phase 1 of the research were also utilised. 
This qualitative information is used extensively when discussing the 
performance of particular interventions, relations between Sweden 
and the Government of Vietnam, changes in Swedish policy, and 
the impact of these changes.
A large proportion of the qualitative data is presented in case 
studies. These case studies focus on specific interventions over the 
45-year period and were agreed in co-operation with Sida at the 
inception stage. These case studies were chosen to reflect particular 
approaches to aid delivery and important thematic issues underpin-
ning Swedish aid delivery over time.
The historical nature of this evaluation, which must evaluate the 
cumulative impact of many activities over several decades, distin-
guishes it from a typical project or program evaluation. For this rea-
son, the selection of case studies involved a combination of a ‘longi-
tudinal’ perspective – a selection of a chain of chronologically con-
nected projects and programs – with a ‘thematic’ perspective – pro-
jects and programs that shed light on thematic issues pertaining to 
a particular time period.
All cases were selected in consultation with Sida at the inception 
stage of this evaluation from a large set of potential cases. In an ideal 
evaluation world all aid activities in the country program under con-
sideration would be evaluated, be they projects, discrete components 
of	projects	or	programs.	Yet	this	is	beyond	the	resources	of	
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practically all long term evaluations, including this evaluation. 
Choices and judgments must therefore be made. Recognising that it 
is rarely self-evident as to which cases are the most appropriate, clear 
and transparent general selection criteria need to be employed. 
These criteria are outlined in Appendix A.
1.3.2 The Aid Quality Evaluation Framework
This evaluation is influenced by the Aid Quality Evaluation 
Framework (AQEF) which was developed by the authors in response 
to the complexity of this large scale, historical evaluation1. The 
AQEF is a conceptual tool that can be applied to almost any devel-
opment aid activity. This framework is based on cutting edge knowl-
edge of those generic factors that drive aid effectiveness. Under this 
framework aid effectiveness is defined in terms of the impact of aid 
on multidimensional poverty reduction, either directly or via 
impacts on the drivers of poverty reduction.
By looking at the agreed drivers of aid effectiveness the AQEF 
caters specifically for the many situations where it is not possible to 
directly observe or quantify the impact of aid on poverty reduction, as 
is the case with Sweden’s aid to Vietnam over a 45 year period. As 
suggested above it is very difficult to disentangle Swedish aid from oth-
er aid and endogenous factors in Vietnam’s development; however, 
this framework can be used to assess Swedish aid against well accept-
ed aid effectiveness criteria. As such, the AQEF is both input-based, in 
that it takes into account those activities that are thought to contribute 
ex ante to effective aid, and outcome-based, in that it looks ex post at 
observed aid impacts from a development effectiveness perspective.
The AQEF is comprised of five components. Assessments of aid 
quality can be made against each of these components using a mix 
of quantitative and qualitative data. The five components of the 
AQEF are: 1. absorptive capacity; 2. quality of public sector finan-
cial management; 3. consistency with Paris Declaration principles; 
4. consistency with partner country sectoral priorities; and 5. consist-
ency with donor country program strategies (or equivalents). The 
importance of the first two components is discussed further in Chap-
ter 2 and all components are be discussed in Chapters 6 and 7, with 
reference to the data presented in Chapters 2 through 5. Further 
details of the AQEF can be found in Appendix C. 
1 For a detailed outline of the AQEF see Carpenter et al. (2010) 
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1.4 Evaluation Questions
The primary question this evaluation addresses is:
How, and to what extent, did Sida’s development assistance contribute to 
poverty reduction in Vietnam?
This question is directly drawn from the terms of reference and 
addresses the OECD DAC impact criterion. Poverty reduction (in 
various guises) has long been the overarching objective of Swedish 
aid, from that outlined in Proposition 1962:100 (the ‘bible of Swedish 
development co-operation’) through to the present day (Danielson 
and Wohlgemuth, 2003, p.3).As such, poverty reduction constitutes 
an appropriate yardstick for assessing the impact of Sida’s aid to 
Vietnam over the considerable time period covered by this evalua-
tion. The reference to ‘contribution’ in the primary evaluation ques-
tion highlights the focus on exploring the plausible associations 
between Sida’s aid and changes in poverty, rather than supplying 
definitive proof of any causal relationship between the two.
To the extent that poverty reduction has been the principal aim 
of Sweden’s country program in Vietnam, addressing this question 
involves the application of component 5 of the AQEF.
Consideration of the broad enabling environment is a key to 
addressing this question. This includes examining the absorptive 
capacity of the recipient country (component 1 of the AQEF) and the 
quality of public fiscal management (component 2 of the AQEF). 
These are widely acknowledged to be important for the effective and 
efficient use of aid funds for development purposes. 
In accordance with contemporary international development 
thinking this evaluation adopts a multidimensional conception of 
poverty. It is widely accepted in policy and research circles that pov-
erty is multidimensional in nature. This is based on the recognition 
that quality of life or well-being depends not only on income, but on 
levels of health, education, participation, personal security, political 
participation and many other factors. It is also based on the recogni-
tion that high levels of income do not necessarily always closely cor-
relate with high levels of health, education and other dimensions of 
well-being. This means that an individual might have an income lev-
el which is high enough for them not to live in poverty with respect 
to income, but might well be living in poverty with respect to these 
other dimensions. The World Bank, the United Nations 
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Development Program and other thought leading development 
agencies have long embraced this concept2.
Sub-question 1: To what extent did Sida’s aid respond to pressing multi­
dimensional development needs in Vietnam?
Sub-question 1 is directed at the appropriateness and relevance of 
the sectoral and geographic allocation of Sida’s development co-
operation over time as well as the consistency of this with country 
strategies in Vietnam. This recognises that to be effective, aid must 
be targeted at the most pressing development needs of each recipient 
country at a particular point in time. Addressing this sub-question 
involves an analysis of components 4 and 5 of the AQEF.
Sub-question 2: To what extent has Sida’s development co­operation 
 program in Vietnam been effectively and efficiently delivered?
Aid may be allocated according to pressing needs, but it must be 
well delivered if it is to contribute to poverty reduction. This area of 
the evaluation explores the extent to which Sida’s development co-
operation exemplified internationally agreed principles of good aid 
delivery practice, most recently articulated in the Paris Declaration 
(component 3 of the AQEF). This analysis demands the careful and 
nuanced application of these principles - see Appendix C for an expla-
nation of why it is valid to apply the Paris Principles retrospectively.
Woven into this analysis is an exploration of the different ways of 
working that Sida adopted throughout the period of development 
co-operation and how these may have evolved in response to multi-
dimensional needs. This includes an assessment of the choice of 
modalities, channels, partner organisations and the relative efficien-
cy of these arrangements as aid delivery mechanisms. The analysis 
under this sub-question directly addresses the OECD DAC criteria 
of efficiency and effectiveness.
2 It is recognised that obtaining quantitative information on some of these pov-
erty dimensions is extremely difficult. For these reasons the quantitative analy-
sis focuses primarily on poverty with respect to income, health and education 
given that the availability of quantitative data on these variables permits more 
incisive assessments. This is consistent with the approaches of many leading 
development agencies and the recognition that these are among the most im-
portant poverty dimensions. The UNDP’s Human Poverty Index, for example, 
is based on assessments with respect to income, health, education and access to 
water. This evaluation addresses the other well-being dimensions appropriate 
to a multidimensional concept of poverty through our qualitative analysis.
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In-depth case studies illustrate how these choices and strategies 
have worked in particular contexts and at particular points in time.
Sub question 3: How and to what extent did Sida’s development co­opera­
tion nurture an enabling environment for poverty reduction in Vietnam?
The third sub-question acknowledges that although aid may be 
well targeted and well delivered, it must also be undertaken in, and 
actively contribute to, a supportive enabling environment if it is to 
have a sustainable impact on poverty reduction. This analysis consid-
ers Sida’s approaches to influencing policy and building the capacity 
of the government, civil society and the capacity of individuals to 
improve their lives. The relative effectiveness of these more indirect 
forms of development co-operation has been assessed to help under-
stand which particular approaches worked well in influencing the 
enabling environment and the reasons why. This assists judgements 
about the sustainability of Sida’s long-term co-operation program.
Detailed case studies explore how these challenges were 
approached in particular instances and the degree to which they 
were able to influence aspects of the enabling environment. This 
question directly addresses the OECD DAC criteria of sustainability.
Sub question 4: What lessons can be learned from Sweden’s development 
co­operation with Vietnam to improve development effectiveness in the future?
The fourth sub-question draws together the analysis in sub-ques-
tions 1–3 to identify the most salient lessons for development co-
operation programs. Lessons are identified at the country, sector, 
and intervention levels.
1.5 Proceeding Chapters
This report consists of six additional chapters. Chapter 2 looks at 
the ‘big picture’. That is, it provides the broader development context 
within which development co-operation between Sweden and Vietnam 
can be understood and evaluated. This includes looking at the broad 
operating environment faced by donors in Vietnam, the development 
achievements of Vietnam over the 45 year period of co-operation, and 
Sweden’s actual aid allocation. In accordance with the application of 
the AQEF, this chapter also introduces data on consistency with the 
Paris Declaration principle of aid predictability, the quality of public 
sector fiscal management, and the capacity of Vietnam to effectively 
absorb aid. The chapter ends with some stylised facts regarding ODA 
and development achievements in Vietnam that are considered later in 
this evaluation report. 
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Chapter 2 is a quantitative chapter. Chapters 3, 4, and 5 are more 
qualitative in nature and discuss Sweden’s aid to Vietnam during 
three important historical periods. Chapter 3 covers the conception 
of Swedish aid in 1969 to1986. Chapter 4 covers the period from 
1986 to 1999, while Chapter 5 focuses on the period from 1999 up to 
2011, see Appendix A for a more in-depth discussion of case study 
selection and methodology. 
Chapters 6 and 7 contain a synthesis of the key issues. Chapter 6 
discusses the main thematic issues that have been introduced over 
the previous four chapters and how they have shaped and con-
strained the effectiveness of Swedish aid over time (including refer-
ence to the AQEF components). Chapter 7 answers the primary 
evaluation question and sub-questions and introduces a number of 
lessons learned for Sida and other donors when delivering aid to oth-
er states facing similar development challenges to Vietnam.
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2.  ViETnAM nATiOnAL DEVELOPMEnT 
PrOFiLE
2.1 Economic Change in Vietnam – A Concise History
At the end of the French colonial period in 1954 Vietnam found 
itself with two distinct economies delineated geographically. The 
economy of the North was reasonably heterogeneous, relying on 
a number of sectors. Wealthy in natural resources, dominant activi-
ties in the North included: extractive industries, shipbuilding, plan-
tation agriculture, railroads, roads and hydraulics works. The econ-
omy of the South was dominated by the agricultural sector, which 
focussed mainly on rice and rubber cultivation. There was some 
industrial activity in the South, mainly in the form of food process-
ing plants and the production of light consumer goods. The political 
division of Vietnam in 1964, into North Vietnam and South, height-
ened this distinction, with the former giving priority to industrial 
development in its first five year plan of 1961 to 1965.
The Second Indo-China War, from 1954 to 1975, had an enor-
mous economic and human impact on both economies. Estimates 
vary, but as a result of aerial bombing from 1965 onwards all six 
industrial cities, 28 out of 30 provincial towns , all power stations, 
1,600 hydraulic works, six railway lines, all roads and sea and inland 
ports in the North were seriously damaged or destroyed. In addition, 
in the North approximately 400,000 cattle were killed and hundreds 
of thousands of square kilometres of farm land were damaged. In the 
South, it is estimated that up 100,000 and 50,000 square kilometres 
of farm and forestland, respectively, were damaged and 1.5 million 
cattle were killed. In Vietnam as a whole, it is estimated that there 
were up to 1.5 million civilian and military deaths, 360,000 people 
made invalids, one million people widowed and 800,000 children 
orphaned as a result of the war. It is also estimated that by the early 
1980s approximately one million people, among them tens of thou-
sands of professional, technical and skilled workers, had migrated 
out of Vietnam following the end of the war in 1975.
In 1976, the newly unified Vietnam embarked on its second five-
year plan with the overall objective of putting the post-reunion econo-
my on a path towards socialism with an emphasis on industrial devel-
opment. Specific objectives were to economically integrate the North 
and South, to shift the economy of the South from a private 
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enterprise to social command system (through efforts including the 
collectivisation of agriculture), to reconstruct following the ravages of 
the war, and to link growth in the agricultural and industrial sectors. 
The results of the second five year plan were mixed. The economy 
remained dominated by small-scale production and low productivity, 
and the ambitious growth rates sought under the plan (16 percent for 
industry and 8 to 10 percent for agriculture) were not achieved. 
The third five year plan was introduced in 1981. Its highest prior-
ity was to develop the agricultural sector by integrating collectives 
and individual enterprises into an overall system that emphasised 
intensive cultivation and crop specialisation. The plan was pragmat-
ic in that it was based on the recognition that private enterprise had 
to be temporarily retained as it was essential to maintain high rates 
of economic growth. Some forms of private activity were allowed 
(such as peasants being allowed to sell surplus production from land 
not being used by collectives) and the nationalisation of small enter-
prises in the South was temporarily halted. Notwithstanding these 
moves, the rate of collectivisation of agriculture was accelerated. 
The year 1986 was pivotal in Vietnam’s economic (and political) 
history. It saw the launch of Doi Moi, the sweeping reforms intended 
to facilitate the transition from a socialist command economy to what 
was described as a “socialist-oriented market economy”. Combining 
government planning with free market incentives, Doi Moi involved 
abolition of agricultural collectives, the removal of price controls on 
agricultural goods and permissions for farmers to sell their goods in 
the marketplace. It encouraged the establishment of private business-
es and foreign investment, including foreign-owned enterprises. 
Periods of profound economic reform are often associated with sig-
nificant decreases in economic growth. This was not the case with Doi 
Moi, as shown in Figure 2.1, with growth increasing in 1987 and over 
the subsequent five years averaging more than five per cent per annum. 
Growth actually trended sharply upwards from 1986 to 1997, reaching 
as high as 9.5 per cent in 1995, and as documented later in this chapter, 
substantial inroads were made into reducing income poverty. Doi Moi is 
widely regarded as one of the most successful economic reforms ever 
implemented in a developing country. Chapter 4 discusses Doi Moi 
further and Sweden’s special role in supporting this critical reform. 
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Figure 2.1 Real GDP Growth, Vietnam, 1985 to 2008
Vietnam was adversely affected by the East Asian financial crisis in 
1997, with growth falling in 1998 and 1999, although still remaining 
strong by international standards. Vietnam tended to adopt a more cau-
tious economic policy orientation following the crisis, emphasizing mac-
roeconomic stability rather than high growth. At the same time the 
Vietnamese government still continued to hold a tight rein over major 
sectors of the economy, such as the banking system, and state-owned 
enterprises, which remained an important feature of the economy.
The United States lifted its embargo of Vietnam in 1994 and in 2000 
the United States-Vietnam Bilateral Trade Agreement was signed. The 
access to the United States that this agreement provided allowed Viet-
nam to hasten its transformation into a manufacturing-based, export-
oriented economy. The agreement also concomitantly attracted foreign 
investment to Vietnam, not only from the United States but also Europe 
and other countries in Asia. In the early- to mid-2000s the private sector 
accounted for more than one-quarter of all industrial output, the private 
sector’s contribution was expanding more rapidly than the public sector, 
and as shown in Figure 2.1, the economy continued to maintain strong 
economic growth. In 2007 Vietnam became the 150th member of the 
World Trade Organisation. 
Vietnam’s membership of the WTO should provide yet another 
important boost to its economy by supporting the continuation of liber-
alizing reforms and creating options for trade expansion. While growth 
fell a little due to the 2008 Global Financial Crisis it remained very high 
by international standards, at 6.3 percent. In 2009 Vietnam achieved 
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World Bank middle income country status. While it faces many ongoing 
economic challenges, including the reform of what are seen as often rel-
atively inefficient state owned enterprises, Vietnam is widely considered 
one of the top performing developing countries and is likely to maintain 
high rates of economic growth into the foreseeable future.
2.2 Multidimensional Development Achievements in Vietnam3
Vietnam’s economic achievements are largely mirrored by its mul-
tidimensional development achievements. Its achievements in human 
development, based on its Human Development Index (HDI) scores, 
have without exception improved from one year to the next from 1970 
through to 2008. This is evident from Figure 2.2.4 Vietnam’s HDI 
scores during this period have increased by an annual average growth 
rate of 1.4 percent over the 39 years in  question, from 0.38 to 0.65.
197
0
197
2
197
4
197
8
197
6
198
0
198
4
198
8
198
2
198
6
199
0
199
2
199
4
199
6
199
8
200
0
200
4
200
2
200
8
200
6
0.7
0.6
0.5
0.4
0.3
0.2
0.1
0
H
um
an
 D
ev
el
op
m
en
t I
nd
ex
Figure 2.2 Human Development, Vietnam, 1970 to 2008
Vietnamese achievements in health, education and income are shown 
in Appendix D, in Figures D.1 to D.4. Life expectancy and adult liter-
acy have increased continually over the periods for which data are 
shown. Life expectancy has increased from 44 years in 1960 to 74 
3 Data presented in this section unless otherwise indicated are taken from 
UNDP (1990–2009 and 2010) and from World Bank (2010). Gaps in yearly 
coverage and the first year of coverage ref lect data availability. Some data 
have been estimated using standard techniques. Further details are available 
from the authors of this report.
4 The HDI combines life expectancy, adult literacy, gross school enrolment and 
purchasing power parity GDP per capita into a single number or score.
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years in 2008. The percentage of literate adults increased from 80.1 in 
1970 to 91.8 in 2008. Income per capita in 2008 was more than three 
times its 1984 level, increasing sharply from the early 1990s. School 
enrolment at all levels of education follows a considerably different 
path. While it is higher in 2008 than in 1970 (64 versus 54 percent, 
respectively), school enrolment declined in each of the years 1981 to 
1986 and 1989 to 1992 as well as in a number of single years. 
It is informative to compare Vietnamese multidimensional devel-
opment achievements to those of all developing countries. Figure 2.4 
provides comparisons based on the HDI, life expectancy, adult litera-
cy, school enrolment and purchasing power parity (PPP) GDP per 
capita for the period 1970 to 2008.It should be recalled that the sec-
ond, third, and fourth of these variables are components of the HDI. 
These comparisons are obtained by dividing Vietnamese achieve-
ments in these variables by the average achievements of all low and 
middle income countries for which requisite data are available. If the 
resulting ratio is greater than one, Vietnam has higher achievement 
than these countries, while the reverse is true if the ratio is less than 
one. Four points emerge from Figure 2.3. The first is the overall 
improvement in level of achievement over time relative to all develop-
ing countries, as indicated by its relative HDI score. This has been 
due to relative improvements in life expectancy and GDP per capita, 
as is shown in Figure 2.3. Vietnam’s achievements in human develop-
ment are such that it exceeded the average achievement of all low and 
middle income countries in all years from 1996 after lagging well 
behind these countries in 1970. The second point is the relative 
declines in the knowledge indicators, adult literacy and school enrol-
ment. For adult literacy, Vietnam’s achievement in 1970 was 44 per-
cent higher than the average for low and middle income countries. In 
2008 it was 14 percent higher. For school enrolment, Vietnam com-
menced the period in question ahead of the average achievement of 
all low and middle income countries, yet it ended clearly behind 
them. The final point concerns Vietnam’s income per capita. In 1970 
Vietnam’s GDP per capita, adjusted for purchasing power parity, was 
slightly less than one-fifth of that of the average for all low and middle 
income countries. Owing to the high rates of economic growth noted 
above it has improved its position relative to these countries appreci-
ably, but it still lags far behind, as in 2008 its GDP per capita was less 
than half that of the average for these countries.
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Statistical information on income poverty in Vietnam is limited, 
with data on the proportion of the Vietnamese population living 
below absolute poverty lines available only from 1993 onward. The 
latest year for which this information is available is 2006. For most 
income poverty indicators the most recent information is for 2002. 
Figure 2.3 provides information on five measures of income poverty. 
All show impressive declines. The most commonly used measure - 
the percentage of people living below the extreme income poverty 
line of $1.25 per day – records a two-thirds reduction in income 
poverty in Vietnam between 1993 and 2006, from 64 to 21 percent. 
This decline is much larger than that achieved over roughly the 
same period by the developing country group as a whole, which saw 
a decline from 39 percent in 1993 to 25 percent in 2005 – a decline 
of 14 percentage points compared to Vietnam’s 43 percentage 
points. The proportion of Vietnam’s population living on less than 
two dollars per day has declined over the same period, falling from 
86 percent to 48 percent. Despite the seemingly large decline a lower 
proportion of the population was living on less than two dollars per 
day in the East Asian region as a whole in 2005 – 39 percent. The 
equivalent number for the world in this year was 47 percent, suggest-
ing that Vietnam still has some progress to make in terms of the $2 
per day poverty line (Ravallion and Chen, 2008). The proportion of 
the rural population living below the national poverty line fell slight-
ly between 1998 and 2002, from 9.2 to 6.6percent. Over the same 
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period the percentage of people living below the national and urban 
poverty lines fell from 37 to 29 and 46 to 36 percent, respectively. 
Empirical Information in income inequality is also limited in 
Vietnam, only being available from 1992 and as late as 2006. Data 
on income inequality are shown in Figure 2.5. Measured by the 
incomes of the richest 10 percent of the population relative to those 
of the poorest 10 percent, income inequality rose slightly between 
1992 and 2006.It has remained reasonably steady based on the 
income ratio of the richest to poorest 20 percent of the population 
over these years. Both measures, however, fall between 2004 and 
2006. Another measure of income inequality is the Gini coefficient. 
It rose from 35.6 in 1993 to 39.2 in 2004, but then fell slightly to 37.8 
in 2006. The world average Gini coefficient for 2006 was 46.2, sug-
gesting that income inequality in Vietnam is low by world standards. 
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2.3  Development Co-operation with Vietnam5
2.3.1 Official Development Assistance Levels
Foreign development aid donors were active in both North 
 Vietnam and South Vietnam from 1954. Total official development 
assistance (ODA) from OECD member countries increased in vol-
ume rapidly during the early 1960s, reaching $2.77 billion in 1966, 
the highest annual volume of ODA ever received by Vietnam. Nine-
ty percent of ODA during these years came from the United States. 
As shown in Figure 2.6, ODA varied substantially from year to year 
until 1974, but then fell substantially to $640 million in 1976, largely 
due to the scaling-down of the level of support to South Vietnam 
from the United States. Support from the United States was eventu-
ally withdrawn in 1975 and fell to zero in 1977. ODA to Vietnam 
rose again in 1977 and 1978, reaching $US1.1 billion in the second 
of these years. It then fell again, reaching its lowest post-1960 level in 
1989, when it fell to $US199million. From then total ODA to Viet-
nam increased substantially, reaching in $US2.7 and $US2.6 billion 
in 2007 and 2008, respectively. Much of the upward trend is due to 
support from bilateral DAC donors, although multilateral support 
also follows a strong upward trend from the early 1990s.
Swedish development co-operation with Vietnam commenced in 
1967. Small amounts of ODA were provided in the early years of this 
co-operation, with none being provided in 1971. From 1973 Swedish 
ODA to Vietnam rapidly increased, with Sweden soon becoming the 
biggest donor of aid to Vietnam following the withdrawal of the Unit-
ed States. Swedish ODA to Vietnam was $US157 million in 1975, and 
reached its highest level of $US309 million in 1977. Vietnamese ODA 
receipts from Sweden of no less than $US100 million were provided 
up to 1986, and since then have hovered between $US87 and $US28 
million dollars per year. This information is shown in Figure 2.6.
5 Data presented in this section are taken from the OECD DAC (OECD, 2011). 
The earliest aid data published by the OECD are for the year 1960, hence 
the coverage of this section. The unit of currency referred to is the United 
States dollar. All aid dollar amounts are in constant 2008 prices. No account 
is taken of aid to Vietnam from the former Soviet Union and other Eastern 
Bloc countries. During the second five year plan development aid from the 
Soviet Union was thought to be in the range of $US10 to $US14 billion in 
2008 prices, although estimates vary. These amounts are roughly 2.5 to 3.5 
times the level of ODA from all DAC and multilateral agencies during this 
period. The report returns to this issue in Chapter 3.
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Vietnam has received bilateral ODA from each of the 23 current 
DAC member countries. As shown in Table 2.1, the top three donors 
in terms of ODA volume since 1960 have been the United States, 
Japan and Sweden. These donors have provided more than 75 per-
cent of Vietnam’s bilateral ODA since 1960. The United States has 
been by far the largest donor, providing just over to half of all bilat-
eral ODA to Vietnam, owing largely to its dominance as a donor in 
the 1960s. During this decade the United States provided 95 percent 
of all bilateral ODA to Vietnam. 
More pertinent to this evaluation are ODA levels since 1976, after 
the end of the Indo-Chinese war and the withdrawal of the United 
States. During the period 1976 to 2008, Sweden is the second largest 
provider of bilateral aid to Vietnam, providing 13.42 percent of total 
such flows. This is shown in the last two columns of Table 2.1. By far 
the largest donor over this period has been Japan, which has provided 
just under 38 percent of total bilateral aid to Vietnam.
Sweden was the second largest ODA donor to Vietnam in the 
1970s, the largest in the 1980s and the fourth largest in the 1990s6. 
Indeed Sweden dominated Vietnamese ODA receipts in the 1980s, 
providing 64 percent of total bilateral ODA to Vietnam during this 
decade. This represents 36 percent of total (bilateral and multilater-
6 This discussion takes no account of aid from the Soviet Union, which is not 
included by the OECD in ODA statistics. Much of what was provided as aid 
by the Soviet Union would in all probability not qualify as ODA based on 
OECD criteria.
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al) ODA flowing to Vietnam during this decade. The next largest 
donor in terms of volume was Finland, which provided 10 percent of 
Vietnam’s total bilateral ODA receipts.
The level of ODA to a developing country is important in its own 
right from various perspectives, but what matters from a development 
impact perspective is its level relative to various national aggregates 
of the recipient country, including GNI, GDP and population size. 
ODA relative to these aggregates for Vietnam is shown in Figure 2.8. 
Putting aside the huge United States-driven declines in aid levels rela-
tive to population from the mid-1960s to mid-1970s, the main mes-
sage coming from this figure is that relative to these aggregates ODA 
volumes to Vietnam are reasonably large by international standards. 
In the case of GDP, developing countries typically receive ODA levels 
that are between one and two percent of their GDPs and no more 
than $50 per capita.7 Sub-Saharan Africa in the past few years has 
received around $40 per capita. ODA relative to GDP received by 
Vietnam averaged 4.4 percent of GDP between 1985 and 2008, and 
ODA per capita from 1977 (when United States ODA fell to zero) to 
2008 averaged $16, and after trending upward since the early 1990s 
reached 31.6 percent in 2007. With these levels of ODA one can rea-
sonably expect to observe some relationship with national develop-
ment outcomes, good or bad depending on the quality of the ODA.
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Developing countries, receive foreign inflows from a variety of 
sources. Vietnam is no exception. Inflows other than ODA can poten-
tially complement aid in a way that enhances its development impact. 
Vietnamese ODA receipts, along with inflows of other official financ-
ing (OOF) and total private inflows are shown in Figure 2.8. OOF is 
other developmental flows from foreign governments and multilateral 
organisations that are not sufficiently concessional to be defined as 
ODA. Total private inflows include foreign direct investment, private 
lending and remittances. Each has the potential to have pro-develop-
ment impacts, augmenting ODA. A key message from Figure 2.8 is 
that Vietnam has, in general, been reliant on ODA relative to other 
foreign inflows and, purely on the basis of volumes, that potential for 
the above mentioned complementarity is limited. This is not to say that 
the potential development impact of ODA is limited, just that if any for-
eign inflow is likely to have had a significant development impact it is 
likely to be this inflow and not the others. Also evident from Figure 2.8 
is the huge growth in private foreign inflows from 2006 onward. These 
inflows for the first time exceeded ODA in terms of volume in 2006. It 
is widely expected that these inflows will play a very important role in 
the Vietnamese economy in the years to come.
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2.3.2 ODA Composition by Sector
The sectoral composition of all donor and Swedish ODA to Viet-
nam is shown in Tables 2.2 and 2.3.8The sectors are those defined by 
the OECD DAC. Economic Infrastructure and Services has been by 
far the most supported sector by all donors combined. Debt Action 
and Government and Civil Society are the second and third most 
8 Data on the composition of ODA by sector for years prior to 1995 are not 
published by the OECD DAC. The data shown in Tables 2.2 and 2.3 relate to 
ODA commitments. Disbursement data are only available from 2002 onwards.
Table 2.2 Sectoral Composition of All Donor ODA to Vietnam,  
1995 to 2008
Sector Percentage of Total oDA
1995 to 
2000
2001 to 
2005
2006 to 
2008
1995 to 
2008
Education 7.25 8.16 8.71 8.07
Health 5.11 5.31 6.33 5.57
Population & Reproductive Health 2.53 4.09 6.55 4.42
Water & Sanitation 7.16 4.80 5.43 5.68
Government & Civil Society 6.51 10.79 12.70 10.17
Other Social Infrastructure  
& Services
3.99 4.89 4.51 4.51
Economic Infrastructure  
& Services
25.32 16.24 16.41 18.90
Agriculture, Forestry and Fishing 8.57 4.99 5.12 6.06
Industry, Mining & Construction 2.41 2.37 1.58 2.13
Trade Policies & Regulation 0.28 0.80 0.86 0.67
Tourism 0.11 0.09 0.16 0.12
Multisector/Cross Cutting 9.59 7.82 7.70 8.29
Commodity Aid/General  
Program Assistance
9.87 7.68 6.01 7.78
Debt Action 6.74 15.06 10.95 11.37
Humanitarian Aid 7.03 8.03 7.27 7.50
Donor Administrative Costs 0.97 2.55 4.10 2.59
NGO Support 0.93 1.44 1.46 1.30
Refugees 0.65 1.44 1.66 1.28
Sectors Not Specified 2.24 1.60 1.19 1.65
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sectors, respectively, by all donors combined. The three most heavily 
supported sectors by Sweden are Government and Civil Society, 
Multisector/Cross Cutting and Humanitarian aid. Included in the 
Multisector/Cross Cuttting is support for the environment.
A list of the programs and projects implemented under the devel-
opment co-operation program between Sweden and Vietnam was 
prepared under part one of the evaluation process and is provided in 
Appendix E.
Table 2.3 Sectoral Composition of Swedish ODA to Vietnam,  
1995 to 2008
Sector Percentage of Total Swedish oDA
1995 to 
2000
2001 to 
2005
2006 to 
2008
1995 to 
2008
Education 7.07 5.83 4.49 5.76
Health 6.26 4.68 5.75 5.47
Population & Reproductive Health 3.20 3.84 2.77 3.32
Water & Sanitation 4.29 3.58 2.66 3.49
Government & Civil Society 15.35 17.66 23.16 18.73
Other Social Infrastructure & Ser-
vices
4.45 4.16 3.82 4.14
Economic Infrastructure & Ser-
vices
13.09 7.75 6.33 8.85
Agriculture, Forestry and Fishing 6.11 2.96 4.30 4.29
Industry, Mining & Construction 1.38 0.21 1.24 0.87
Trade Policies & Regulation 0.30 0.70 1.29 0.77
Tourism 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Multisector/Cross Cutting 14.63 11.14 6.80 10.78
Commodity Aid/General Program 
Assistance
5.58 5.28 4.15 5.01
Debt Action 0.39 2.95 5.08 2.88
Humanitarian Aid 16.47 12.64 11.48 13.39
Donor Administrative Costs 0.17 4.07 6.21 3.61
NGO Support 5.33 7.18 0.63 4.58
Refugees 0.01 6.10 10.15 5.62
Sectors Not Specified 3.00 5.10 4.19 4.20
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2.3.3 Aid Supported Activities
Aid can be examined not only in dollar amounts but also in terms 
of the number of activities that donors support.9 This can be impor-
tant from a number of respects. Donors might support activities that 
are too large, thereby encountering a diminishing margin of impact. 
Donors might also spread their aid too thinly, supporting too many 
small activities with potentially negligible development impacts. Rec-
ognising that most activities impose some burden on partner coun-
tries and that all countries have capacity constraints, funding large 
numbers of activities can have adverse development consequences. 
While each of these concerns has been expressed by the international 
development community, it is the last that has been uppermost in the 
minds of donors in recent years, particularly considering the prolifer-
ation of donor financed activities in the last 10 or so years.
Data on the number of aid supported activities in Vietnam are 
shown in Figures 2.9 and 2.10. The first of these figures provides 
information on the number of aid supported activities since 1977.10 
The number of Swedish supported activities in Vietnam has been rel-
atively stable, not exceeding 100 activities per year, between 1977 and 
2001. This number then jumped substantially in 2002, peaking at 346 
activities in 2004. The yearly average during 1977 to 2008 has been 
61 activities. The number of all donor supported activities has, how-
ever, proliferated enormously. It has risen from 40 in 1977 to 2,946 in 
2008. The number of donors active in Vietnam has risen from 12 in 
1977 to 32 in 2008. As is evident from the stable average number of 
donor supported activities in Vietnam, which has never exceeded 92 
9 An aid activity is defined by the OECD DAC as a discrete entity or exercise 
that can take many forms, such as a project or a program or a component 
thereof, a cash transfer or delivery of goods, a training course, a research pro-
ject, a debt relief operation or a contribution to a non-governmental organisa-
tion (OECD, 2011). Each activity will have its own budget, is assigned a DAC 
purpose code and reported by agencies to the OECD DAC. Care needs to 
be assigned when reading activities data, especially regarding comparisons 
across donors owing to different reporting practices. Some donors (such as the 
EU) can report a number of activities as a single activity or vice versa, breaking 
up a program or project into numerous individual activities.
10 OECD (2010) only provides information at the activity level for 1995 on-
wards. Earlier versions of OECD (2010) did report such data for earlier years. 
The data shown in Figures 2.10 and 2.11 and Figure A2.6 for 1977 to 1994 
were obtained from these earlier versions some years ago for a previous study 
in which one of the authors of this report was involved.
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per year, it is primarily the increase in the number of donors in the 
country that has driven the proliferation. Irrespective of what drove 
the proliferation, it certainly raises questions regarding development 
effectiveness of aid to Vietnam.11 This is not a criticism of Swedish aid 
to Vietnam, but of the overall donor effort in this country.
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Figure 2.9 Aid Supported Activities, Vietnam, 1977 to 2008
An extremely interesting related statistic concerns the financial size 
(or level of donor spending on) aid activities in Vietnam. This size 
has plummeted spectacularly since 1977, as Figure 2.10 makes clear. 
This is evidence of what is referred to in the literature as aid frag-
mentation, which is considered undesirable from an aid effectiveness 
perspective given the fixed costs associated with aid activities. Due 
to these costs, an increasing burden of administering aid activities is 
imposed on recipient countries which can distract their attention 
away from other priorities, including domestic resource mobilisation 
and other aspects of budgetary planning and implementation. The 
average financial size of all donor activities has fallen from $US41 
million to $US1 million between 1981 and 2008. The financial size 
of Swedish aid activities has fallen to a much greater extent, driving 
the overall donor decline. The average size of Swedish aid activities 
11 It should be acknowledged that it is not necessarily the case that all these 
activities will necessarily have been delivered in Vietnam. Some may have 
been delivered in donor countries but allocated to their Vietnam country pro-
grams. These activities are likely to represent only a tiny proportion of total 
activities. It should also be acknowledged that part of the observed increase in 
aid	activities	could	be	due	to	more	comprehensive	reporting.	Yet	even	if	this	is	
accounted for, it would be unlikely in the extreme to alter the conclusion that 
there has been significantly increased proliferation of activities in Vietnam.
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fell from $US181 million in 1977 to $US0.13m in 2008. This in iso-
lation does not bode well for the development effectiveness of Swed-
ish ODA to Vietnam.
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Figure 2.10 Average Financial Size of Aid Supported Activities, 
Vietnam, 1977 to 2008
2.3.4 ODA Predictability
Important pre-requisites for maximising aid effectiveness are the 
predictability and stability of aid over time. Aid predictability is an 
indicator of the Paris Declaration principle of alignment, and an 
important element of AQEF component 3. There are many ways aid 
stability and predictability can be measured, but a widely used and 
easily interpreted measure is the coefficient of variation in aid to the 
recipient country.12 There is no threshold level of stability that deems 
aid especially effective nor any agreed benchmark for donors to reach. 
As shown in Figure 2.11, Sweden’s aid disbursements to Vietnam 
over the period 1960 to 2008 have been less stable statistically than 
aid from all donors to this country. It is also less stable than total aid 
12 See, for example, Gemmell and McGillivray, 1998 and Bulíř and Hamann, 
2001. The coefficient of variation is the standard deviation of aid divided by its 
mean, each for the time period in question. The measure of aid used was Gross 
ODA Disbursements at constant 2008 prices. Disbursements are used, as op-
posed to commitments, on the grounds that they represent the actual amount 
of aid received by the partner country, which is what matters most for aid effec-
tiveness. Commitments tend to be more stable and predictable over time than 
disbursements given that they result from conscious programming decisions. 
The measure of predictability preferred by the OECD DAC in monitoring 
progress under the Paris Declaration is the proportion of aid disbursed within 
the fiscal year for which it was scheduled. This measure is not currently used 
mainly because it is not possible to get historical information on scheduled aid.
50
PArT oNe – SweDISh DeVeloPmeNT Co-oPerATIoN wITh VIeTNAm: SeTTINg The CoNTexT
to all developing countries. It is also evident that there is greater 
instability in total (all donor) aid to Vietnam than aid to all other 
developing countries during 1960 to 2008.While this is obviously in 
large part due to huge variations in aid to Vietnam during the 
1970s, during the 1980s and 1990s total aid to this country is sub-
stantially more unstable than to the developing world as a whole. 
The relatively large variation in the combined donor and Swedish 
effort in Vietnam suggests that its effectiveness might have been less 
than would otherwise have been the case. 
Aid levels change over time for many reasons and are often driv-
en by changing development conditions within and among coun-
tries. Changes from one year to the next do not necessarily mean 
that they were unanticipated by the recipient. The statistics shown in 
Figure 2.11 and the conclusions based on them should, therefore, be 
interpreted with a degree of caution. In the case of Swedish aid, 
however, there are a number of large reductions in aid from one year 
to the next during the mid-1970s to mid-1980s that seem difficult to 
attribute to changing development conditions or needs within Viet-
nam. These reductions vary from $US31 million in 1974 to $US134 
million in 1978, in constant 2008 prices. 
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Figure 2.11 ODA Instability, 1960 to 2008
2.4 The ODA Enabling Environment in Vietnam
The ability of aid to achieve sustained development results 
depends on many factors. Two especially important factors are the 
capacity of the partner government to efficiently absorb aid for 
development purposes and the quality of a government’s public sec-
tor fiscal management. 
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The capacity of the partner country to efficiently absorb aid is 
assessed against the amount of inflows it receives relative to the size of 
its economy as measured by GDP. International research has found 
that the incremental impact of aid on partner country growth follows 
an inverted U shaped relationship. That is, this impact initially rises 
with increases in aid relative to GDP, reaches a maximum and then 
commences to fall (Feeny and McGillivray, 2011). The fall is attribut-
ed to absorptive capacity constraints within the partner country. 
Feeny and McGillivray (2008) find that the incremental impact of 
aid on growth falls when it reaches 20 percent of GDP and continues 
to decline at all higher levels of aid. This applies on average across 
a diverse sample of aid receiving countries, and not necessarily to all 
countries, including Vietnam. Aid levels that are substantially above 
this level do, however, need to be carefully scrutinised given the 
potential adverse implications for growth and for the multidimen-
sional development achievements that growth can facilitate.
In the Vietnamese case, aid from all donors combined reached 
a maximum of 8.1 percent of GDP in 1994.13 This does not raise 
questions regarding the capacity of the Vietnamese economy to effi-
ciently absorb ODA during this period, and therefore of the develop-
ment effectiveness of these inflows. This is not to say that these 
inflows were effective. Nor does it say anything of the effectiveness of 
Swedish ODA to Vietnam. But it does suggest that on this criterion 
alone the broader enabling environment was conducive to growth 
and related multidimensional outcomes.
The AQEF identifies four key drivers of absorptive capacity. The 
first is concessional borrowing capacity. If a country is close to what 
is considered the limit to what it can efficiently borrow, then its 
capacity to absorb aid is limited and vice versa. The second is human 
capacity, as proxied by the HDI. High human capacity indicates 
a high capacity to efficiently use aid and vice versa. The third driver 
is private sector capacity, as proxied by World Bank IFC doing busi-
ness indicators. This represents the ability of the private sector to 
take advantage of the many opportunities, direct and indirect, of 
aid. The fourth driver is the quality of public sector financial man-
agement (PFM), as proxied by World Bank PEFA and CPIA ratings.
13 GDP data are not available prior to 1985, so assessments for earlier years can-
not be undertaken with (the former year being the first for which GDP data 
are available).
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Vietnamese data on three of these drivers are shown in Figure 
2.12. Data for 1970 to 2008 on human capability capacity and PFM 
capacity are shown, along with data on private sector capacity for 
1994 to 2008. A simple average of each is also shown, and interpret-
ed as aggregate or overall absorptive capacity.14This capacity has 
trended upward during the overall period in question, although fell 
during the early 2000s owing to declines in private sector capacity. 
This is good news, although it only slightly militates against the 
comments made above regarding the aid enabling environment, aid 
proliferation and fragmentation specifically.
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Figure 2.12 ODA Absorptive Capacity Drivers, Vietnam, 1970 to 2008
AQEF component 2 – the quality of PFM – has already been partly 
addressed through the investigation of the drivers of absorptive 
capacity. A more thorough analysis of this issue involves assessments 
regarding the extent to which economic policies are effectively built 
into the government budget, the accuracy of recurrent budget 
expenditure and revenue forecasts, transparency of budgets, accura-
cy of reporting of foreign and domestic debt and the extent of on-
budget reporting of donor assistance. Owing to very limited data it is 
not possible to undertake robust and comprehensive analysis of this 
issue, much beyond what is shown in Figure 2.12. This analysis 
points to an overall upward trend in PFM quality from the 1970s.
14 In an ideal situation one would report a weighted average of these drivers. 
Unfortunately there is no agreement among specialists as to what the weights 
to each driver should be. A simple average is taken on these grounds, as it is 
the least contentious option. The average shown in Figure 2.13 is based on 
human capability and PFM capacities up to 1983 and all three capacities 
under consideration from 1984 onwards. Note also that the drivers shown in 
Figure 2.12 as expressed as four year moving averages.
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2.5 Effectiveness of Aid to Vietnam: Some Stylized Facts
What does the preceding overview suggest about the donor effort 
in Vietnam since the mid-1960s, and in particular of Swedish devel-
opment co-operation with this country? The following characteris-
tics were observed:
•	 After	suffering	extensive	damage	during	the	Second	Indo-Chinese	
War, Vietnam has achieved extremely impressive multidimensional 
development and poverty reduction outcomes since the early 1990s;
•	 It	has	achieved	very	high	levels	of	economic	growth	since	the	ear-
ly 1980s;
•	 Doi	Moi	appears	to	have	been	extremely	successful	and	is	associ-
ated with these levels of economic growth; 
•	 Vietnam	has	received	reasonably	high	levels	of	aid	relative	to	
population and GDP, and also relative to other foreign inflows;
•	 Year-on-year	increases	in	Vietnamese	aid	receipts	have	not	been	
as stable as could have possibly otherwise been the case;
•	 There	has	been	significant	proliferation	and	fragmentation	of	aid	
financed activities in Vietnam;
•	 The	level	of	aid	to	Vietnam	has	been	such	that	it	would	be	rea-
sonable to look for attribution between these inflows and national 
development outcomes in this country;
•	 The	total	aid	to	Vietnam	has	not	been	at	a level	that	was	too	high	
for its economy to efficiently absorb; and
•	 Public	financial	management	(PFM)	quality	has	trended	upward	
in Vietnam since the 1970s.
Most of these characteristics are pleasing from a development effec-
tiveness perspective. While alone they clearly do not provide suffi-
cient evidence that aid to Vietnam has been effective, they do paint 
an optimistic view of development effectiveness in the country. The 
proliferation and fragmentation of aid, including in particular the 
fragmentation of Swedish aid, are not consistent with effective aid, 
and suggest that one should not rush to causally link the improved 
multidimensional outcomes in Vietnam to the ODA it has received.
What might this imply for Swedish development co-operation? 
Recall that Sweden has been a major donor of ODA to Vietnam. 
This was especially so during the 1980s when it was the largest bilat-
eral donor to Vietnam and provider of a massive 64 percent of total 
Vietnamese aid receipts. While this does not ensure that Swedish aid 
has had national level impacts in Vietnam, it does provide grounds 
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for investigating whether such impacts have occurred, especially if it 
can be shown that Sweden supported highly strategic, pivotal activi-
ties that were efficiently delivered. This is the underlying focus on 
much of what follows in this report.
Against this backdrop it is useful to examine more closely the 
association between ODA to Vietnam and its development achieve-
ments in human development, health, education and income. A num-
ber of associations, in the form of scatter plots, were examined. The 
associations examined were ODA and the HDI, ODA and life expec-
tancy, ODA and adult literacy, ODA and school enrolment, ODA 
and GDP per capita and ODA and GDP per capita growth. These 
development achievement variables have been used quite extensively 
in the research literature on aid effectiveness, in studies of aid and per 
capita GDP growth in particular.15 Shown below in Figure 2.13 is the 
scatter plot showing the statistical association between per capita 
ODA and human development in Vietnam. It is evident from the fig-
ure that ODA and human development are strongly associated, with 
higher levels of the former being associated with higher achievement 
in the latter and vice versa. Indeed, as is evident from the R2 statistic, 
91 percent of the variation in human development in Vietnam during 
1980 to 2008 is predicted by the level of ODA. Such a high level of 
prediction is most uncommon, based on similar statistical investiga-
tion for other aid receiving countries. 
15 Scatter plots using other measures of aid, including aid relative to GDP, were 
also produced. Various time lags were also assigned to the aid variables on the 
grounds that the impact of aid on development achievements can take time 
to observe, especially in the case of health and education outcomes. Virtually 
the same picture emerges from these scatter plots. There are many different 
criteria that can be used to determine the type of regression line fitted that 
is fitted to the data. It can be a straight line, reflecting a linear relationship 
between the two variables in question. Alternatively it can be curved, reflecting 
a logarithmic, exponential or other non-linear functional relationship between 
these variables. A common criterion is to select the regression line that provides 
was chosen on the basis of that which provided the highest R2, which is the 
percentage of variation in the variable on the vertical axis that is predicated by 
the variable on the horizontal axis. This report has been restrict to lines of best 
fit that correspond to either a linear or logarithmic relationship. Not only are 
these functional forms easy to interpret and make intuitive sense, but are con-
sistent with relationships found in more complex and empirically rigorous aid 
effectiveness research. It was also the case, coincidently, that these functional 
forms usually provided higher R2s than other alternatives. 
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Figure 2.13 ODA and Human Development, Vietnam, 1980 to 2008
ODA to Vietnam is also strongly associated with better health, 
greater knowledge and higher incomes, based on scatter plots 
obtained for these development indicators.16 This is obviously good 
news from a multidimensional development effectiveness perspec-
tive. Each of these associations is statistically significant, based on 
standard tests. These associations should in no way be taken as evi-
dence of casual relationships for a variety of methodological reasons. 
There is, in particular, no attempt to control for other determinants 
of the development achievement variables or to allow for endogeni-
ety, in which aid both influences and is influenced by these variables. 
The scatter plots do, however, point to stylised facts about simple 
associations between aid and development achievements in Vietnam 
that are highly consistent with effective development co-operation. 
Indeed the closeness of the associations shown is quite striking by the 
standards of those prevailing in other developing countries and 
would appear to be difficult to dismiss as mere statistical artefacts. 
They send a potentially very positive message about aid effectiveness 
in Vietnam. This does not necessarily mean that Swedish aid was 
effective but reinforces the contention that knowledge of this broader 
context should inform the interpretation of the evaluation results 
that follow in this report.
16 ODA levels to Vietnam predict 82, 85 and 84 percent of the respective year 
on year variation in life expectancy, adult literacy and GDP per capita. The 
corresponding scatter plots are available on request from the authors of this 
report, who can be contacted via Sida. 
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Part Two – Swedish Development 
Co-operation With Vietnam
3.  rEbuiLDing inFrASTruCTurE  
AnD SuPPOrTing ECOnOMiC 
DEVELOPMEnT: 1969 TO 1985
3.1 Political and Economic Synopsis
The first period of Swedish development co-operation with Viet-
nam unfolded amid considerable turbulence. In 1969 Vietnam was 
a country divided and at war. The North (the Democratic Republic 
of Vietnam – DRV), with the support of the Soviet Union and China 
was engaged in a struggle for unification with the South (the Repub-
lic of Vietnam, as it was known), which received massive military aid 
from the US and several other western nations. The US had begun 
bombing the DRV in 1965 causing widespread damage to economic 
infrastructure and considerable loss of life.
In April 1975, after several attempts at negotiations, the DRV 
overran Saigon (now Ho Chi Minh City), the capital of South Viet-
nam bringing to an end the conflict and the prolonged division of 
the country. The victory of the DRV occurred against the backdrop 
of increasing opposition to the Second Indo-Chinese War in the US 
as well as many other western nations. However, large numbers of 
southern Vietnamese had fled the country fearing persecution.
The late 1970s witnessed the outbreak of further conflict and 
international isolation. The victory of the DRV in 1975 was followed 
by growing tension with neighbouring Kampuchea (now Cambo-
dia). In December 1978 Vietnam invaded Kampuchea, overthrew 
the Khmer Rouge regime, and commenced what was to become 
a ten year occupation. This move triggered the retaliatory invasion 
of northern Vietnam by China (an ally of the Khmer Rouge regime 
at that time) in 1979. While this attack was repelled, it caused fur-
ther damage and loss of life to the Northern provinces. At the same 
time a large proportion of the international community admonished 
Vietnam’s ‘aggression’ and cut off all diplomatic relations.
Economically, development in both the southern and northern 
parts of the country was adversely affected by these events. The 
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Vietnamese Communist Party (VCP) had instituted a planned 
approach to economic management in the north based around the 
creation of five-year plans since the early 1960s. As was mentioned 
in Chapter 2, the second five-year plan was launched in 1976 to 
guide the country’s development over the first years of unification, 
after a period in which the economy was on a war footing. The sec-
ond five-year plan set ambitious goals for growth and integration of 
the southern parts of the country into the planned economy of the 
north. By the late 1970s however it was clear that objectives of the 
plan had not been achieved and productivity remained low. As also 
noted in Chapter 2, subsequent planning for the period between 
1981 and 1986 was more cautious, and sought a compromise 
between pragmatism and ideological concerns. The seeds of more 
far reaching reforms were sown during this period.
The DRV received substantial economic support from the Soviet 
Union throughout this period. It was pointed out in Chapter 2 that 
estimates of the extent of this support vary, but according to one esti-
mate, this was as high as $US0.7 billion per year during 
1977–1978,rising to more than $US1 billion per year in the early 
1980s (Library of Congress, 1987). Vietnam began to access devel-
opment assistance from multilateral and bilateral sources following 
the end of the war but this was cut off following the invasion of Cam-
bodia in 1978. The outbreak of war between China and Vietnam 
also led to the loss of Chinese aid, reportedly close to $US300 mil-
lion per year in 1977 (Library of Congress, 1987).
3.2 Summary of Swedish Aid during this Period
Official diplomatic relations between Sweden and Vietnam (DRV) 
began in 1969 at the height of the war with the US. Sweden had pro-
vided humanitarian aid in the form of medical supplies and non-ear-
marked cash through the Red Cross since 1967 (Nordic Consulting 
Group, 2010, see also Christian Michelsen Institute, 1999). The advent 
of full diplomatic ties, however, paved the way for the commencement 
of a larger scale program of official development assistance.17
In Sweden, the decision to support Vietnam with an official aid pro-
gram occurred in the context of strong public sentiment, driven by “the 
17 Note that in what follows in this report , the acronym SIDA when discussing 
the Swedish International Development Authority between its inception in 
1965 and before its transformation to Sida in 1995 – the Swedish Interna-
tional Development Co-operation Agency
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image of a poor nation being ravaged by an imperious United States” 
(Christian Michelsen Institute, 1999, p. 23). Political debate in Sweden 
polarised around protecting the relationship with the US on the one 
hand and demonstrating solidarity with Vietnam in the face of US 
aggression on the other. Charismatic figures on the left of the Swedish 
political spectrum, notably Olof Palme, helped galvanise support for 
Swedish aid to North Vietnam with a series of high profile gestures. 
The most famous of these involved Palme marching side-by-side with 
the DRV’s ambassador to Sweden in a protest march in 1968. Capital-
ising on the public mood, in 1969 the Social Democrat-led Govern-
ment announced that DRV would be offered official development assis-
tance. Two weeks after this announcement, the first Vietnamese dele-
gation arrived in Stockholm for initial discussions on the shape of this 
program. In 1970 the Swedish embassy was opened in Hanoi.
The outline of the development co-operation program began to 
emerge in the early 1970s, after arduous negotiations that had taken 
more than two years. Initially, Sweden had indicated a preference 
for flexible forms of development co-operation and had attempted to 
convince the Vietnamese of the merits of such an approach. To 
Swedish officials this seemed an appropriate choice, given the sheer 
magnitude of the knowledge gap that existed on both sides. Howev-
er, the Vietnamese delegation had arrived with a detailed list of pro-
jects and insisted on project aid (Christian Michelsen Institute, 
1999). This made sense from a Vietnamese perspective, since there 
was neither the knowledge of Western capital markets nor the capac-
ity to buy the technology they wanted. Furthermore, project aid 
would include technical assistance, which the Vietnamese side was 
keen to receive. The requests from the Vietnamese delegation priori-
tised agriculture and heavy industries, a reflection the five-year plan 
intended for 1971–76,which had been put on hold through the war 
period. It also reflected prevailing socialist doctrines of economic 
development (Christian Michelsen Institute, 1999). Ultimately plan-
ning proceeded along the lines of project aid.
The centrepiece of development co-operation was a project to 
construct a paper and pulp mill in Bai Bang to the north of Hanoi. 
The original budget for this commitment, as estimated in 1973, was 
770 MSEK (Nordic Consulting Group, 2010). Other assistance was 
negotiated in the health sector (see case study 1, below), while an 
import support program emerged as a key avenue through which 
Vietnam could access an array of goods and services that Sweden 
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could provide. Imports encompassed a wide variety of items to meet 
various industrial needs from pulp (see Sida, 1976) to chlorine tow-
ers (see Sida, 1980). Relations between the two nations in this early 
period were sometimes strained by the very real practical and logis-
tical challenges of administering development co-operation 
between two very different economic and administrative systems. 
Significantly, Sweden was one of only three Western nations that 
did not substantially scale back aid to Vietnam in 1979 in a response 
to the invasion of Cambodia.18 As noted in Chapter 2, Sweden was 
by far the largest ODA donor following the withdrawal of the United 
States, and during 1980 to 1989 provided 64 per cent of total bilat-
eral ODA to Vietnam.
Two key examples of Sweden’s support to Vietnam during this ini-
tial period are explored in the remainder of this chapter. The first, 
a ‘thematic case study’ (see chapter 1 for an explanation of thematic 
and longitudinal case studies) provides a summarised account of Swe-
den’s support to the health sector. The second, is the first of three case 
studies (one in each of the three time periods covered in this study) 
tracing the evolution of Swedish development co-operation from an 
economic development project (Bai Bang) to a natural resource man-
agement project (the Forest Co-operation Program) and eventually to 
participatory poverty alleviation (Chia Se, via the Mountain Rural 
Development Program). Finally, this chapter concludes with some 
observations about thematic issues emerging from this period that 
have significance for the evaluation questions posed in this study.
3.3 Case Study 1 – Sweden’s Early Support to the Health Sector
3.3.1 Development Context
As noted above, the decision to support Vietnam in the late 1960s 
was an expression of Swedish solidarity during the conflict between 
18 An interesting story was told to the evaluation team by a long standing mem-
ber of the VCP who recalled being sent by Prime Minister Pham Van Dong 
to Sweden in 1978 to discuss the reasons behind Vietnam’s invasion of Cam-
bodia and to seek ongoing Swedish support. He briefed Swedish politicians 
on the situation in Cambodia, which he had seen himself, and explained that 
Vietnam intended to liberate the Cambodian people from the Khmer Rouge, 
who unbeknownst to many westerners at the time were killing thousands 
in Cambodia. Swedish officials criticised the Vietnamese act of aggression 
but also indicated their ongoing support and explained they understood the 
reasons behind, what they referred to as Vietnam’s ‘enlightened aggression’.
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DRV and the US. Diplomatic relations between Sweden and Vietnam 
were formalised in the early 1970s, as the War was approaching its 
conclusion, providing the foundation for development co-operation.
The development challenges facing Vietnam at this time were 
formidable. Infrastructure had sustained widespread damage while 
the economy was thought to exhibit minimal rates of growth. The 
vast majority of the population lived in income poverty and health 
achievements lagged behind those of other developing countries.
One event galvanised widespread Swedish support for Vietnam, 
and the health sector in particular. In December 1972, Bac Mai 
Hospital in Hanoi sustained damage during a US bombing raid. 
The “Christmas Bombings”, as this incident was nicknamed in Swe-
den, caused widespread outrage and demonstrations against the US. 
Public anger became focused on collecting funds to rebuild the dam-
aged hospital (Sida, 1998).
Against this backdrop, in 1973 the first Swedish delegation 
arrived in Vietnam to hold initial consultations on health sector sup-
port. Later that year a Vietnamese delegation from the Ministry of 
Health travelled to Sweden to sign the first bilateral agreement for 
development co-operation in the health sector. The first decision was 
to build a children’s hospital in Hanoi. These plans were extended 
soon after to the construction of another hospital for miners at Uong 
Bi, Quang Ninh Province.
3.3.2 What was intended? The Objectives
As the above discussion suggests, Sweden’s development co-oper-
ation was a key avenue to express solidarity with the people of Viet-
nam. This was important domestically, but also internationally and 
within Vietnam as a concrete demonstration of Sweden’s foreign 
policy (Christian Michelsen Institute, 1999). As such, from a strate-
gic perspective the most important objective was implicit – to show-
case this policy stance.
Minutes from discussions between Vietnamese and Swedish delega-
tions reveal a focus on the technical details of the health projects (see for 
example Sida, 1975). From an operational perspective the objectives 
pursued in these discussions were simple: the two hospitals were to be 
constructed within the planned timeframe and budget. Systematic 
methods of project planning such as the logical frame approach were 
not widely used at the time, and thus there is little evidence in early dis-
cussions of objectives beyond the construction of the hospital buildings. 
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3.3.3 What was done? Implementation
Construction of the Children’s Hospital in Hanoi began in 1975, 
shortly after the conclusion of the war. Minutes from early discus-
sions are indicative of the challenges of early development co-opera-
tion between two countries with very limited knowledge of the sys-
tems and organisational arrangements that prevailed on each side. 
The Vietnamese side submitted an organisational chart to the Swed-
ish side to help explain the organisational setup. At the same time, 
the Vietnamese side were focused on obtaining more detailed esti-
mates of the costs involved. Construction activities were supervised 
by Swedish experts from the firm Hifab, and throughout much of 
1975, the main activities involved building camps to house them. 
These camps involved significant investment and of themselves 
involved considerable construction activity.
The construction phase for both hospitals began in earnest in 
1976. Initial cost estimates for construction put forward in the dis-
cussions from May that year were 75 MSEK for the Children’s Hos-
pital and 50 MSEK for the Hospital at Uong Bi (Sida, 1976). The 
Swedish delegation raised the prospect of training for staff that 
would use and maintain the sophisticated equipment that had been 
supplied, emphasizing that such a program would be essential to the 
successful operation of the hospitals. However, it was agreed at that 
stage that the cost of the training program would be difficult to esti-
mate so these were not included in initial estimates.
Overall, the construction phase of both projects proceeded 
according to schedule and within budget – notwithstanding several 
upward revisions of the budgets and extensions of the original work-
plans. The Children’s Hospital was completed by late 1980, receiv-
ing its first patient in October of that year. It was officially inaugu-
rated in early 1981. The total cost of construction was 135.5 MSEK, 
reportedly slightly over budget. The General Hospital at Uong Bi 
was complete one year later, at a cost of 100 MSEK; apparently well 
within the final budget (Sida, 1981).19
In many respects, the greatest challenges were in the operational 
phase. Discussions between 1981 and 1983 highlighted a number of 
persistent difficulties including the timely supply of health equip-
ment through the port of Haiphong, maintenance of the buildings, 
19 These judgements ref lect the assessment of Swedish officials in minutes of 
review meetings at the time. See Sida, 1981.
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and organisational capacity. Some of the challenges arose from the 
planned nature of the Vietnamese economy during this time, which 
meant that all transactions of goods and services were subject to 
administrative control. The Swedish delegation constantly raised 
these logistical difficulties during meetings, occasionally leading to 
tense exchanges. For the most part, however, relationships between 
the Swedish and Vietnamese were cordial and constructive.
Problems with developing the human resource capacity required 
to operate the hospitals at full capacity were particularly thorny. 
A shortage of trained staff at the Children’s Hospital was frequently 
raised (See for example Sida, 1981a and 1981c). In some cases staff 
that had been trained through the hospital projects had been trans-
ferred to other areas, leading to an insistence from Sida that this be 
addressed (Sida, 1981b). Some capacity problems affected the main-
tenance and functionality of the hospital buildings. Training in the 
maintenance and operation of equipment and buildings had been 
provided to staff of the Vietnamese companies involved in the con-
struction process. After the Swedish advisers left, these workers 
were later replaced by others from the Ministry of Health who did 
not possess the skills required (Sida, 1981). These issues were raised 
during quarterly reviews between Sida and GoV representatives 
with both sides committing to working through the various chal-
lenges. Sweden continued to support the operational aspects of the 
two hospitals until 1999, when support was phased out.
3.3.4 What was the Result?
There is little doubt that the support provided to the construction 
of the Children’s Hospital in Hanoi and the General Hospital at Uong 
Bi has been a successful and lasting demonstration of Sweden’s solidar-
ity with Vietnam. The two hospitals, particularly the Children’s Hos-
pital, continue to have symbolic resonance within both countries. The 
former Deputy Head of the Planning Department in the Ministry of 
Health captured something of this sentiment during an interview in 
1998 when he explained how the hospitals have done a lot for Swe-
den’s image: “Nobody says ‘The Institution for Children’ but quite 
simply call it the ‘Swedish children’s hospital’”, he stated (Sida, 1998). 
This perspective was echoed by the present Director of the hospital, 
who felt that Sweden was the only donor who would have provided 
such support at the time. There is particularly deep respect, he said, 
and gratitude for Olof Palme, the Swedish Prime Minister during the 
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time, whose photo now hangs in the hospital board room.20 From the 
perspective of Sweden’s strategic objective, the support to the two hos-
pitals has been a resounding success.
These remarks are not to suggest that the public health effects of 
the hospitals were of secondary importance. Rather, the choice of con-
structing hospitals, especially the Children’s hospital, is likely to have 
reflected the deep humanitarian concern within Sweden. Regardless, 
today the Children’s Hospital in Hanoi is the leading paediatric hospi-
tal in the country, while Uong Bi is apparently widely regarded as the 
best general hospital in Vietnam (Sida, 1998). Clearly, Sweden’s sup-
port has resulted in the establishment of two high quality hospitals.
From an operational perspective, the projects were completed largely 
on time and within budget. This result in itself is a remarkable achieve-
ment, especially at such an early stage in the development co-operation 
relationship when there was limited knowledge of either side’s system. 
From an operational standpoint, the construction phase was a success.
However, the challenge of developing sustainable operational 
capacity was very much underestimated by both sides. Former Sida 
officials interviewed for the present study admitted that Sweden had 
overestimated Vietnamese management capacity at the time. As 
a result of these constraints, the hospitals operated at much less than 
full capacity during the early years and initial patient numbers were 
quite limited (see for example Sida, 1981). The costs associated with 
operating a hospital of such standard were high. In 1999, when Sida 
assistance was phased out, these operational costs remained a con-
cern for the Ministry of Health (Sida, 1998). Nevertheless, it is evident 
from the condition of the hospital today that the Ministry of Health 
and GoV have succeeded in overcoming many of these obstacles.
3.4 Case Study 2: ‘Bai Bang and the Side-projects’:  
The Broadening of Sweden’s Rural Development Assistance
3.4.1 The Development Context
This case study is the first of three that collectively trace the story 
of the transition of Sweden’s development co-operation from the 
construction of the pulp and paper mill in Bai Bang, to a poverty 
alleviation and participatory governance program. As such, these 
case studies unfold amid a constantly evolving political and 
20 Interview with Professor Liem, Director of the Vietnam National Paediatric 
Hospital, Hanoi, 18/3/2011.
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economic context – from the cut and thrust of Cold War geopolitics 
during the 1970s to economic transition over the 1980s and 1990s 
and the Vietnamese policy priorities of more recent years. It is there-
fore more accurate to refer to several contexts.
Nevertheless, the logical starting point for a discussion of context 
must be Sweden’s foreign policy stance during the war in Vietnam. It 
is here that the seeds of Sweden’s involvement in development co-oper-
ation in natural resources management were first sown. As discussed 
earlier in this chapter, during the late 1960s the Swedish Government 
expressed strong opposition to the US involvement in the war in Viet-
nam. To a large extent, this policy reflected a desire to demonstrate 
solidarity with a range of post-colonial struggles across the globe. The 
establishment of diplomatic relations in 1969 was followed later the 
same year by the announcement of Swedish aid. The construction of 
a paper and pulp mill at Bai Bang became by far the largest and most 
significant element of this development program. More than any other 
single project during this time, the Bai Bang Paper and Pulp Mill was 
intended to be a concrete expression of Sweden’s policy.21
3.4.2 From a Paper and Pulp Mill to Broader Rural Development
Much has been written of the construction of the pulp and paper 
mill at Bai Bang – best known as ‘the Bai Bang Project’22. This case 
study does not attempt to retrace this ground. Nevertheless, the Bai 
Bang Project represents the starting point for understanding the evo-
lution of Swedish development assistance to natural resource man-
agement, rural development, and eventually, participatory poverty 
alleviation and decentralised governance. 
The Bai Bang Project stands out for a number of reasons. Firstly, 
it carried enormous symbolic weight, emerging as it did as a direct 
result of Sweden’s policy of solidarity with Vietnam during the con-
flict with the US. Secondly, it remains the largest development pro-
ject ever financed by Sweden. The project consumed 2,766 MSEK 
of funding (at current prices) between 1970 and the end of Swedish 
21 A comprehensive description of the context surrounding the establishment of 
the development co-operation program is presented in Christian Michelsen 
Institute (1999), A Leap of Faith – a story of Swedish aid and paper produc-
tion: the Bai Bang project 1969–1996, Sida, Stockholm 1999
22 See for instance studies on various aspects of the Bai Bang Project by Chris-
tian Michelsen Institute (1999), Centre for International Economics, (1999), 
Bjereld (1998).
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assistance in 1995. Ostensibly, the idea behind the project was sim-
ple. Sweden would provide support to Vietnam to construct an inte-
grated pulp and paper mill that would raise living standards in the 
region. Implementation however, proved considerably more compli-
cated. The project confronted a range of serious challenges from the 
outset, many of which related to the difficulties of co-operation 
between two countries with such different political and economic 
systems. Compounding these difficulties was the considerable 
adverse media coverage in Sweden, much of which focused on vari-
ous controversies that arose including the living conditions of work-
ers at the mill and the surrounding forest areas, and the frequent 
revisions and extensions of the project timeframe that were required 
to overcome the various issues that arose. A study of the conditions 
of women workers at the mill pointed to the particular hardships 
that they faced (see Sevefjord, 1985). Allegations of forced labour in 
the forestry component of the project arose in 1985. Although later 
studies suggested these had been overstated, the issue created a polit-
ical storm in Sweden (Christian Michelsen Institute, 1999, p. 178).
However, it was the emergence of these difficulties during plan-
ning and implementation that gave rise to broader Swedish support 
for the forestry sector in Vietnam. Chief among these issues was the 
adequacy of the wood supply for the integrated paper and pulp mill. 
Wood supply was intrinsically linked with early discussions between 
Sweden and Vietnam over mill capacity, which had become quite 
fractious. Vietnam had favoured construction of a larger capacity 
mill, initially suggesting 100,000 tonnes of annual production, while 
Sweden, concerned about the supply of raw materials, had instead 
pushed for a figure of approximately 50,000 tonnes. In the end the 
consultants engaged by SIDA to design the mill were never given 
access to sufficient data to accurately assess the wood supply from 
the designated raw material areas in northern Vietnam (Christian 
Michelsen Institute, 1999). One of the main consequences of the 
uncertainty over the supply of raw materials was the establishment 
of an extensive forestry program in the surrounding provinces of 
Yen	Bai,	Tuyen	Quang,	Vinh	Phu,	Lao	Cai	and	Ha	Giang.
In retrospect, the forestry activities that emerged during the Bai 
Bang Project marked a significant point in the evolution of Swedish 
support for several reasons. Firstly, it was the start of what was to 
become Sweden’s 30 year involvement in the northern mountain 
provinces. Secondly, it was the starting point for the mandate of 
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SIDA’s involvement beyond the remit of industrial technology specif-
ic to the mill towards broader rural development concerns.
The forestry components of the Bai Bang Project were eventually 
separated into the Plantation and Soil Conservation Program (PSCP), 
which commenced in 1986. The possibility of a plantation project 
“aimed at securing long-term wood supply to the mill” first appeared 
in 1984 during negotiations on development co-operation for 1985/86 
to 1986/87. Initial work concentrated on silviculture, harvesting and 
transport aspects. However, SIDA’s thinking on support to the sector 
had evolved further by 1989, just as the PSCP was approaching its 
conclusion. Discussions between Vietnamese and Swedish delegations 
on development co-operation in that year noted that: 
A continuation of the plantation and soil conservation programme should be 
based on a wider concept including both social forestry activities and industrial 
plantations. (Sida, 1989, emphasis added)
The planning of a new forestry program would also take into 
account the experiences of another project – the Forest, Trees, and 
People Project or the ‘FTP Project’. Implemented in the same areas 
as the PSCP, the FTP Project was a co-operative initiative between 
SIDA and FAO which incorporated a major emphasis on the social 
aspects of tree planting and agriculture.
What was behind this embrace of a wider agenda? The rate of 
deforestation had attracted increasing international attention during 
the 1980s, embodied in the launch of the Tropical Action Forestry 
Action Plan (TFAP) by UNDP, the World Bank, FAO, and the 
World Resources Institute in 1985. This concern was accompanied 
by the discrediting of more industrial approaches to forestry. Sweden 
had also been an active participant in the emergence of social forest-
ry – a new approach in 1970s and 80s. These currents of change 
played a major role in shifting SIDA’s thinking on the forestry sector 
towards more people-centred approaches. Finally, it has also been 
suggested that the end of the construction phase of the Bai Bang 
paper and pulp mill in 1985 left considerable “financial room” for 
further SIDA-financed projects and activities in the ‘country frame’ 
(Lindahl et al, 2001). 
3.5 Significance for this Evaluation
The two case studies discussed in this chapter highlight how, in dif-
ferent ways, Sweden’s support emerged from a desire to provide a con-
crete demonstration of solidarity with Vietnam during very difficult 
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circumstances. These projects and the context from which they 
emerged provide an insight to the starting point of the ‘special rela-
tionship’ that subsequently emerged between the two countries. These 
case studies highlight a number of issues that are of relevance to the 
main evaluation questions posed in this report – and are discussed at 
length in Chapters 6 and 7. Some key issues that emerge include:
•	 The	case	study	of	the	two	hospital	construction	projects	is	an	
example of how development co-operation could be highly effec-
tive in contributing to a strategic objective – in this case a con-
crete demonstration of solidarity. While the Bai Bang Project has 
been subject to more controversy, the Children’s hospital retains 
lasting resonance as a symbol of goodwill between the two sides. 
The role of such goodwill should not be underestimated in creat-
ing positive conditions for Sweden’s development co-operation to 
build on in the years to come;
•	 Having	emerged	from	political	and	international	considerations,	it	
is unlikely that the projects funded during this period of develop-
ment co-operation were necessarily targeted at the areas most rel-
evant to poverty reduction. For example, interviews with former 
Swedish officials familiar with the decision admitted that the pri-
mary health care system, rather than two hospitals, may have been 
more appropriate as an initial focus for health sector co-operation;
•	 The	case	study	of	the	two	hospitals	also	highlights	the	prevailing	
focus on infrastructure during this time period (a feature, also, of 
the Bai Bang Project) to the exclusion of more nuanced issues 
relating to capacity development; and
•	 The	case	study	of	the	transition	between	the	Bai	Bang	Project	and	
Forest Co-operation Program shows how a long-term approach, 
when accompanied by a flexible orientation and underpinned by 
sound relationships can lead to the emergence of new ideas.
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4.  SuPPOrTing rEFOrM AnD buiLDing 
inSTiTuTiOnS: 1986 TO 1999
4.1 Political and Economic Synopsis
During the early 1980s Vietnam suffered from poor economic 
growth, agricultural productivity was low, food shortages were 
common, and almost 75 per cent of the population was living in 
income poverty based on the national poverty line. (Van Dongeet 
al., 1999). Vietnam was heavily dependent on aid from the Soviet 
Union and was strongly influenced by the Soviet central planning 
model (Fforde, 1991). The impact of central planning was variable 
across the country, being stronger in the north, where it had been in 
place since 1954, than in the south where the private sector, though 
illegal, was not as suppressed (Rana, 1995). This so-called ‘variable 
equilibrium’ between plan and market forces across the country was 
a particular characteristic of Vietnamese communism which, 
Fforde(1991) suggests, strongly influenced the trajectory of market-
oriented economic reform that was initiated during this period.
After the war, as the economy stagnated and poverty levels 
increased, the legitimacy of the VCP, which had hitherto been tied 
to its performance in terms of national development, reached a crisis 
stage. In 1986 the Party embarked on a series of market-oriented 
economic reforms – the so-called Doi Moi reforms – as part of an 
effort to recapture that legitimacy (Alagappa, 1995). While the 
reform process was driven by the VCP and other actors within Viet-
nam’s complex polity, the demand for reform emanated from the 
will of the people, a point that is recognised by senior Vietnamese 
policy makers23 and academics alike24. 
The first phase of reform included the creation of a central treasury 
to execute the budget, encouraging the autonomy of State Owned 
Enterprises (SOEs), the removal of some price controls, and the end of 
the government monopoly on foreign trade25 . In the late 1980s, as it 
23 Professor Le Xuan, Director, CIEM, pers comm 22/03/2011
24 Professor Ari Kokkoperscomm 15/04/2011
25 We recognise it is simplistic to suggest that these reforms started in 1986 as 
some reforms did occur earlier, such as the limited reforms in the agriculture 
and SOE sectors in the late 1970s (See Fforde 2009). For the purposes of this 
evaluation it makes sense to focus on the GoV’s major reform policy, Doi Moi, 
which formed the basis of Sweden’s development response.
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became clear Soviet aid would soon decline, the Government initiated 
more dramatic measures including withdrawing from Cambodia and 
normalizing relations with ASEAN and China. This was followed by 
further substantial economic reforms between 1989 and 1991, which 
included the complete removal of price controls in agriculture, the lib-
eralisation of foreign trade and investment, the unification of the 
exchange rate, the streamlining of the public sector and significant tax 
reform (Dollar, 1994). This culminated in a new constitution in 1992 
which provided explicit protection for private property rights and the 
enactment of a wide range of legal frameworks designed to regulate 
and support the emerging market-oriented economy.
Politically however, the VCP remained firmly in charge. Indeed 
the essence of the reforms was to create a ‘socialist-oriented market 
economy’ – a reference to the unique blend of planned and market 
approaches that the Party sought. 
The initial results were promising. Official Vietnamese data 
showed that the economy grew between 2 and 3 per cent per year 
between 1989 and 1991 (Fforde, 1991).26 The challenges associated 
with the mix of state-led and market-led economic approaches were 
also appearing. These included, for example, the ongoing influence 
of the state-sector over the market, which contributed to increasing 
levels of corruption. Inflation also became a concern, rising to quad-
ruple digit levels in 1989 (Fforde, 1991).
Much of the 1990s involved a focus on these emerging challenges 
while maintaining the overall direction of reform. A key element of 
this response included developing institutions appropriate to a market 
economy including a Treasury and Inland Revenue system, banking 
legislation, and affecting the merger of a number of ministries 
(Fforde, 1991). Recognising that the economic transition required 
administrative change, the GoV commenced a program of public 
administration reform (PAR) in the early 1990s. The GoV was assist-
ed in these tasks by international donors, who had reengaged with 
Vietnam following the withdrawal from Cambodia in 1989.
By 1999, the results of the reforms were clear. More than 30,000 
private businesses had been created, and the economy was growing 
26 It has been suggested that this figure was probably an underestimate since 
much of the growth accumulated in the underreported private sector (Fforde, 
1991). This seems to be confirmed by the World Bank data presented in 
Chapter 2, which record the Vietnamese economy growing at between 7.4 
and 6.0 percent during these years. 
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at an annual rate of more than 7 percent. Income poverty declined 
substantially from the early 1990s to mid-2000s, as was noted in 
Chapter 2. Progress did, however, vary geographically, with most 
prosperity concentrated in urban areas, particularly in and around 
Ho Chi Minh City. In general, rural areas also made progress, as 
rural households living in poverty declined to 36 percent in 2002. By 
contrast, concentrations of poverty remained in certain rural areas, 
particularly the northwest, north-central coast, and central high-
lands (Library of Congress, 2005).
4.2 A Summary of Swedish Aid During this Period
Sweden provided $US893 million in ODA to Vietnam over the 14 
year period between 1986 and 1999.27 As discussed in Chapter 2, this 
period witnessed an increase in the number of donors and a prolifera-
tion of development activities. The volume of Swedish development 
co-operation trended downward over this period, falling from $US 
132 million in 1986 to $31 million in 1994 and to $48 million in 1999.
During the latter half of the 1980s Swedish development co-oper-
ation adjusted slowly to the magnitude of the economic reforms 
unfolding. Initially this involved continuation of the support that had 
commenced during the 1970s, albeit expanding, and in some cases 
broadening into related, but new areas. Prominent among these was 
the Bai Bang Project, which continued its difficult operations phase. 
The construction of the two hospitals, completed in the early 1980s, 
had evolved into support for the provision and administration of 
drugs, and had also led to a primary healthcare project in the catch-
ment area of the Uong Bi General Hospital. One major area of sup-
port – energy – had emerged from discussions in 1984.
By 1990, it was apparent that a major economic transition was 
underway and that Sweden was well positioned to support this pro-
cess. This is clear in the annual discussions on development co-oper-
ation in 1990, where it was stated that “The two Delegations agreed 
the main objective of the development co-operation in the forthcom-
ing years would be to support Vietnam to stabilize the economy and 
implement an economic reform program” (Sida, 1990). A compre-
hensive study commissioned by Sida in 1991 argued that Sweden 
focus on supporting the economic transition and abandon or sub-
stantively reshape the projects conceived in the context of a planned 
27 The ODA data quoted in this paragraph are in constant 2008 prices.
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economy (Fforde, 1991). While other donors were reengaging with 
Vietnam during this time, there was a growing awareness that Swe-
den was uniquely well placed as a result of its long-term involvement.
The 1990s saw Swedish development co-operation respond to 
these prompts. A wide ranging program of support to various facets 
of economic reform was launched with involvement from senior levels 
of Sida (see Case Study 3). One consequence of this support was Swe-
den’s involvement in a range of new areas including legal support, tax 
administration, statistics, and Parliament. An embryonic dialogue on 
anti-corruption also commenced, alongside support to the GoV’s 
PAR program. The sensitivity of some of these areas – especially 
legal reform and anti-corruption – provided further evidence that 
Sweden was a ‘trusted partner’. A further characteristic of Swedish 
support was a concern for the impact of the economic reforms on vul-
nerable groups. This emerged strongly during the 1990 discussions, 
where it was noted that this issue would be explored through the 
ongoing projects in forestry, health, and environment (Sida, 1990).
In 1994 the first country strategy with Vietnam was developed to 
guide development co-operation to 1998. Until this point develop-
ment co-operation had been agreed during annual consultations, 
a situation that may have actually facilitated a greater responsiveness 
to Vietnamese priorities28. The 1994–1998 country strategy also 
reflected important concerns from the Swedish Government, in par-
ticular, a reduction in the number sectors. Broadly however, the 
country strategy reaffirmed that support to the economic reform 
program would remain the key focus of development co-operation.
4.3 Case Study 3 – Sweden’s Support to Economic Reform
4.3.1 Sweden’s Development Objective
As the main western donor in Vietnam during the early years of 
Doi Moi, Sweden played a special role in supporting the economic, 
legal and administrative reforms that would provide the foundation 
for the emerging market economy. Because of its long support to 
Vietnam and its continued support during the aid embargo, Sweden 
enjoyed a special relationship with the Government of Vietnam, 
28 See the Phase I Report by Nordic Consulting Group (2010) which mentions 
that Vietnamese delegations tended to be extremely well prepared for such 
negotiations. This perspective also emerges in the account of negotiations 
over the Bai Bang Project provided in Christian Michelsen Institute, 1999.
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a relationship which the senior Vietnamese officials who participat-
ed in this evaluation variously described as being supportive, influ-
ential, flexible and non-judgemental. Indeed for some senior eco-
nomic advisers, Sweden was regarded as Vietnam’s ‘best friend’ dur-
ing the difficult period after the war29. 
One of Sweden’s first major contributions to the reform process 
involved funding an international conference in 1989 to discuss 
models of economic, banking, finance and public administration 
reform. This conference brought together economists from around 
the world and policy makers from the Vietnamese government. Par-
ticipants included David Dollar, Peter Timmer and Professor Ari 
Kokko, who has provided long term advice to Sida on the economic 
trajectory of Vietnam. At that time knowledge of market-based eco-
nomics was extremely limited in Vietnam even in key institutions 
like the Central Institute for Economic Management (CIEM) and 
the National Economics University (NEU). 
In the early 1990s Sweden increased its support for reform and by 
the time Dr Börje Ljunggren became Ambassador in the mid-1990s 
Swedish support was all about reform, as the quote from Dr Ljunggren 
below suggests:
I was with the Director General [of Sida] at that time [1994] and we met 
with the Deputy Prime Minister. Sida had this objective you know: growth, equi­
ty, democracy…….the goals increased every year……..so we said “why not have 
just one goal, how about whatever we do should be in support of the reforms?” 
And when I was here as Ambassador that was my fundamental question…… 
I tried to push the staff members to see the larger picture and we had very good 
donor coordination in those days…we had good contacts, we had one guy, who 
was the head of CIEM [Dr Doanh]…..he was a very clever guy, he was the bro­
ker, so instead, you know a donor can get into all kinds of details, completely 
meaningless and about themselves what they have achieved…..but we didn’t do 
29 The following quote from an interview with Madam Pham Chi Lan, first 
Director General of the Vietnam Chamber of Commerce brings this out “I 
remember I had an interview with an American journalist in 1976, he was 
previously working in the Johnson administration, he asked me which coun-
try was the best friend of Vietnam and I said Sweden, he was very confused 
and thought I would say Russia or China. I said “no Sweden helps us for no 
other reason than to help us, for a self less reason, everyone else, even Russia 
want to get something. Sweden just helped us as Vietnamese people” Madam 
Pham Chi Lan perscomm 23/03/2011.
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that, we wanted to discuss the structure, the reforms and how to intervene in 
 support of that. So I think it was a wonderful time.30
It was in that supportive manner of dialogue, guidance and dem-
onstration that Sweden’s support for reform progressed, as is be dis-
cussed more below. This focus on reform was reflected in the 1994–
1998 Country Strategy, the main thrust of which was to support eco-
nomic, legal and administrative reform processes, including decen-
tralization and to decrease areas of co-operation. 
4.3.2 Implementation
Between 1986 and 2007 Sweden provided over SEK 850m to 
support economic, legal and administrative reform in Vietnam. This 
included approximately SEK 387 million to economic reform, SEK 
276 million to legal reform and SEK 186 million to administrative 
reform. Between 1985 and 1993 Sweden also provided approximate-
ly SEK 638m in import support which aside from the provision of 
foreign exchange during the critical embargo period, also had 
important systemic effects on a government facing a steep learning 
curve with regard to market economics31. If one accepts the view 
that import support helped build the capacity of institutions to adjust 
to a market-based system then the actual contribution of Sweden to 
reforms in Vietnam exceeds SEK 1.5 billion. 
In the area of economic reform, Sweden provided significant and 
long lasting support for CIEM which was, and is, the primary eco-
nomic policy think tank in Vietnam. In the early years of reform the 
Government and Communist Party relied heavily upon CIEM 
(which was originally part of the Communist Party and whose 
Director in the 1980s was in the Politburo) to provide advice on eco-
nomic reform policy options and to conduct research on the impact 
of reform. Knowledge of market-based economics was extremely 
limited within CIEM, and Vietnam more generally during the early 
30 Dr Börje Ljunggren, perscomm, 21/03/2011. Note: it was obviously very 
beneficial at that time to have as Ambassador someone with who had written 
his doctoral dissertation about the challenges of reforms in Vietnam (“The 
Challenge of Reform in Indochina”, Harvard University Press, 1993; also 
published in Vietnamese).
31 As the quote from van Donge et al (1999) explains “this [import support] was 
an important opportunity to engage the government on issues relating to forex 
and financial markets and to provide support to developing systems enabling 
institutions to behave in a more market-oriented manner (for example, techni-
cal assistance given to commercial banks for them to manage forex sales)”.
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stages of reform, and Sida played a pioneer role in providing eco-
nomic training for CIEM economists, many of whom travelled to 
Sweden for training at the Stockholm Economic Institute. Funds 
were also provided for important research on economic growth, 
social welfare, poverty reduction and private sector development. 
This support continued for over 17 years and ended only in 2003. 
The support to build capacity in market-based economics also 
extended to the National Economic University (NEU) where Swe-
den also had a long term presence, delivering over USD 7 million in 
programs over a 15 year period starting in the mid-1990s. The con-
cept of a market economy was very unfamiliar at that time even at 
NEU as the quote below explains:
It was very important to change the way of thinking about economics during 
Doi Moi…..the concept of a market economy was very unfamiliar, as were con­
cepts such as competition and privatization. Nobody in Vietnam at that time 
thought that you could privatize a big bank or that a large petrochemical company 
could be equitized. Privatization was also very sensitive politically and it was 
dangerous for people who pushed that. Knowledge of market economic concepts at 
NEU was very low and virtually non­existent. In NEU we had a structure and 
curriculum that reflected a central command economy. Sida was one of our earli­
est friends and helped us change our way of thinking about market economics32.
Over the years Sweden provided training in market-based eco-
nomics for over 90 people, 30 of whom became the so-called ‘core 
group’ who now hold very senior positions in the Government of 
Vietnam, NEU and as General Managers of large enterprises. 
Swedish support also extended to the funding of a new business 
school at NEU, which provides Bachelors and Masters-level training 
in business to over 270 students each year. The new business school 
is modelled more on a western style teaching approach adopted 
through exposure to Swedish and US universities as opposed to the 
Soviet style model still prominent in other parts of NEU. 
Sweden also provided significant support to tax reform in Vietnam 
for a decade from the early 1990s to 2001. In the late 1980s Vietnam’s 
tax system was very simple and primitive and not of an international 
standard, very little was known about how to structure a market-based 
tax system and the complicated elements that provide the foundation 
for revenue generation under a market-based system such as income 
32 Professor Phan Quang Trung Vice Rector National Economics University 
per comm 23/03/2011.
75
PArT Two – SweDISh DeVeloPmeNT Co-oPerATIoN wITh VIeTNAm
tax, company tax, and import/export tax. Sida is seen by senior Minis-
try of Finance officials as being the most significant foreign supporter 
of tax reform in Vietnam as the quote below suggests:
Sida’s support was important from the outset. They were the first to help us 
with international principles of tax and movement to a market economy. Sida was 
very effective and non­conditional in their support, they just assisted us to do what 
we wanted and there was a high level of ownership on our side. Sida was the first 
ever donor to apply the programme approach, so we can bring into effect our own 
projects; they were very flexible and did not interfere or try to have influence. The 
Dept. of Tax was established in 1991 and Sida supported the Tax Reform project 
from 1991–1994 (Phase 1), they were the only donor. Sida provided us with 
principles of the tax system, research on income tax, applications of the informatics 
system, infrastructure for informatics, propaganda for taxpayers, tax inspection, 
training courses, workshops and seminars. The long term nature of the co­opera­
tion with Sida was the reason for success, plus they adopted a very systematic 
approach by also focussing on things like human resource development33.
In the those legal areas associated with the reform process Swe-
den provided significant resources for the provision of information 
about the full range of new reform-oriented regulations that were 
emerging as a result of reform. This included the development of 
a National Legal Database and the development of a Law Diction-
ary which included comparative definitions for terms hitherto 
unknown to Vietnamese law and policy makers such as those associ-
ated with the market-based economy. The support that was most 
appreciated by the Ministry of Justice however, was that associated 
with the drafting of new laws, and it was not so much the quantum 
of this support that was appreciated but the flexible and supportive 
manner in which it was given at a critical time, as the quote from 
a senior Ministry of Justice officials below suggests:
Sweden also provided support for drafting a series of laws for the Govern­
ment, this included laws on bankruptcy, law on the civil court, competition law 
and law pertaining to economic integration. We received not just expertise from 
Sweden but many other countries and had access to many different legal perspec­
tives which was very important including: Latvia, US, Netherlands, Czech 
Republic, Australia, UK etc. This was very different from CIDA and JICA 
funded projects where we got experts from Canada and Japan only, with the 
Swedish funded project we got access to many different consultants with a broad 
33 Dr Nguyen Than Do, Director General, Ministry of Finance perscomm 
21/03/2011
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range of experience and knowledge of different legal systems, this helped us devel­
op more appropriate laws. 
We were starting from a very low base and it was important to understand 
all the different models out there so we could develop our approach. Donors often 
tried to export their model to us after Doi Moi, but Vietnam needs knowledge, we 
had limited choices. Some lawyers think that we should take foreign models and 
experience in a very selective way e.g. civil law from Japan, Competition law 
from the US, while others think that we should develop our own theory of law, so 
we need to diversify. Sida understood our needs very well and their support was 
very useful and relevant..34
Sida’s support during this critical time was clearly very well regard-
ed within the senior ranks of the Vietnamese administration for its 
long term nature, focus, and flexible, supportive mode of delivery. 
4.3.3  The Results of Sweden’s Support to Economic Reform in 
Vietnam
Sweden contributed to the reform process in a number of ways 
including: through ‘demonstration’, policy dialogue, training and 
research and technical assistance.
As the above discussion highlights Sweden’s support for the 
reform process in Vietnam was highly appreciated by senior GoV 
officials and highly appropriate. Sweden was the only donor provid-
ing support to reform in the critical 1989–1991 period when the 
Vietnamese government were making major decisions about the 
structure and function of their socialist oriented market economy. 
The support to Tax and the training of economists at CIEM and 
NEU are particularly important in this regard.
Aside from its direct support, the special relationship between the 
two countries was also very important to the reform process for 
a number of reasons, not the least of which was the ‘demonstration’ 
effect of Sweden’s model of capitalism. Dr Doanh, former Director 
General of CIEM and senior economic adviser to Prime Minister 
Pham Van Dong summarises this well in the following quote, when 
discussing the attitudes of Party members in the early years of reform: 
I remember people in the Party were very critical of capitalism. They were 
taught that it was the misery of the people. Sweden showed us that this was not 
the case, it was an impressive and fair country, many people in the government 
had travelled to Sweden at that time and it made an impression on them. It was 
34 Senior MoJ official perscomm 28/03/2011
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a well­functioning market economy, with good education, social safety nets, good 
health care and so forth, it was a new philosophy but very convincing for us ... we 
also knew the French economy well but it was not as convincing as the Swedish. 
This certainly influenced the Prime Minister, and after my visit he asked me all 
about my trip and what I thought.35
The manner in which Sweden’s support for reform was delivered 
was also appropriate given the high level of ownership by the Gov-
ernment of Vietnam and the complex political-economic issues asso-
ciated with the reform process. As van Donge et al (1999) suggested 
in their report on Sweden’s Programme Aid during the 1990s 
“….influence in Vietnam is most likely to be had if dialogue is of 
a suggestive (or reflective) rather than directive nature” (Van Donge 
et al 1999, p.29). As the quote from Dr Ljunggren above suggests the 
opportunity for policy dialogue was seized upon by Sida, and its 
access to high level policy makers gave it significant influence at this 
critical time in Vietnam’s history. 
It has also been suggested36 that influence on reform was exerted 
through the delivery of the Bai Bang Paper Mill Project, the largest 
aid project ever delivered by Sweden. This influence arose from the 
capitalist-oriented management style (e.g. autonomous decision mak-
ing based on profit motive) and the influence of the ‘Scandinavian 
Management Model’. 
4.4  Case Study 4 – ‘From FCP to MRDP’: Towards Participatory 
Rural Development
4.4.1 The Development Context
The economic context within Vietnam evolved considerably from 
the mid-1980s as Vietnam embarked upon a major transition from 
planned to market-based economy – the process of Doi Moi‘ renova-
tion’ (see Case Study 3). This shift brought about a prolonged period 
of change in the roles of government and state-owned enterprises as 
markets emerged and private sector activity flourished in a number 
of areas. In particular, the elimination of centrally controlled prices 
had an impact on the assumptions underpinning several Sida-fund-
ed initiatives. 
The transition to a market economy also precipitated reforms in 
public administration – a development that exerted considerable 
35 Dr Le DanhDoanh, pers comm 23/03/2011
36 See CIE 1998 p 84 and van Donge et al 1999 p 31.
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influence on the shape of Sweden’s development co-operation. 1992 
saw the adoption of a new constitution which provided the basis for 
political organisation and public administration structure in the 
post-Doi Moi era. From this point, public administration reform pro-
ceeded “step by step”, with cautious experimentation supported by 
only a few donors including UNDP and Sida. Towards the late 
1990s and early in the new century, the decentralisation of govern-
ment authority to various sub national actors gained increasing 
impetus as a key direction for reform. These policy priorities, and 
the complexities associated with implementing them in a practical 
sense, have continued to shape development co-operation in Viet-
nam to the present day (Andersson, 2003).
4.4.2 The Emergence of the Participatory Agenda
Implementation of the Vietnam-Sweden Forestry Co-operation 
Programme (FCP) began in 1991, after an extensive planning phase 
in which the Vietnamese authorities were said to have had “an unu-
sually high degree of active participation” (Lindahl et al, 2001). The 
Swedish contribution to FCP was budgeted at 140 MSEK, covering 
the activities of seven diverse projects including soil and conserva-
tion, agro forestry, forest machinery, forestry research, forestry train-
ing, support to the Ministry of Forestry, and land management. The 
program was designed to be implemented through a ‘process’ 
approach, whereby detailed activities were decided upon during 
implementation rather than being predetermined (a ‘blueprint’ 
approach) at the outset. FCP continued the geographic legacy of the 
Bai Bang ‘side projects’ working in the northern provinces of Ha 
Giang,	Yen	Bai,	Lao	Cai,	VinhPhu,	and	Tuyen	Quang.
From an evolutionary perspective, FCP can be situated at the 
heart of a key period of the transition for Swedish assistance from 
forestry towards broader rural development agenda. As such, the 
program bore the characteristics of an attempt to embrace new 
thinking while closing off some aspects the past. An evaluation by 
Lindahl et al in 2001 noted that: 
In retrospect, the design of the FCP leaves the impression of a number of discrete 
projects of different origin with limited internal coherence put under an administra­
tive umbrella. From this perspective, FCP is a good illustration of the transition the 
Swedish support was undergoing (Lindahlet al., 2001, emphasis added).
The evaluation pointed out that some FCP projects were directed 
at “mopping up the past” where financial dependencies had been 
79
PArT Two – SweDISh DeVeloPmeNT Co-oPerATIoN wITh VIeTNAm
created by initial Swedish assistance (such as forestry machinery), 
while others represented novel thinking at the time (such as land 
management). The end result however, was a diverse mix of activi-
ties with only a limited degree of connectedness.
Nevertheless, the newer elements that FCP introduced were signifi-
cant. FCP marked the first large scale attempt to introduce Participa-
tory Rural Appraisal (PRA) methods as part of an effort to enshrine 
participatory principles at the heart of implementation. Key informants 
who had been involved in FCP in Ha Giang province recalled during 
interviews that this had been the first time the technique had been 
applied in their province In this regard, they felt that FCP had impor-
tant as a “testing house”. The use of PRA was accompanied by greater 
attention to village-based organisations. Many of the organisations 
established, such as Village Management Groups and Village Exten-
sion Groups, became focal points for development activities in their 
specific area. The program introduced a range of models for rural 
finance and business development that later became integral parts of 
other SIDA-funded initiatives. Collectively, these approaches are 
emblematic of FCP’s embrace of a broader rural development agenda. 
In 1994 discussions began on the next phase of FCP between the 
Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development (MARD), and 
SIDA. Phase I of FCP, which had been widely considered a success, 
was drawing to a close and there a palpable desire on both sides to 
build on this experience (See Sida, 1996. See also Lindahl et al, 
2001). FCP had evolved considerably by this time, a product of the 
process approach applied during implementation. As decentralisa-
tion gathered pace as a Government priority, the management of the 
program was increasingly decentralised to the provinces. Newer ele-
ments introduced by the program, including PRA and rural finance, 
steadily became core activities while remnants of the older Bai Bang 
side-projects (the farm machinery project, for example) were shed. 
As a result, the point of departure for the next phase had moved con-
siderably more towards these newer areas of focus.
Sida, keen to ensure a high degree of Vietnamese ownership, had 
handed over considerable control of the design work to MARD. The 
detailed agreement between Sweden and Vietnam was to be based 
on the output of this process, which would be facilitated by a consult-
ant engaged by Sida. The draft design produced through this pro-
cess attracted considerable criticism from a consulting team engaged 
by Sida to appraise the document. Among other things, the 
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appraisal recommended that the new program begin on a small 
scale, focused on methods development, scaling up at a later point.37 
The appraisal further noted that the program document made no 
substantive reference to the experiences of FCP. These findings were 
strongly rejected by the Vietnamese side, who had argued for 
a much larger scale program. In the end it appears that Sida and 
MARD did not substantially alter the design document on the basis 
of the appraisal recommendations.
Implementation of the new program – called the ‘Mountain 
Rural Development Program’ (MRDP) –began in 1996. The extent 
to which it represented an evolution from FCP has been much debat-
ed. For MARD and Sida, the extensive involvement of the GoV in 
the design process and its strong basis in decentralisation were clear-
ly steps forward. Comments from informants interviewed in Ha 
Giang tended to reflect this view, pointing out for instance that 
MRDP was the first time that Participatory Rural Appraisal (PRA) 
methods had been applied to a broader set of rural development con-
cerns rather than forestry. The 2001 evaluation disagreed, stating 
that there “is little new in substance in the design of MRDP except, 
perhaps, gender and a re-orientation from massive re-plantation.”
However, the 2001 evaluation agreed that MRDP had evolved 
several times during its life, and was substantively different by 2002. 
An especially significant change occurred in 2000, when the decision 
was made to shift MRDP from a component structure to an area-
based structure. Villages and communes – the ‘demand structure’ – 
would prepare and submit plans to a ‘support structure’ – the district, 
province and ministry. A key aspect of this shift was the creation of 
a ‘Village Development Fund’ – a discrete pool of funds that could be 
used to respond to priorities expressed through village plans. PRA 
methods were intended to be central to the production of these plans.
While the 2001 evaluation found this agenda to be largely unful-
filled during MRDP, the seeds sown in this process were crucial to 
the subsequent emergence of the Chia Se Poverty Alleviation Pro-
gram (subsequently abbreviated to ‘Chia Se’ for ease). Case study 5 
in the following chapter, discusses how Chia Se has built on and sig-
nificantly extended the participatory intentions of its predecessors.
37 Key informant interview in Sweden with one of the appraisal team members, 
a Swedish rural development consultant and academic. See also Lindahl et al 
(2001), p. 20
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4.5 Significance for this Evaluation
The two case studies discussed in this chapter highlight how Swe-
den’s support evolved in response to the major economic transition 
in Vietnam during the late 1980s and 1990s. 
Sweden’s support to economic reform has, in the Evaluation 
Team’s view, been extremely significant and highly effective. It was 
highly relevant, emerging at a key time in the reform program. As 
emphasized in this report, Sweden was uniquely placed among donors 
to advise the GoV on such momentous reforms. Sweden’s privileged 
position in this process was a result of decisions made during the pre-
ceding two decades of the relationship that may not have been neces-
sarily the most relevant to poverty reduction. Nevertheless, these deci-
sions were crucial to establishing the trust that was to underpin the 
successful co-operation that is showcased in Case Study 3.
At the same time, the iconic Bai Bang Project, conceived in 
a time of the planned economy, had evolved into a broader rural 
development initiative. As this second of the series of case studies 
illustrates, relationships played a key role in this transition, enabling 
new approaches to be incorporated into existing initiatives. One 
important effect of this was to enable a continuing long-term 
involvement in the natural resource management and rural develop-
ment sectors while ensuring continuing evolution and innovation.
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5.  TACkLing POVErTy, SuPPOrTing 
DEMOCrACy AnD huMAn righTS:  
1999 TO 2011
5.1 Political and Economic Synopsis
The turn of the century brought new challenges for Vietnam. The 
East Asian Financial Crisis struck the region in 1997 and, as noted in 
Chapter 2, this impacted negatively on economic growth over 1998 
and 1999. In particular Vietnam, now more integrated into the global 
economy, was adversely affected by the decline in demand for exports 
and the general reduction in world trade. Nevertheless, integration 
continued and a historic free trade agreement was signed with the US 
in 2000. In 2002 Vietnam began working towards accession to the 
WTO, a process that eventually resulted in full membership in 2007.
The trajectory of the economic reforms first launched during the 
1980s continued during the 2000s. This encompassed the restructure 
of inefficient state-owned enterprises, which was a particularly thorny 
legacy of the pre-Doi Moi era, not least because it involved large-scale 
retrenchments. In 2001, the GoV adopted a comprehensive banking 
reform program to ensure the stability of the banking system and, 
over the medium and long term, to support better resource mobilisa-
tion in the domestic economy. Economic pressures began to build in 
2004, driven by capital inflows and excessive credit growth. Inflation 
reached double-digit levels in 2008, prompting a decisive and effec-
tive response from the government (World Bank, 2008).
Despite these fluctuations, economic growth over this period of 
development co-operation contributed to further reductions in pov-
erty. As noted in Chapter 2, urban and rural poverty continued to 
fall during this time, although a significant gap remains. Regional 
and ethnic disparities in poverty levels also continue to be a feature 
of poverty in Vietnam (Sida, 2008).
Several key strategies were produced in the early 2000s that col-
lectively provided insight into the trajectory of further reforms 
sought by the Party with respect to poverty reduction. The Socio-
Economic Strategy set the ten year planning framework and was 
based around the ambitious goal of doubling GDP per capita by 
2010. The Comprehensive Poverty Reduction and Growth Strategy 
(CPRGS) was presented to donors in 2002 as the country’s main 
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overarching Poverty Reduction Strategy. It places strong emphasis 
on economic growth as the primary engine of poverty reduction. 
Politically, change continued to be incremental during this period, 
a reflection of the Party’s emphasis on achieving consensus around 
new ideas before moving forward. A range of laws and decrees were 
passed but implementation of these was slow. Nevertheless, several 
important currents of change emerged during this time. For instance 
the Grassroots Democracy Decree, passed in 1998 as a response to 
peasant dissatisfaction in Thai Binh province, provided some space 
for localised experimentation with new forms of democracy (Sida, 
2003). This measure, alongside a growing emphasis on decentralisa-
tion, anticorruption, and improving transparency, formed part of the 
government’s attempts to respond to concerns emerging in Vietnam-
ese society. These moves were driven, in part, by anxiety that the 
legitimacy of the VCP could be threatened if such concerns were not 
addressed. There was also a perceptible change in the role of the 
National Assembly, which increasingly sought to hold the govern-
ment to account (Sida, 2006). Despite the promise embodied in these 
measures, the reality is that the scope for the emergence of pluralist 
notions of democracy in Vietnam was limited during this period, and 
continues to remain so into the foreseeable future. Vietnam remains 
a one-party state and the government continues to exercise a high 
degree of control over the media and other key institutions.
5.2 A Summary of Swedish Aid During this Period
Sweden provided a total of $US480 million in ODA to Vietnam 
over the 11 year period between 1999 and 2009 – an annual average 
of approximately $US 44 million.38 However, this annual amount did 
fluctuate quite markedly. During the late 1990s and early 2000s, 
budgetary concerns across the Swedish Government led to a reduc-
tion in aid disbursements in development co-operation. Consequently 
annual disbursement fell to a low of $US28 million in 2003 from 
$US61 million in 2001 before rising again to $US46 million in 2005. 
There were notable changes in the strategic focus of development 
co-operation between the two countries as the relationship entered 
its fourth decade. As outlined in the previous chapter, the focus dur-
ing the 1990s had been on assisting the process of economic reform 
through technical support in areas such as taxation and economic 
38 The ODA data quoted in this paragraph are in constant 2008 prices.
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management. In the early 2000s, this began to shift towards a focus 
on public administration reform and democratic governance (Lun-
dell, 2001). This entailed a subtle, but nevertheless important, transi-
tion towards more politically sensitive issues. These objectives are 
reflected in the 1999–2003 country strategy, which had two objec-
tives: the promotion of democracy and poverty alleviation.
This strategic shift continued to gain momentum after 2003 when 
a Parliamentary Commission on Swedish aid resulted in the develop-
ment of the Policy for Global Development (PGD). Sweden was the 
first member of the OECD DAC to adopt such a comprehensive gov-
ernment-wide approach to development. The PGD committed the 
Swedish government to a consistent approach to development in are-
as such as trade, agriculture, environment, security, migration, and 
economic policy. The policy introduced a strong rights-based per-
spective and pro-poor approach to the Swedish aid program, which 
influenced policy development and engagement in its partner coun-
tries. The PGD has eight themes: democracy and good governance; 
respect for human rights; gender equality; sustainable use of natural 
resources and protection of the environment; economic growth; 
social development and security; conflict prevention and resolution; 
and global public goods. The minutes of development co-operation 
consultations with Vietnamese counterparts in 2003 show that the 
Swedish delegation emphasized the need to incorporate these con-
cerns into development co-operation (Sida, 2003).
Major new programs such as Chia Se and the Strengthening 
Environmental Management and Land Administration (SEMLA) 
program illustrate how this set of issues was incorporated into exist-
ing sectors. Sida’s work in the health sector also continued during 
this period, having evolved towards a focus on health systems. The 
links between existing projects in media, human rights, the legal sec-
tor and democracy were also made much more explicit. Sweden’s 
stronger focus on rights-based perspectives occasionally resulted in 
tensions between the two parties. 
Harmonization and coordination became key concerns for Sida 
during this period. However, as noted in Chapter 2, there was 
a striking proliferation of development activities. Sweden contribut-
ed to this trend during this time. The number of Sida activities 
reached a peak of 346 in 2004, as recorded by OECD DAC statis-
tics. As discussed in Chapter 2, these trends are suggestive of an 
environment less conducive to the efficient delivery of aid. 
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There is much evidence that donors recognised these issues at an 
early stage in Vietnam, and also that Sida played an active role in the 
process. Minutes from donor meetings in 2003 illustrate these con-
cerns clearly: highly centralized, cumbersome and lengthy decision-
making processes, numerous approval levels for project implementa-
tion processes, to name a few. These concerns gained new prominence 
with the signing of the Paris Declaration in 2005. Within months of 
the Paris Declaration, the GoV and donors signed the Hanoi Core 
Statement committing themselves to a range of targets associated with 
principles such as harmonization, ownership, and alignment.
There were other innovations in the way in which donors collec-
tively sought to improve their coordination and enhance their 
engagement. One of these was the appointment of lead donors in 
particular sectors. Sweden’s unique relationship with Vietnam and 
the high level of trust that it enjoyed enabled it to play this role well 
in sensitive areas such as anticorruption. 
In 2007, the Swedish Government took the decision to scale 
down and significantly alter development co-operation with Viet-
nam by December 2011. The decision, which appeared to take some 
partners by surprise, arose from a desire within the Swedish Gov-
ernment to concentrate the aid program and rationalise the number 
of program countries. Practically speaking, in Vietnam, this 
involved a transition towards a new type of development relation-
ship, referred to as ‘Partner-Driven Co-operation (PDC)’.
The case studies presented in this chapter illustrate how many of 
these issues played out in specific contexts and sectors. Case study 5 
describes the emergence and impact of Chia Se – the final iteration of 
a 40-year evolutionary process that began with the Bai Bang Project. 
This is followed by a case study on public administration reform in 
Quang Tri, which showcases how Sweden supported decentralisation 
in an intensely practical way. Case studies on media and the legal sec-
tor show how Sweden approached more sensitive areas that were a fea-
ture during this period. Finally, the case study of PDC describes the 
challenges and opportunities associated with Sweden’s chosen strategy 
during the final stages of traditional development co-operation.
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5.3 Case Study 5: The Emergence of the Chia Se Poverty 
Alleviation Program
5.3.1 From MRDP to Chia Se: a Difficult Transition
Planning for the Chia Se Poverty Alleviation Program began as 
early as 2001, as attention turned to the successor to the MRDP. Ini-
tial consultations were between Sida and MARD, continuing the 
relationship that had developed since Bai Bang and had continued 
through FCP and MRDP. The Ministry of Planning and Invest-
ment (MPI) was also involved, as the central liaison and coordina-
tion point for all Swedish development co-operation with Vietnam. 
MPI’s involvement grew as it became clear that Chia Se would be 
a multi-sectoral initiative, leading to some conflict within the GoV 
over which agency would have responsibility for implementation. 
This disagreement was partly responsible for the lengthy gestational 
period – almost 2 years. In the end, it was decided that MPI would 
take up this role, ending Sida’s area and sector-based focus, pursued 
through 20 years of co-operation with MARD. Sida described this 
move as part of the ‘fence-breaking’ approach that Sweden had 
applied in Vietnam since the 1990s (Sida 2003).
Chia Se was (and still is) widely seen as highly progressive in its ori-
entation. The program seeks to alleviate poverty through a compre-
hensive effort to encourage the sustained and in depth participation of 
village level beneficiaries. The degree to which the program works at 
the ‘village level’ has been described as highly unusual and ‘unortho-
dox’ among rural development projects in Vietnam (see Fforde, 2009). 
The poverty focus of the program closely aligns with the GoV’s Com-
prehensive Poverty Reduction and Growth Strategy (CPRGS). How-
ever, local democracy and decentralised governance are also explicit 
themes in the Chia Se approach. Indeed, as Fforde noted, Chia Se 
could also be characterised as a ‘political project’, a sensitive subject in 
Vietnam, even in an era of reform (Fforde et al, 2009). 
Why was the GoV receptive to such a program? Indeed a well-
placed key informant pointed out that MPI had taken a risk in support-
ing such a reform-minded initiative.39 One reason why the idea had 
attracted such support, he felt, was the level of trust that had developed 
between the GoV and Sweden, especially between the individuals in 
MPI and Sida. The implication is that few other donors could have suc-
39 Key informant interview with J. Rudengren.
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ceeded in introducing such a program in Vietnam. Changes in the 
political climate within Vietnam also provide part of the explanation. 
The Party had launched a drive for grass roots democratization in 
1997, which had gained additional momentum through the rise of the 
decentralisation agenda. The focus on localised management and deci-
sion-making in Chia Se was consistent with these directions.
Within Sida there had also been a willingness to “try something 
new”, as one key informant put it. This may have been related to an 
evaluation of the 1999–2003 country strategy which had drawn 
attention to the risks of ‘rolling over’ projects and programs. The 
evaluation suggested that in some cases this tendency had led to 
“a lack of new ideas and innovation in the objectives of follow-on 
projects” (Baulch et al, 2002).40
Other factors contributed to the emergence of participation and 
local democracy as key themes in Chia Se. During the planning stage 
staff at the development co-operation section of the Swedish Embassy 
in Hanoi had been strongly influenced by Perspectives on Poverty, pub-
lished in 2002 to provide guidance to staff on maintaining and sharp-
ening the poverty focus (Sida, 2003). Perspectives on Poverty emphasises 
the manifold causes of poverty, placing a particular accent on the role 
that empowerment and democratic governance play. This was also 
evident during annual bilateral discussions on development co-opera-
tion in 2002, where the Swedish delegation noted the increased focus 
on democracy by the Swedish Parliament41 and proposed that this 
aspect be strengthened in all Sida development programs (Sida, 2002).
Geographically, Chia Se continued Sida’s long association with 
the	northern	mountain	provinces,	focusing	on	Ha	Giang	and	Yen	
Bai, while also working in Quang Tri in central Vietnam, where 
Sida had been supporting public administration reform since 1999. 
All three provinces were selected due to their high levels of poverty. 
In	2003	Ha	Giang,	Yen	Bai,	and	Quang	Tri	were	ranked	2,	15,	and	
17 respectively on the GoV’s provincial poverty index.
40 In fact an internal Sida Assessment Memo outlining the rationale and 
features of the Chia Se Poverty Alleviation program explicitly addresses this 
point, stating that: “The organisation of the program preparation, partly 
outside the inf luence of the previous program management (of MRDP) and 
with the assistance of a separate Facilitation Team has prevented the com-
mon ‘rolling over’ of project concepts, approaches etc”. See Sida 2003, p. 6.
41 As a result of the Parliamentary Commission’s review of the Swedish Policy 
for Global Development.
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Operationally, two ‘mechanisms’ are central to Chia Se’s approach. 
The first, the ‘Local Development Fund’ (LDF) was heavily influenced 
by the Village Development Fund from MRDP as well as the experi-
ence of the Seila decentralisation program in Cambodia, to which Sida 
had been a substantial contributor. A LDF was set up in each of the 
three provinces to channel funds to districts, communes and villages in 
accordance with locally agreed plans and priorities, such as the repair 
of an irrigation scheme, construction of a basic access road, or the 
refurbishment of a school building. Importantly, these needs were not 
predetermined in any way allowing broad space for local priority set-
ting and decision-making. A key feature of the approach was an 
unprecedented level of transparency at the village level. Villagers were 
able to view the available budget for their particular village, consider-
ably enhancing the depth of their participation in decision-making.
A second supportive mechanism is the Local Planning and 
Management for Development (LPMD) – involving the establish-
ment of a system of decentralised and integrated planning in the 
relevant local administration. The operation of the LPMD is guid-
ed by a number of high level principles, including: decentralisation 
and local involvement; equality and equity; transparency and 
accountability; poverty focus; and sustainability. The majority (51 
percent) of the initial funding commitment of US$ 41.5 million was 
allocated to the LDF, with the LPMD consuming 14 percent. How-
ever, actual disbursements may have resulted in an even greater 
proportion being allocated to the LDF. For instance, in Ha Giang, 
the LDF was reported to have consumed 68.85 percent of Chia Se 
funding (Ha Giang People’s Provincial People’s Committee, 2009).
Somewhat uniquely, Chia Se simultaneously committed resourc-
es to coordination and policy development at the national level. In 
addition to the 3 provincial projects, a ‘national project’ was set up 
within MPI in Hanoi. Advisers in the national project worked close-
ly with the Secretariat for the CPRGS, allowing Chia Se to coordi-
nate with other donor-funded initiatives and showcase the operation-
alisation of CPRGS poverty objectives through Chia Se’s provincial 
projects. The national project would also draw on the “good exam-
ples” from the application of Chia Se approaches in the provincial 
projects with a view to expanding the application of such approaches 
across Vietnam.
Implementation of a 1-year pilot and inception phase began in 
November 2003. The early stages were dominated by the need to 
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undertake extensive capacity building of officials and villagers in the 
methodologies and management processes that would give effect to 
the program’s participatory orientation. Initially progress was slow. 
This was to some degree expected, considering the novelty of the 
approaches applied. Key to these early efforts was the establishment of 
the structure of provincial secretariats, as well as program manage-
ment units (PMUs) at the district and commune levels staffed by offi-
cials seconded from line management. An in depth review of the pilot 
phase conducted in late 2004 found that major benchmarks associated 
with these foundational elements had been met and recommended 
that Chia Se proceed to full implementation (Andersen et al, 2004). 
Completion was originally scheduled for 2008, but the program was 
extended until 2009. Subsequent to this, Sida agreed to provide ongo-
ing funding for a second phase focusing on the policy work of the 
National Project in conjunction with some extra funds for the LDF in 
Ha Giang and Quang Tri until July 2011. Much of the early focus 
involved significant scale up from a few pilot villages to almost five hun-
dred across the three provinces. Between 2005 and 2006, much of the 
focus shifted towards consolidating the LPMD processes, while the 
National Project began to engage at the policy level, providing CPRGS 
advisers, and support to communication processes within GoV. Over 
the program’s life, the distribution of LDF funding evolved steadily 
from a focus on income generation at the household level to common 
goods and infrastructure (Chia Se Poverty Alleviation Program, 2009). 
5.3.2 The Impact of Chia Se – the Emerging Evidence
Progress reports, reviews, and evaluations combined with inter-
views with informants at multiple levels suggest that the effects of 
Chia Se have been significant in a number of areas.42
At this stage, statistically robust evidence of poverty alleviation 
attributable to the program is not available. However, there is some 
evidence that Chia Se has made a difference to poverty levels in tar-
get areas. According to the Results Analysis prepared by the program 
staff, the proportion of poor households43 has declined faster in Chia 
Se districts of Ha Giang and Quang Tri than the national average 
42 Village, commune, district and provincial level in Ha Giang and Quang Tri 
provinces as well as staff in the national secretariat attached to MPI. For 
further detail see the list of persons consulted in appendix B
43 As defined by the GoV’s 2010 poverty line of VND 200,000 per person per 
month in rural areas.
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(Chia Se Poverty Alleviation Program, 2009). Furthermore, within 
these districts, the decrease has been more pronounced in communes 
where Chia Se has been active than in others. During fieldwork the 
study	team	heard	that	the	incidence	of	poverty	in	Yen	Phong	com-
mune, in Bac Me district, Ha Giang had fallen from 70 percent in 
2004 to 24.6 percent in 2009. One complicating factor is the fact that 
similar	trends	have	not	been	observed	in	Yen	Bai	province,	although	
the Results Analysis offers potential explanations for this. 
Qualitative research, undertaken on a small scale as part of the 
present study and as part of several studies during implementation,44 
provides some insight into the benefits of Chia Se experienced at the 
village level. For instance, reflecting a common theme, one interview-
ee	in	Yen	Son	village,	Yen	Phong	Commune,	Bac	Me	district,	in	Ha	
Giang province, explained how the buffalo he received had dramati-
cally reduced the time it took to plough his field, making it easier to 
ensure that his rice field was ready in time. Previously, he had needed 
to borrow draft animals from a neighbour, delaying the start of his 
crop and reducing his yield.45 Another interviewee in the same village 
described how her daughter was able to study thanks to the electricity 
provided through Chia Se. In Lai Binh village, Quang Tri, one inter-
viewee attributed a 30–40 percent increase in his household income 
to Chia Se livestock training that his wife had attended. They had 
been able to save considerably since she now performs many of the 
tasks for which they previously paid a veterinarian. Interviewees also 
discussed how positive change had occurred at a community level. 
For example, several interviewees in Lai Binh village46, Quang Tri 
province, pointed out that children had better access to school during 
the wet season thanks to a road constructed with Chia Se support.47
But it is the impact of Chia Se’s unique combination of participa-
tory methods, transparency, and decentralised approach to collec-
tive decision-making that holds the most promise for lasting impact. 
Satisfaction with Chia Se processes was a theme throughout much of 
44 These included special studies on empowerment, participation, capacity, and 
equality. 
45 The decreased reliance on the goodwill of others was a strongly recurring 
theme across recipients of buffalo.
46 In Vinh Chap Commune, VinhLinh District.
47 In many villages Chia Se is one of several poverty-focused programs. Several 
interviewees also named GoV programs such as P135 II and NGOs such as 
Plan and ActionAid.
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the qualitative research at the village level. Interviewees described 
attending introductory meetings where they first learned of Chia Se, 
participating in various PRA exercises (such as wealth ranking), and 
prioritising activities. One interviewee from Lai Binh village, Quang 
Tri, reflected a common view:
We discussed about the options how to get benefit or increase income genera­
tion among villagers. We agreed that they should focus on livestock raising. This 
can help with increasing the income, so we selected this one…the villagers are, in 
my opinion, glad with the meeting. I could see the democracy in the meetings. 
They got to express their opinions. (translation from Vietnamese).
Such accounts also resonate with views from commune and dis-
trict level officials as explored through the qualitative research. 
Many emphasized that Chia Se’s approach was closely aligned with 
the decentralization policy. When asked to identify distinguishing 
features of Chia Se, they tended to highlight two features: the capac-
ity of the program to concentrate funds in a single village to a great-
er degree than any other; and the extent to which the decision-mak-
ing was decentralised. As one official explained: 
After Chia Se there is more decentralisation. People take part in more of the 
discussion: how to use the budget? Who will get the benefits? (Commune offi-
cial, Minh Son Commune, Bac Me District, Ha Giang Province – 
translated from Vietnamese).
Fforde et al also explored perceptions similar to these in a 2009 
study, which sought the views of a range of informants on the 
approach employed by Chia Se. The Fforde study contends that the 
unique success of Chia Se relates to its ability to ‘Vietnamise’ West-
ern ideas of democracy in an intensely practical sense. The program 
is able to accomplish this effect, the authors suggest, through ‘proce-
dures’ (loosely translated from Vietnamese). There is much nuance 
to the use of this term, but the core argument is that Chia Se has 
provided a convincing demonstration of how “through procedural 
changes of a certain type, a range of often antagonistic interests are 
brought into better balance” (Fforde, 2009, p. 7). This thought-pro-
voking argument certainly helps to explain the wide appeal that 
Chia Se has for a diversity of actors.
The sustainability of the approaches introduced by Chia Se will be 
influenced by a range of issues including the ongoing direction of 
reform in Vietnam. At the policy level, the work of the National Pro-
ject is paramount in determining the extent of the program’s lasting 
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imprint. Staff and advisers of the National Project pointed to the influ-
ence that Chia Se has had on the Decree on Formulating, Monitoring 
and Evaluating Social and Economic Development. In addition, Chia 
Se’s experience is influencing the preparation of a planning decree 
being drafted by MPI (in March 2011) towards a ‘bottom-up’ orienta-
tion. Interviewees attributed this to the unique capacity of the Nation-
al Project to draw on and communicate successful field experiences. 
Nevertheless, they also acknowledged that policy impact takes time, 
and that the National Project has only had 2 years since the results of 
Chia Se’s work at the field level have begun to emerge.
At the village and commune levels, it is apparent that Chia Se’s 
processes hold lasting attraction for the reasons that the Fforde study 
suggested. Nevertheless, interviews conducted for the present study 
highlight the challenges that need to be overcome if such approaches 
are to be sustainable. Some commune-level informants pointed out 
that as the funds in the LDF have run out, the participatory plan-
ning techniques introduced through LPMD are no longer being 
used.48 This issue, if confirmed, suggests that an ‘LDF-like’ fund is 
a critical ingredient of sustainability. This is not surprising, but the 
study team heard that there were many political obstacles to creat-
ing such a mechanism; not least the question of which ministry 
would be responsible for administering it. Ultimately, the wider 
impact and sustainability of Chia Se’s innovative approach will 
depend on how these broader political dynamics play out.
5.4  Case Study 6: Swedish Support to Public Administration 
Reform in Quang Tri Province
5.4.1 Development Context
During the 1990s the GoV pursued reform of the public adminis-
tration apparatus and legal system alongside economic transition, 
although with less vigour (Andersson, 2003). Reform began tentatively 
with the Seventh Congress of the Communist Party of Vietnam, where 
it was made clear that the approach would be to develop a market 
economy but retain the strong control of the state (Poon and Vo, 2006).
Prior to 1999, the GoV and donors did not share a common under-
standing of public administration reform (PAR) and what such a pro-
ject might entail (Andersson, 2003). UNDP assistance to the GoV in 
48 This perspective emerged during a group discussion with commune level of-
ficials in Minh Son, Bac Me district, Ha Giang province.
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PAR had begun as early as 1992. This was followed by a number of 
PAR projects in provincial locations supported by DANIDA and 
UNDP. However, these early efforts largely failed to influence internal 
currents of change that were occurring within the GoV. Such internal 
reforms focused on Party directives for simplifying administrative pro-
cedures of direct importance for citizens and enterprises for example, 
licensing and registration of business activities, registration of land, 
and procedures for making appeals. Simplifying administrative proce-
dures and making them efficient was regarded as the key to further 
reforms and to maintaining confidence in the determination and abil-
ity of the party and government (Andersson, 2003). 
Land use is a prominent example of such a service. Reform of 
Vietnam’s system of Land Use Rights (LUR) had commenced with 
the Land Law in 1993. Despite this, in the late 1990s, the issuance of 
Land Tenure Certificates (LTCs) was occurring at a slow rate, ham-
pered by confusion over issuance procedures, delays in the prepara-
tion of cadastral maps, boundary conflicts among land users and low 
levels of commitment demonstrated by local officials (McCarty et al, 
2007). Access to an LTC is a critical issue for many households. 
LTCs enable the fulfilment of a range of administrative and legal 
transactions, for example to ensure inheritance of land tenure or to 
support an application for a loan from a financial institution.
5.4.2  What was intended? The Objective of Supporting PAR  
in Quang Tri
Sweden’s support to PAR in the central province of Quang Tri 
began in 1999 and was aimed squarely at land administration. The ini-
tial project design, produced by international consultants, was directed 
at economic reform rather than PAR. Consequently Sida allocated the 
Quang Tri Department of Home Affairs (DoHA) the task of planning 
a PAR project suitable for funding. DoHA, in consultation with other 
provincial authorities, selected reform of land administration proce-
dures as the issue of focus for the PAR Pilot Project.
Land administration was certainly highly relevant to households 
in the province. Prior to the project, on average, an urban household 
in Quang Tri was required to visit six different offices a total of 
twelve times, the whole process taking (on average) 91 days (McCa-
rty et al, 2007). Sida provided financial assistance to the province to 
pilot the ‘One Door’ model of land service administration within 
two pilot districts: Cam Lo and Dong Ha. The ‘One Door’ model of 
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land administration, whereby service users visit only one point of 
contact, was seen as an effective way of increasing the speed and effi-
ciency of both land allocation in addition to the issuance of LTCs.
5.4.3 What was done? Implementation
The pilot phase of the project began in 1999 and was completed 
in 2004, with a total allocation of 20 MSEK from Sida. The project 
design specified two interrelated components: reform of land alloca-
tion procedures; and capacity building for officials from the various 
line agencies involved. 
Responsibility for implementation of the Quang Tri PAR Pilot 
Project was vested in DoHA, who followed a ‘blueprint’ approach 
that involved careful planning at the outset (Poon and Vo, 2006). 
DoHA played a coordinating role, working with 14 front line service 
delivery units (at the commune level) in the pilot districts. The Pro-
ject Director and Project Manager were based in a Project Manage-
ment Unit (PMU), constituted within DoHA for the express purpose 
of managing the project. A part-time Project Director, who was also 
head of DoHA, had overall strategic direction, while a full-time Pro-
ject Manager was responsible for organising most activities. The fact 
that this individual was also an expert at the provincial Office of 
People’s Committee (OPC) enabled him to maintain an influential 
position in dialogue with service delivery units. International con-
sultants were used for specific, discrete inputs, particularly to expose 
officials to new knowledge and methods and to support the capacity 
building process (Poon and Vo, 2006).
DoHA’s approach to implementing the pilot project has been 
characterised as ‘bottom-up’ in that it allowed considerable autono-
my to the service delivery units whose practices the project was 
attempting to alter. During the inception phase, these units were 
encouraged to prepare and submit proposals for the streamlining of 
regulations and procedures. During an initial inception phase 
DoHA worked intensively with these service units to further develop 
these ideas as a basis for reform. The inception phase was followed 
by a ‘hands off’ implementation where service delivery units were 
provided with guidance on the implementation of process improve-
ments. The project sought to develop capacity of the officials 
involved through structured training events and study tours.
Implementation also involved the establishment of ‘One-Stop-
Shops’ – a single point where households in Cam Lo and Dong Ha 
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districts could apply for and obtain a LTC, or ‘red book’, as they are 
often referred to in Vietnam. To publicise these services, the project 
facilitated a number of community meetings with district and pro-
vincial officials in attendance to explain state policies and the 
reforms that had been undertaken.
The reforms also involved the project in challenging work at the 
institutional and legislative level. Before the One-Stop-Shop model 
had been implemented, the People’s Committee at district level was 
not authorized to grant land use right certificates to households. To 
overcome this challenge, leaders of the province requested permis-
sion from central government for the ”one-door” model to be piloted 
in the province. In 2001, the Government issued Decision No 
32/2001/QD-TTg authorizing the piloting of the ”one-door” model 
in the Cam Lo district and Dong Ha town. At the same time, the 
General Department of Tax also authorized pilot districts and towns 
to collect land-use fees at the Task Force office (Poon and Vo, 2006). 
These decisions were instrumental in ensuring the pilots could move 
ahead on sound legal foundations.
5.4.4 Results 
Evaluation reports provide strong evidence that the Quang Tri 
Pilot PAR Project was effective in meeting its objectives. An evalua-
tion in 2006 found that after the Pilot PAR Project, households 
needed just 3 visits to a single one-stop shop to obtain a ‘red book’, 
the whole process taking 23 days on average (Poon and Vo, 2006). 
This represents a significant improvement over the situation in 1999, 
when it took households 91 days on average and 12 administrative 
“doors”. The project has been a major contributor to this result.
Ultimately however, streamlining administrative processes are 
a means to changing the way households experience service delivery 
and, in the long-term, to supporting poverty reduction. The evalua-
tion in 2006 noted some tentative signs that attitudinal changes 
among civil servants providing land services, and had also that citi-
zens in the target districts were less “anxious” (Poon and Vo, 2006). 
Trends in the number of ‘red books’ held by households provide 
a striking illustration of the take up of the reforms. At the conclusion 
of the pilot in 2003, the number of households holding an LTC was 
20,350, accounting for 68 percent of the total number of households 
in the province at that time. This rate was much higher than the 
average level of the country, which stood at 35 percent in 2003. In 
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Dong Ha district, the number of land use certificates issued by the 
end of 2004 was 16,500 compared with 2,032 prior to the implemen-
tation of the reform (Poon and Vo, 2006). In 2001 just 1,200 house-
holds in Cam Lo district held a red book. By 2011 that figure had 
increased to 5,692, of which 3,822 were farmers. Interviews with 
staff at One-Stop-Shops highlighted increased workloads as aware-
ness of the reforms increased. They also pointed out that additional 
services had been added to the One-Stop-Shops.
The 2006 evaluation notes that Quang Tri, as well as the two 
pilot districts, experienced significant poverty reduction between 
2001 and 2004. The present study sought to probe, in a limited way, 
further signs of some relationship between increased LTC issuance 
and poverty reduction. One way that this can occur is by encourag-
ing economic activity. During a group interview, a senior manager 
from the Agricultural and Rural Development Bank in Cam Lo 
described steep increases in loans to enterprises and farmers since 
the new procedures had been introduced – a proxy indicator of com-
mercial activity in the district. The doubling of the Bank’s total loans 
to small enterprises and farmers from VND 93 billion (in 2001) to 
VND 184 billion (2011) was, the senior manager posited, over-
whelmingly due to the ease of obtaining a ‘red book’. 
The success of the pilot PAR project in Quang Tri has had wider 
impacts. In 2003 Sida provided funds for the model to be replicated 
in the provinces of Quang Binh, Ha Tinh, Nghe Anh, and Hue, 
with DoHA in Quang Tri serving as the coordinating agent. An 
evaluation in 2007, suggested that this project had led to similar dra-
matic improvements as had been experienced in Quang Tri (McCa-
rty et al, 2007). Officials in Cam Lo pointed out that Finland funded 
efforts to build on the success of the One-Stop-Shop by streamlining 
other procedures such as business registration, household registra-
tion, and building certificates. 
5.5 Case Study 7: Swedish Support to the Media
5.5.1 Development Context
In Vietnam, emphasis is often placed on the role of the media in 
the implementation of the policies of the GoV and the Party – a per-
spective also prescribed in the Press Legislation. At the same time, 
the GoV and Party have recognised the importance of a capable and 
effective media in exposing corruption and bureaucracy – key 
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concerns that could undermine the legitimacy of the Party. The 
GoV regarded good journalists as those that had a revolutionary ide-
ology and a communist, as well as professional, ethic (Bring et al, 
1998). This conception of the role of the media is clearly different to 
what exists in a democratic and pluralistic society.
Nevertheless, the mass media sector in Vietnam was undergoing 
change during the late 1990s. There was a growing interest in inves-
tigative journalism among daily newspapers, accompanied by a ten-
dency in some publications towards sensationalism with a focus on 
entertainment rather than critical reflection. Traditional ownership 
ties between state organisations and newspapers were gradually 
being loosened as publications became increasingly dependent on 
the income from their sales and advertisements. Local radio, long 
considered an important avenue for communication by the Party, 
was undergoing a similar process, although reaching fewer people. 
With Swedish support, local radio had begun to incorporate more 
live shows and feedback from callers, although this remained limited 
to relatively few stations (Bring et al, 1998).
Swedish support to the media had first begun in 1993, when Sida 
approved a range of media and cultural projects. Indeed, Sweden was 
the first donor to work in the media sector, a position that reflected the 
‘special relationship’ and the high degree of trust that had developed 
between the two governments. Early projects were small scale and 
involved providing support to local radio and collaboration between 
respective writer’s unions in Sweden and Vietnam. A bilateral agree-
ment between Sweden and the Ministry of Culture and Information 
(MoCI) signed in 1996 provided for 36.8 MSEK to continue support 
to 15 local radio stations and provide training for journalists. The 
overall objective of this agreement was “to contribute to the reform 
process and the development of democracy in Vietnam” (Sida, 2002).
5.5.2 What was intended? The Objective of Sweden’s Support
In 1999, a new agreement for co-operation in the cultural and 
media spheres over the period 2000–2003 was signed between Sida, 
MPI (in a coordination capacity) and MoCI. There was much conti-
nuity from the previous agreement, the overall objective being “…to 
create conditions for openness and development towards democra-
cy”. Five ‘specific objectives’, each aligned with a separate project 
were specified to support the achievement of the overall objective. 
Specific objectives for media co-operation were: “high quality 
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Vietnamese journalism, characterised by professionalism, integrity 
and interaction with audience”, and “a sustainable system for high 
quality local radio broadcasting characterised by a high degree of 
interaction with audience” (Sida, 2002). The substantive focus of 
these two specific objectives represented a continuation of existing 
co-operation. However, a third objective introduced a new dimen-
sion: to improve the institutional environment through “an exchange 
of dialogue on the role of the media” (Sida, 2002).
The key changes in the 1999 agreement were intended to amplify 
the connection between media and democracy. The 2000 agreement 
was preceded by an in-depth assessment of co-operation in media 
and culture, which noted that greater priority had been placed on 
democracy in the 2000–2002 country strategy for development co-
operation. It pointed out that support to the media could influence 
the processes which lead to greater openness. Improved skills and 
professionalism among journalists and media managers, as well as 
greater interaction between the public and press were put forward as 
possible avenues for this to occur. The inclusion of dialogue on the 
institutional framework affecting the media reflected the analysis of 
the importance of the Press Law contained in the assessment. Final-
ly, the assessment called for close monitoring of the risks associated 
with supporting media, alongside well-defined objectives. The objec-
tives in the 2000 agreement were shaped by these considerations. 
The assessment argued that “…Sweden at this point of time has an 
opportunity to influence and reinforce the democratisation process 
and that this opportunity should not be lost” (Sida, 2002).
5.5.3 What was done? Implementation
Sweden’s support to media under the 2000 agreement comprised 
two projects that reflected the specific objectives: the second phase of 
the Sweden-Vietnam Local Radio Project, and the ‘Further Train-
ing for Journalists’ Project.
The second phase of the Local Radio Project continued work 
under earlier phases that had been regarded as a success (Phan et al, 
2004). The project commenced in 2000 with Sida providing 8 
MSEK of funding for a 3-year implementation period. The organi-
sation responsible for implementing the Project was the Voice of 
Vietnam (VoV), the GoV-managed broadcasting agency, while the 
main source of Swedish expertise was Swedish Radio (SR). Building 
on previous support to 15 radio stations, VoV worked with an 
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additional 15 radio stations at the provincial level to carry out 
a range of training and support activities. Of the 62 provincial radio 
stations, 30 have received support through the Local Radio Project. 
SR acted in a support capacity during this phase, with Vietnamese 
trainers taking lead roles. Financial management was also delegated 
to VoV, a departure from established practice during earlier phases.
To receive support, local radio stations were required to demon-
strate that they possessed the necessary funding, and commitment to 
live broadcasting. This approach reflected the emphasis on increas-
ing the level of interaction between local radio stations and listen-
ers – a process that Sweden viewed as supportive of the democratisa-
tion process. Local radio stations were also required to contribute 
their own funds for extra equipment, studio upgrading, and 
improvement of salaries for staff (including producers, reporters, and 
technicians) that produce live programs. The project organized in-
house training courses on live radio broadcasting at the selected pro-
vincial radio stations and offered a minimum (but complex) set of 
studio equipment. During the second phase of the Local Radio Pro-
ject large number of trainees from 15 local radio stations and VoV 
participated in some 40 training activities.
The ‘Further Training of Journalists’ Project also began in 2000, 
with the aim of contributing
…to upgrading the quality of Vietnamese journalism both in terms of content 
and the form of expression through further training aiming at improving the pro­
fessional skills of journalists at in­house training and short term training courses. 
(as stated in Ljungman et al, 2005)
MoCI managed the project, with technical assistance from the 
Swedish Institute for Further Education of Journalists (FOJO). The 
training courses provided by the project aimed to improve the pro-
fessional skills of journalists, but also provided opportunity for dia-
logue on the role of the media and the Press Law. A study in 2005 
noted that of the 11,000 accredited journalists in the country more 
than 1,200 received training through the project (Ljungman et al, 
2005).5.5.4 Results 
Results from evaluation reports and from interviews with key 
informants conducted during this present study suggest that Swe-
den’s support to the media during this period, and subsequently, has 
been a success.
An evaluation of the Local Radio Project in 2004 found that half 
of all local radio stations across Vietnam broadcast at least one live 
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hour per day, a significant advance on pre-2000 levels. Further, the 
evaluation noted that the capacity of the local radio stations had 
developed, with noticeable improvements in management skills, par-
ticularly staff competence in live broadcasting and using technical 
equipment. The evaluation found that stations that had introduced 
live broadcasts had experienced dramatically increased calls and 
greater audience interaction, leading some to invest in expanding 
their capacity to produce this type of service. However, the evalua-
tion also noted concerns over the sustainability of many stations giv-
en the costs of the equipment and the ongoing shortages of resourc-
es. An evaluation of Sida’s overall support to media and culture in 
2005 broadly echoed these findings, stating that:
Staff retention, the creation of a core of Vietnamese trainers, greater pro­
gramme variety and listener satisfaction all point to the conclusion that the pro­
ject’s overall goal is being reached. (Ljungman et al, 2005)
Similarly, Sweden’s support for the training of journalists is widely 
seen as having made a significant contribution to the development of 
the press in Vietnam. Former participants and government officials 
claim that newspapers no longer blindly carry government press 
releases and now include more development news (Ljungman et al, 
2005). Interviews with MoCI personnel familiar with the program 
revealed high levels of satisfaction with Sweden’s support, especially 
relative to other potential donors. MoCI were also of the opinion that 
levels of interaction between the media and audience had increased 
considerably alongside professional standards. One former partici-
pant interviewed for the present study described how this exposure 
had impacted him and his organisation, Vietnam Television (VTV):
I was selected to be a trainer, in the train the trainer programme. This was 
the first time we learnt about presenting the news in a ‘western’ style, it was 
a more effective style than the ‘Soviet’ style we were used to. It was more focussed, 
there was more human content and it was much shorter. This was introduced by 
Sweden, this really influenced VTV.
Other key informants who had participated in the program 
described how the training they had received had improved their 
understanding of ethics. Interestingly, some felt that Sweden’s reasoned 
and balanced approach had been an important ingredient of the pro-
ject’s success. As one interviewee said “when Sweden work with us they 
do not push us, they give us a choice and are not imposing”. However, 
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they also highlighted the political sensitivities involved, referring to an 
occasion when the project had supported dissident elements.
5.6 Case Study 8: The Access to Justice Project
Sweden’s first project on legal reform (Support to Strengthening 
the Rule of Law, Phase I) commenced in 1991, but was part of 
a broader suite of Swedish interventions to support the necessary 
economic, legal and administrative reforms for Vietnam’s transition 
to a market-oriented economy. Case Study 3 provides an overview of 
the Doi Moi reform, and associated political and economic challeng-
es. In response to these challenges, over a period of almost 20 years 
(1991–2009), Sweden supported a series of projects to support legal 
reforms and access to justice (see Box 1) over a period of almost 
20 years (1991–2009). Sida was the first donor to engage in this sensi-
tive sector made possible by their special relationship with the Viet-
namese government49, and was soon followed by several other 
donors (initially Danida, Novib and CIDA, and then ADB, Jica and 
GTZ) (Carlsson et al, 1999). Past evaluations and newly gathered 
data shows that Sida’s approach to law and justice reform shifted 
over time, and had several significant impacts. 
5.6.1 Sweden in the legal Sector: Development Objectives 
Sweden’s initial support to the legal sector aimed to contribute to 
the development of reliable public administration systems and the rule 
of law, which was seen by both countries as central to a flourishing 
49 Interview with Professor Hiep, Ministry of Justice 28 March 2011.
Box 1: Sida-funded projects in the legal sector
Support to Strengthening the Rule of Law, Phase I: 1991–1995 
Support to Strengthening the Rule of Law, Phase II: 1995–1997 
Legal Sector Support: Strengthening the Rule of Law in Vietnam, 
Phase II: 1997–2001 
Support to Strengthening the Rule of Law, Phase III: 2000–2002 
Strengthening Legal Information (Sub-project): 2001–2004 
Strengthening Law Making and Law Implementing in Vietnam (Sub-
project): 2001–2004 
Support to the Legal Aid System in Vietnam: 2001–2004 
Legal Education (Sub-project): 2001–2004 
Strengthening Legal Education, Phase III (Sub-project): 2005–2009
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market economy. Three phases of activities to “Strengthen the Rule of 
Law” (1991–1997; 1997–2001; 2000–2002) broadly aimed to help 
Vietnam develop reliable legal and administrative systems, and 
through this to create favourable conditions for substantial interna-
tional investment and growth in the domestic economy. Key areas of 
support included: (i) the development of independent (i.e. civil rather 
than the existing state-based) systems to arbitrate economic disputes; 
(ii) legislation for administrative decision making and appeals as well 
as a functioning system of administrative courts; (iii) strengthening 
legislative and administrative processes in the Ministry of Justice; (iv) 
strengthening tertiary legal education through better teaching 
resources and strengthening the capacity of teaching staff; and (v) 
a legal information system to document and share information on 
legal proceedings. 
In 1997, a major evaluation of Sida’s legal reform programs found 
that the overall aid effort was well placed in relation to national 
development needs, but that a clearer delineation was needed 
between law-making and the implementation of laws, which extend-
ed to questions of access to the justice system. By the early 2000s, 
there was a visible shift in Sweden’s emphasis from the making of 
laws and strengthening of administrative systems to access to justice, 
with a focus on marginalised groups, democracy and human rights. 
5.6.2 The Impact of Sweden’s Support
Three significant areas of impact emerge from previous evalua-
tions of Sweden’s support to Vietnam’s legal and justice system and 
recent interviews undertaken as part of this evaluation: 
1. Contribution to the development of legal frameworks and admin-
istrative systems; 
2. Strengthening of the legal profession and professional associa-
tions; and 
3. Broadening access to the justice system.
On the first point, a key strength of the suite of ‘rule of law’ projects 
has been their focus on areas of high priority for the Vietnamese gov-
ernment (Carlsson et al, 1999). Several new laws directly resulted 
from Sweden’s projects, for instance on bankruptcy, civil courts and 
competition law, to name a few.50 Furthermore, the laws developed 
50 Group interview with Ministry of Justice officers, 28 March 2011.
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with Swedish support were seen as being most relevant to the Viet-
namese context:
 … with the Swedish funded project we got access to many different consult­
ants with a broad range of experience and knowledge of different legal systems; 
this helped us to develop more appropriate laws.51
These reforms have ongoing importance for Vietnam, for instance 
in, positioning the country well for its recent ascension to the WTO.52
Sweden’s work on legal education has been positively assessed for 
its impact on legal educators, professional associations and tertiary 
legal curricula (Karia et al, 2008). Several, now highly respected, 
lawyers, were trained in Swedish universities and one informant 
captured this relationship with the statement that “many Vietnam-
ese lawyers remember Sida very fondly”53. Sweden directly assisted 
the drafting of a law54 guiding the operation of lawyers, and helped 
to establish an independent Bar Association in 2005 (Denmark also 
supported the latter initiative). These initiatives provided oversight of 
the legal profession as well as strengthening capacity. Sweden’s gen-
der equity focus also meant that many female officials benefited 
from these legal education initiatives. However their sustainability 
has been questioned, as the changes sought through these projects 
were long term and complex (Karia et al, 2008).
In terms of access to justice, Sweden was once again an early and 
influential actor in establishing and extending the impact of Vietnam’s 
legal aid institutions. While the legal aid project started in 2001, Swe-
den had already been active in this area during the 1990s, hosting 
a workshop on legal aid in 1995, and sponsoring a visit to Australia in 
1997 by key officials to learn about the legal aid system in that coun-
try. These initiatives were influential. The Vietnamese government 
decided to pilot its first provincial legal aid centres in 1996, and to 
establish a National Legal Aid Agency under the Ministry of Justice in 
1997. As a result of the legal aid initiative, officials reported a:
... huge increase in awareness of the poor about their right to access legal aid, 
awareness increased from 10% in 2004 to 64% in 2009; more than 400,000 
people have accessed legal service; the number of people who had a lawyer to rep­
resent them has increased 28%.
51 Group interview with Ministry of Justice officers, 28 March 2011
52 Group interview with Ministry of Justice officers, 28 March 2011
53 Group interview with Ministry of Justice officers, 28 March 2011
54 Group interview with Ministry of Justice officers, 28 March 2011
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An independent evaluation also found that Sweden’s legal aid 
program contributed to improvements on several indicators of 
democracy and human rights, particularly on access to justice by 
disadvantaged groups.55
At the same time, access to justice and human rights was argu-
ably one of the most fraught areas in the Sweden-Vietnam relation-
ship. Sweden’s rights-based approach to development did not always 
sit comfortably with the GoV, with a senior official commenting: 
During this time we did not understand each other sometimes; we did not 
understand the reaction of the Swedish government to human rights in particular. 
Unlike the initial legal sector programs, Sweden’s move into human 
rights and democracy did not coincide in the same way with GoV pri-
orities. Rather there may have been areas of conflict and tension, with 
implications for sustainability. For instance, Ministry of Justice officials 
were concerned about whether ongoing legal aid programs could be 
sustained following Sweden’s rapid withdrawal, as donor funding 
accounted for around 60% of the total budget (Carlsson et al, 1999). 
Finally, aside from these project-related impacts, Sweden’s early 
role in the legal sector gave it an important opportunity to set the 
focus of donor engagement in this sector, as well as an important 
coordination role. 
5.7 Case Study 9: Partner-Driven Co-operation
5.7.1 The Development Context
As discussed in Chapter 2, Vietnam has made some very significant 
development achievements in a relatively short period of time, particu-
larly since the Doi Moi reforms of the late 1980s onwards. As a result of 
these achievements Vietnam graduated to Middle Income Country 
(MIC) status in 2009.56 This graduation has precipitated a change in 
relations between Vietnam and its development partners, particularly 
those donors whose aid is targeted towards less developed countries. 
55 Final Report: Effects of Vietnamese-Swedish development co-operation on 
democracy and human rights in Vietnam: Data analysis and indicator assess-
ment of the legal sector, November 2006 (Table Ref: 515)
56 MIC status is defined as having a GDP per capita of between USD 996 and 
USD 3,945 for Lower Middle Income and between USD 3946 and USD 
12,195 for Upper Middle Income status. These are relatively arbitrary catego-
ries stipulated by the World Bank. For a detailed discussion of the role of aid 
to MICs, see Glennie (2011).
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Sweden has been very clear about its preferred mode of co-opera-
tion with Vietnam in its capacity as a middle-income country. In 
line with the Swedish Governments policy decision in 2007 to con-
centrate aid resources in a smaller number of countries, a decision 
was made to phase out traditional development co-operation with 
Vietnam by 2013 and gradually replace this with ‘selective co-opera-
tion’. The aims of this co-operation are to enhance democratic gov-
ernance, create a greater respect for human rights and facilitate 
environmentally sustainable development.57 
Partner Driven Co-operation (PDC) is introduced as the pre-
ferred aid modality in the 2009 Country Strategy, with the objective 
to “encourage and enhance the establishment of self-supporting rela-
tions based on mutual self-interest between Swedish and Vietnamese 
actors”58. This focus on a multiplicity of actors (and not the tradi-
tional government to government relations that has largely charac-
terised Swedish-Vietnam relations for nearly 40 years) builds on, and 
operationalizes, many of the principles laid down in Sweden’s 2003 
Policy for Global Development. 59
The Swedish Government’s PDC policy60 defines PDC as “efforts 
that stimulate co-operation between primarily Swedish actors and 
actors in low and middle income countries building on mutual inter-
est and articulated responsibility shared between actors with the 
potential to generate self-sustainable relations with time”. This poli-
cy is being widely used in countries that have reached MIC status or 
where Sweden is phasing out traditional development co-operation. 
While the Swedish Government’s policy for Partner Driven  
Co-operation is relatively new, ‘PDC-like’ arrangements with more 
‘advanced’ developing countries have been a characteristic of the 
Swedish aid program for a number of decades. A recent study by 
Pettit tracks the evolution within Swedish aid of so-called ‘broader 
co-operation’, which has run parallel to traditional aid programs 
since the mid 1970s (Pettit, 2010). With its focus on mutual interest 
and knowledge sharing, and its associated concern with forging 
57 Strategy for Development Co-operation with Vietnam, January 2009-Decem-
ber 2013, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Government Offices of Sweden (2009)
58 Ibid.
59 Shared Responsibility: Sweden’s Policy for Global Development. Government 
Bill 2002/03:122
60 Government proposition 2007/46452/UP, p2
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‘normal’ relations with developing countries, ‘broader co-operation’ 
shares many of the same characteristics as its modern day equiva-
lent. PDC was, Pettit suggests, developed to codify many of the 
aspects of ‘broader co-operation’.
5.7.2 The Implementation of PDC in Vietnam
The main focal points for Sweden’s PDC in Vietnam are: environ-
ment, climate change, health, research and trade or business. Sepa-
rate to this is funding for ‘strategic interventions’ – primarly focused 
on human rights, democracy and anticorruption The PDC adminis-
trative process begins with the promotion of the modality to potential 
partners in Vietnam and Sweden, which may include public service 
bodies, civil society organisations, academia or the private sector. 
This is followed by broader partnership facilitation by Program 
Officer’s (POs) at Post, and the writing of a brief proposal for a plan-
ning grant once a clear partnership idea has been agreed. This is 
a small grant designed to help a group find a partner, or to build trust 
amongst partners with limited previous interaction. The small grant 
helps potential partners develop ideas and provides resources to aid 
in the drafting of an application for a Co-operation Grant.61 
As of September 2011 approximately 108 MSEK had been allocat-
ed to PDC in Vietnam. This included SEK 5,609,152 for the funding 
of 19 planning grants in a large range of fields including culture, 
media, research, environment and natural resource management; and 
SEK 95,678,047 for Co-operation grants in areas such as climate 
change adaptation, health, environment, economics and research co-
operation. As mentioned many of these larger grants have built on 
strong pre-existing bonds between partners that have been built over 
40 years of development co-operation between Sweden and Vietnam. 
The implementation of PDC in Vietnam has proceeded quite 
smoothly since the launch of the 2009 Country Strategy. There was, 
as is experienced with the introduction of any new aid modality or 
management process at Post, a steep learning curve experienced by 
some POs who were used to much more prescriptive aid modalities 
and initially struggled with the more flexible, facilitation-oriented 
role required to administer a PDC program. However, as policies 
and procedures where clarified and guidelines 
61 In cases where a pre-existing relationship exists it is possible to skip the plan-
ning grant and move directly to co-operation grants.
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customised for Post-based operations, this initial stasis was overcome 
and participants have entered into a large range of partnership 
arrangements in areas of mutual interest to Vietnam and Sweden.
5.7.3 Strengths and Challenges
PDC-like approaches are growing in popularity in Vietnam and 
Sida has in some respects led the way in this regard. A recent study 
by McCarty commissioned by the Like-Minded Donors Group 
(LMDG) discusses the role of PDC in Vietnam and highlights the 
important demonstration role Sweden has played as one of the origi-
nal promulgators of PDC. This report reviews a number of 
approaches and suggests that 
…the appropriate approach is more hands­off, rather like the Sida model. Let 
partnerships blossom wherever they emerge, and support them so long as criteria 
are met: mutual interest evident; sustainability a serious possibility. (Pettit,2010)
The report emphasises the importance of letting relationships 
lead the way in creating partnerships, and in defining roles and 
developing proposals, something that Sida has emphasised and 
actively promotes through their role as facilitator and through the 
planning grants. 
In some respects the success of the Swedish PDC approach in Viet-
nam stems from the diverse and long lasting relationships between 
Swedish and Vietnamese actors. Whether in academia, culture or gov-
ernment, Swedish and Vietnamese actors have developed meaningful 
partnerships for mutual benefit for decades now and the PDC arrange-
ment essentially provides transitional funding for old and new partners 
to normalise relations in the post-ODA context. Anecdotal evidence 
suggests that other donors in Vietnam are not progressing as well in 
developing partnerships as has Sweden. Many of these donors have not 
had the same type of special relationship with Vietnam as Sweden. 
This almost certainly impacts on their capacity to forge sustainable 
partnerships. It raises questions about the effectiveness of donors using 
PDC-like models in countries where limited multi-actor partnerships 
exist. This includes the use of PDC by Sweden in such countries and 
suggests that some effort should be made to quantify the scope of pre-
existing relationships prior to implementing a PDC program. 
The depth and breadth of relationships between Vietnamese and 
Swedish actors bodes well for the sustainability of relations after fund-
ing ceases. The issues and challenges with the PDC model stem less 
from these partnerships and more from bureaucratic and policy issues 
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back in Sweden, and from the broader development effectiveness agen-
da which PDC-like approaches expressly contradict in many aspects.
A number of these broader issues where mentioned by respondents 
in Vietnam and Sweden during the conduct of this evaluation. These 
issues included a desire to ensure there was more consistent guidance 
on the procedures for administering PDC programs, the need to clari-
fy a number of issues regarding the potential use of domestic agency 
funding for partner driven co-operation, and international legal issues 
surrounding the use of aid money in support of the private sector in 
Sweden, which may abrogate European financial regulations.
There is a clear need for the Swedish Government to clarify the cir-
cumstances under which domestic agencies can support ODA activities 
with their own budget appropriation, which is, at present, ambiguous. 
This raises an important issue about the sustainability of PDC arrange-
ments. Associated with sustainability is another concern about the 
capacity of Swedish domestic agencies to continue to partner with 
a growing number of developing countries. Such concerns are a partic-
ular issue if those agencies partner in areas that are primary focal 
points for Swedish development co-operation, as one may expect the 
number of activities in these areas to increase over time. This suggests 
that the thematic focus for PDCs in partner countries should be more 
organic and less prescriptive and build on the multiplicity of pre-exist-
ing relations between Sweden and it development partners.
Clearly the PDC modality raises a number of issues about aid 
effectiveness that also need to be addressed by Sweden and the 
development community more generally. This includes the potential 
for proliferation of aid activities, and the tied nature of PDC aid. 
With regard to the former it is the case with Vietnam that PDC-like 
proliferation is not placing a burden on the Ministry of Planning 
and Investment (MPI) as much of the management and reporting is 
undertaken by the Embassy with the MPI playing a much more 
hands off role than in more traditional aid programs. 
There are also a number of interesting issues that the discussion on 
PDC in Vietnam raises about the Paris principles of aid effectiveness, 
and the tied aid provisions in particular, suggesting that some revision 
of these principles in light of the likely growth of PDC may be required. 
It is clear that PDC funding is tied aid under these provisions, however 
it should also be recognised that there is, in Vietnam, a demand for 
Swedish partnership co-operation. This was one of the constant themes 
highlighted in over 150 interviews with Vietnamese respondents. 
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Individuals, government bodies, private sector companies and many 
other groups from Vietnam have developed close and fruitful relations 
with Swedish partners and they wanted these to continue after the 
phase out of traditional development co-operation. As this report dem-
onstrates the special relationship between the two countries has led to 
some impressive and effective development outcomes. 
5.8 Significance for this Evaluation
The case studies discussed in this chapter highlight how, in different 
ways, Sweden’s support has diversified significantly and had moved 
into more sensitive areas. These projects and the context from which 
they emerged provide further insights into the evolution of the special 
relationship. These case studies highlight a number of issues that are of 
relevance to the main evaluation questions posed in this report and are 
discussed in Chapters 6 and 7. Some key issues that emerge include:
•	 The	Chia	Se	case	study	illustrates	how	the	development	of	trust	
over a long period of co-operation contributed to the emergence of 
an innovative program that could have far reaching implications 
for grass roots democracy and participatory planning in Vietnam;
•	 The	case	study	of	Sweden’s	support	to	PAR	in	Quang	Tri	province	
is an example of how Sweden encouraged ownership from an early 
stage. This ownership allowed the provincial implementing agency 
to select a highly relevant focus. The results were highly effective;
•	 The	case	studies	of	the	media	and	legal	sectors	are	illustrative	of	
how Sweden worked in sensitive areas. The legal sector case study 
explores how ownership and sustainability can be undermined 
when a donor’s interests move too far ahead of the partner coun-
try’s interests. Both cases once again show how Sweden’s history of 
co-operation and the relatively high level of trust between Sweden 
and Vietnam provided solid foundations upon which to build;
•	 The	discussion	of	the	successful	PDC	mode	of	co-operation	high-
lights how Sweden has been able to build on the goodwill inher-
ent in its relationships with Vietnamese actors to forge a new type 
of co-operation.
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6.  ThE ChArACTEriSTiCS OF SWEDiSh 
AiD TO ViETnAM
6.1 Introduction
The following chapter provides a synthesis of the material pre-
sented in Chapters 2 through to 5. The chapter outlines what the 
Evaluation Team views as several important characteristics of 
 Swedish aid to Vietnam over the 45 years of co-operation, namely:
•	 A	‘special	relationship’.	This	label	has	been	frequently	applied	to	
development co-operation between Vietnam and Sweden. Never-
theless, it resonates throughout the case studies;
•	 A	long-term	approach.	Sweden’s	tendency	to	apply	a long-term	
perspective has both contributed to, and arises from, the special 
relationship that grew between the two countries. This character-
istic also explains the reaction among Vietnam partner organisa-
tions towards Sweden’s decision to phase out development coop-
eration; and
•	 Flexibility	and	openness	to	new	ideas.	These	characteristics	are	
supportive of a long-term approach since they enable existing 
projects to evolve and adapt to emerging realities in Vietnam. 
This chapter also uses the AQEF framework to discuss some impor-
tant insights into the effectiveness of Sweden’s development co-oper-
ation with Vietnam arising from the material presented in the previ-
ous chapters. This synthesis provides some important context for the 
concluding chapter which addresses the evaluation questions and 
presents lessons learned.
6.2 A ‘Special Relationship’
The term ‘special’ is not used lightly. Was it ‘special’? There is 
much evidence to suggest that it was. Few other donors have enjoyed 
the same access or have been able to work on issues of such sensitivity 
within a single party state. Officials from donor members of the 
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Like-Minded Donors Group (LMDG) echoed this view during 
a group interview in Hanoi.62
The development of this special relationship emerges clearly from 
chapters 3, 4 and 5 and, as it is argued later, has important implica-
tions for aid effectiveness. Indeed it is possible to discern the influ-
ence of this relationship in the origins and evolution of almost every 
case study in this report. 
Sweden’s decision to express solidarity with Vietnam during the 
war with the US was a decisive starting point. The development co-
operation program became the principal vehicle for the concrete 
expression of this policy during the 1960s and 1970s. Many of the 
projects acquired rich symbolic significance because of this back-
ground, and this still remains today. This is clearly illustrated in the 
case study of Sweden’s early support to the health sector, a project, 
which originated from the damage wrought by US wartime bomb-
ing. The Bai Bang Project was without doubt the most high profile of 
these initiatives. The sheer magnitude of this effort and the breadth 
of contact that the project facilitated between the two countries con-
tributed significantly to deepening the relationship, even if progress 
was sometimes difficult. Sweden was certainly not the largest donor 
during this period of massive Soviet support, but was nevertheless 
symbolically important as one of the few donors not to substantially 
scale back aid to Vietnam following the invasion of Cambodia.
The relationship continued to develop during the 1990s. The 
case study of support to economic reform (Chapter 4) illustrates how 
growing awareness of the uniqueness of Sweden’s position led to 
a wide-ranging program of support in a crucially important area. 
The Soviet Union had collapsed as a source of assistance and few 
other donors enjoyed the same level of trust. Sweden’s commitment 
to the Doi Moi reforms in turn contributed to a broadening of devel-
opment co-operation into a range of new sectors. This support was 
highly appreciated by the GoV, as is emphasized in chapter 4.
The impact of the special relationship is also evident in the par-
ticular sectors in which Sida provided assistance. The late 1990s and 
2000s saw Sweden become increasingly involved in democracy, 
human rights, the media, the legal sector and anticorruption – all 
highly sensitive areas, which few other donors were allowed to enter. 
This is also exemplified by the emergence of the Chia Se Program. 
62 Group interview with LMDG members in Hanoi, 18/03/2011.
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As noted in the case study, this involved the negotiation of complex 
dynamics within the GoV, a process that involved some risk for the 
MPI. The fact that such an innovative reform-oriented initiative 
could be implemented, has much to do, it is suggested, with the trust 
that had developed between Sida and MPI. Chia Se, as is noted in 
Chapter 5, has been uniquely successful in a challenging area. 
The relationship has experienced periods of tension, particularly 
after the turn of the century when the Policy for Global Develop-
ment (PGD) amplified the focus on human rights and democracy in 
Sweden’s development co-operation. The move by Sweden into 
a more explicitly political arena tested the ‘special relationship’ as 
the legal aid case in particular illustrates. Despite a special relation-
ship, Sweden, like all donors, must still walk a tightrope in respond-
ing to, as opposed to pushing forward, government agendas. 
More recently, the relationship between Sweden and Vietnam 
has benefited the collective donor engagement with GoV. As high-
lighted in Chapter 5, other donor partners expressed strong appre-
ciation for Sweden’s work as ‘lead donor’ in sensitive areas such as 
anticorruption. Without Sweden they were much less confident of 
securing the same level of engagement. Indeed, a further indication 
of the ‘special’ nature of the relationship has been the fact that Swe-
den continued to be influential during the 2000s despite no longer 
being, in financial terms at least, a major donor. There is some ques-
tion among other donors as to whether Sweden could have pushed 
sensitive issues harder with more significant results.63
Importantly, there is evidence that Sweden was able to act as 
a catalyst for Vietnam developing productive relationships with 
 other donors. This is made clear by the GoV Ministry of Natural 
Resources and Environment (MONRE), which noted that:
Sweden in recent years has helped a lot ... to build a foundation for Vietnam 
to expand co­operation with international partners such as UNDP, UNEP, 
CIDA Canada, Holland, Denmark Danida, Australia AusAID, USAID, 
Finida Finland, UK, France, EU, World Bank, ADB etc. In the field of natu­
ral resources and environment (MONRE, 2009, p.3).
6.3 A Long-term Approach
A long-term approach, although evident in some sectors more 
than others, stands out as a key characteristic of Sweden’s 
63 Interview with LMDG, 18/03/2011.
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development co-operation with Vietnam. As Forsberg notes, many 
Vietnamese partner agencies were surprised by Sweden’s decision to 
phase out because they had grown comfortable with Sweden’s long-
term approach and were unaccustomed to unilateral decisions (Fors-
berg, 2010).
This long-term approach is clearly demonstrated in the three case 
studies that collectively trace the evolution of Swedish aid from the 
Bai Bang Project to forestry, rural development, and eventually to the 
Chia Se Program. Sweden never contemplated ending co-operation 
in natural resource management or rural development, even in the 
face of considerable difficulty. An economic evaluation of the mill in 
1999 (see Centre for International Economics, 1999), illustrated that 
the mill has eventually become financially viable under Vietnamese 
management. Rather, Sweden has been flexible to pursue new ideas 
and modes of co-operation that build upon and extend previous 
efforts in the same sector. The in depth involvement of MARD in the 
preparation of MRDP (Case Study 4) is an example of how this 
approach played out. The results of this approach can be seen in the 
success of the Chia Se program and the influence that it is now hav-
ing on national policy. The long history of Sweden in natural 
resource management and rural development has been integral to 
these successful outcomes. It is unlikely that a program with the char-
acteristics of Chia Se would have emerged without the lessons and 
relationships that had developed during the 30 years that preceded it.
It is difficult to discern the discrete factors that drive the tendency 
for long-term involvement, but they are likely to be manifold. Some 
are structural. For example, the large size of the investment in the 
Bai Bang Project, accompanied by the press scrutiny, would have 
made it very difficult for Sweden to withdraw. The long-term per-
spective also arises partly from the origins of Swedish aid to Viet-
nam as an expression of solidarity. This abstract principle was a par-
ticularly important motivator for Swedish aid in the early stages of 
the relationship – a period when other donors exited and entered. 
However, Sweden remained in Vietnam throughout this time, and 
established important relationships with partner agencies within the 
GoV. These relationships provided the foundation for further co-
operation during the 1990s.
By the early 1990s, when the influence of solidarity as a motivator 
had waned, Sweden had become aware that it occupied a unique 
position. From this point on, the preservation of the relationship 
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itself may have become an important factor in the long-term per-
spective that was adopted at a country strategy level.
6.4 Flexibility and Openness to New Ideas
Allied to a long-term approach, flexibility and openness is evident in 
the way Sweden implemented projects, responded to opportunities, 
and addressed challenges. There are many examples of this. The three 
case studies tracing the evolution from Bai Bang to Chia Se show how 
these characteristics were crucial enablers of the transition between dif-
ferent phases of support. The emergence of PDC also highlights a flex-
ible response to the phase out situation based on a new reality in the 
development co-operation relationship. If PDC succeeds in maintain-
ing (and growing) a significant volume of partnerships, it should be seen 
as a particularly poignant example of these characteristics.
Flexibility and a willingness to consider new ideas are important to 
long-term development effectiveness. Without these characteristics the 
trajectory of long-term development co-operation risks becoming ‘path 
dependent’ – a process whereby early decisions risk constraining choic-
es available later to the detriment of development effectiveness. This 
issue has in fact been raised by several evaluations (see for example 
Baulch et al, 2003), but few examples are found of such a risk eventuat-
ing. The transition between MRDP and Chia Se illustrates that Swe-
den was not constrained by previous choices (in this case, the choice of 
partner agency) in the pursuit of new approaches. In fact, this case 
study demonstrates how Sweden was prepared to negotiate difficult 
political dynamics in order to proceed with an initiative that offered 
greater potential for effective multidimensional poverty reduction.
6.5 The Aid Quality Evaluation Framework
As mentioned in Chapter 1 an important part of the methodolo-
gy used for this evaluation is the application of the Aid Quality Eval-
uation Framework (AQEF)64. This Framework is a heuristic device 
that focuses on the drivers of aid effectiveness; it can be deployed 
when assessing the impact of aid programs over a long period of 
time when quantitative causal attribution is impossible, due to either 
the small size of an aid program or the difficulties in disentangling 
endogenous factors. The following sections discuss four of the five 
components of the AQEF with reference to the information present-
64 This is explained at length in Appendix C. 
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ed in Chapters 2 through 5 and provide some important insights into 
the effectiveness of Swedish development co-operation with Viet-
nam, insights which are discussed further in Chapter 7. Component 
5 of the AQEF is actually addressed when answering the overall 
evaluation questions in Chapter 7. 
6.5.1  Absorptive Capacity and the Quality of Public Sector Financial 
Management
Absorptive Capacity (AC) refers to the capacity of the partner 
country to use aid efficiently for development purposes. It is based on 
the simple recognition that there are limits to the amounts of aid that 
can be efficiently absorbed, with higher and higher levels of aid not 
necessarily associated with bigger and better development impacts. 
As discussed in Chapter 2 AC is an important part of the ODA ena-
bling environment, alongside the quality of public sector financial 
management. If that enabling environment is weak then aid will be 
less efficient in achieving good development outcomes than it other-
wise would be. This provides important context within which to eval-
uate the overall effectiveness of Swedish aid to Vietnam.
The analysis in Chapter 2 suggests that AC trended upwards dur-
ing the period of development co-operation, although declining 
briefly during the early 2000s. This upward trajectory reflects a gen-
eral increase in the four drivers of AC discussed in chapter 2, name-
ly: concessional borrowing capacity; human capacity (as proxied by 
the HDI); and the quality of PFM. This trend, combined with the 
relatively low ratio of ODA to GDP, suggests that AC was not a bar-
rier to effective aid delivery in Vietnam.
It is also important to note that Sweden made a significant contri-
bution to the increase in AC. As emphasised throughout this report, 
the Doi Moi economic reforms have been central to Vietnam’s devel-
opment achievements. Sweden’s support to this process, as outlined 
in case study 3, was both timely and influential.
6.5.2 Consistency with Paris Declaration Principles
The case studies introduced above highlight a number of aid effec-
tiveness issues that can be fruitfully discussed with reference to the Par-
is Principles on Aid Effectiveness. Clearly, it is beyond the scope of this 
evaluation to conduct a comprehensive assessment of the Paris princi-
ples as they relate to Sweden’s aid to Vietnam, however the Evaluation 
Team can highlight some important insights with respect to ownership 
and alignment in particular, which have much to say about 
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the potential sustainability of Sweden’s interventions in Vietnam. As 
discussed in Appendix C, assessments based on these elements are not 
used to criticise the aid delivery decisions made in the early years of 
Sweden’s co-operation with Vietnam as much of the knowledge of what 
contributes to effective aid was not known at that time. However it is 
relevant to assess programs against these principles because it is pro-
posed that aid that exhibited characteristics like those enshrined in the 
Paris principles would be more effective than aid that did not exhibit 
those characteristics, regardless of the period of time under review.
There is much evidence that Sweden has encouraged Vietnamese 
ownership of the development agenda from a very early stage. As noted 
in Chapter 3, the choice of project aid over program aid during the 
very first development co-operation negotiations reflected Vietnamese 
priorities and perceptions at the time. An ‘ownership agenda’ has also 
been at the heart of the evolution of development co-operation agenda. 
The preparation of MRDP was a unique demonstration of Swedish 
concern for ownership (Case study 4). This approach was similar to the 
design of support to PAR in Quang Tri, where the provincial DoHA 
retained significant control over the scope and focus of the support. In 
this case MARD had an unprecedented level of control over the design 
process, with Swedish consultants acting in the role of advisers. Swed-
ish development co-operation tended to be delivered through GoV 
organisations, a practice that has enhanced ownership. As develop-
ment co-operation expanded into sensitive areas such as the ‘rule of 
law’, questions of ownership became more complex. As highlighted in 
the legal aid case study, this can sometimes result in lower levels of GoV 
ownership and consequently, uncertain sustainability into the future.
There are similarly strong indications that Swedish aid was 
strongly aligned to Vietnamese priorities from the initial stages of 
development co-operation. The selection of the iconic Bai Bang Pro-
ject was a response to the second Vietnamese five-year plan, with its 
concentration on the creation of industry and agriculture. The sup-
port that Sweden provided to the Doi Moi economic reform is a par-
ticularly poignant example of alignment. As highlighted in the case 
study 3, Sweden reoriented the thrust of the entire development co-
operation program to respond to the reform process. The well-docu-
mented results of economic reform and their effect on poverty bear 
testimony to the effectiveness of this decision. As Sweden’s focus has 
shifted more towards rights-based perspectives and democracy, align-
ment has been a more nuanced question. Certainly, Sweden’s 
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objectives align closely with the expressed intent of strategies such as 
the CPRGS. However, in sensitive areas such as media, legal aid, and 
anticorruption, practical support has involved a delicate balance 
between promoting change, while avoiding controversial subjects that 
are patently not aligned to Party interests. Despite occasional epi-
sodes of tension, Sweden’s support in these more sensitive areas has 
been broadly aligned to the direction of reform pursued by the GoV.
However, Swedish development co-operation exhibits less positive 
features with respect to two further principles of the Paris principles: 
untying and predictability. Swedish aid, as with most donors, has been 
tied for a large proportion of the 45 years of co-operation.65 This has 
almost certainly contributed to the severe cost overruns on the Bai 
Bang Project and suggests that in general, the efficiency of Swedish 
development co-operation was not as high as it might have been. As 
highlighted in Chapter 2, the predictability of Swedish aid has been 
less stable than aid from all donors to Vietnam. There were many rea-
sons for this. For example, Chapter 5 highlighted how budgetary con-
cerns in Sweden at the time led to an abrupt reduction in the annual 
disbursements over 2002 and 2003 in particular. Nonetheless, this too 
suggests that Swedish aid was less effective than it could have been.
6.5.3 Consistency with Partner Country Sectoral Priorities
Donor country programs should be consistent with development 
needs in countries, and they should be sufficiently flexible to respond 
to changing development needs or priorities. These needs may or 
may not be recognised in partner development plans or priorities. 
This issue is exemplified by Sweden’s early support to the health 
sector, which was focused on the construction of two high quality hos-
pitals during the 1970s. However, as noted in case study 1, this ignored 
the importance of primary health care needs, which would have been 
significant considering the country was emerging from extended con-
flict and was characterised by high levels of poverty. Significantly, 
Sweden and the Ministry of Health recognised this issue, resulting lat-
er in a project to support primary health care during the 1980s. 
In broad terms, Swedish aid was consistent with development 
needs in Vietnam. This is, in large part, a reflection of the far-sight-
edness of the Party in recognising the need for reform in many areas.
65 Sweden officially untied development co-operation in 2006.
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The above synthesis provides positive messages about Sweden’s 
development co-operation with Vietnam over time. Some observed 
features of Swedish aid, such as predictability, were in opposition to 
development effectiveness principles. However, the Evaluation team 
believes there was a strong commitment to principles of ownership and 
alignment even before their incorporation into the aid effectiveness lex-
icon. The development of Sweden’s ‘special relationship’ with Vietnam, 
the long-term approach in certain sectors, coupled with a flexibility and 
openness to new ideas helped improve the impact of development effec-
tiveness over time. Chapter 7 expands on these observations.
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PArT Three – SyNTheSIS
7.  COnCLuSiOnS AnD LESSOnS LEArnED
7.1 Introduction: Evaluation Questions
This chapter returns to the four evaluation questions outlined in 
Chapter 1, recalling that the primary question concerns the contri-
bution of Swedish development co-operation to multidimensional 
poverty reduction in Vietnam. It attempts to answer these questions, 
to the extent possible, drawing on the evidence presented in Chap-
ters 2 to 6 and some subsequent reflection. Responses to the 4 sub-
questions are provided first. Building on these responses, the prima-
ry evaluation question is then addressed.
Each question is succinctly and directly answered, drawing on 
but not replicating in any depth the analysis of the preceding chap-
ters. They are answers that logically emerge from this analysis and 
cannot be read in isolation to the previous chapters. Chapter 6 has 
already answered a number of the evaluation questions without 
directly addressing them, which is the task of this chapter.
7.2 Evaluation Sub-questions
Sub-question 1: To what extent did Sida’s aid respond to pressing multi­
dimensional development needs in Vietnam?
There is clear evidence that, on balance, Sida responded to 
important multidimensional development needs in Vietnam. 
Vietnam faced many significant development challenges in 1975, 
with one of the most pressing being the need to rebuild infrastruc-
ture following the damage done during the Indo-Chinese War. 
Addressing health was also a pressing need. Both the Bai Bang Pro-
ject and support for constructing the Children’s Hospital in Hanoi 
and the General Hospital in Uong Bi were, broadly speaking, con-
sistent with these needs. However, closer examination of the devel-
opment situation in Vietnam at the time would suggest that other 
economic infrastructure and health initiatives would have been 
more appropriate. In the case of the health sector, there is evidence 
that primarily health care was a more pressing need, and was some-
thing that was subsequently recognised as such by Sweden in the 
1980s (see Case Study 1). In these early years, during the first phase 
of development co-operation, it is questionable whether Swedish 
development co-operation in Vietnam was entirely consistent with 
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the most important development needs in Vietnam during the first 
phase (up until 1986) of co-operation.
It was clear in the early to mid-1980s that Vietnam’s economy 
was running into trouble and that reform was required. Growth and 
productivity was low, various economic targets had not been met 
and income poverty was extremely high. Sweden’s support for Doi 
Moi from 1986 onwards was fully consistent with these pressing 
needs. This includes the need to reduce poverty, given links between 
this outcome and economic growth. The MRDP could also, at least 
in design, be considered an appropriate response to the high-income 
poverty rates in Vietnam that persisted throughout the early to mid-
1990s. Overall, therefore, during the second phase (from 1986 to 
1999) Swedish development co-operation with Vietnam was highly 
consistent with these pressing multidimensional poverty needs. 
Vietnam’s post-1986 economic reforms undoubtedly helped lift 
many millions of Vietnamese out of poverty. The number of people 
benefitted in this way is difficult to quantify precisely, but it is cer-
tainly in the millions, recalling that the number of Vietnamese living 
in extreme income poverty fell by 42 percentage points between 1993 
and	2006.	Yet	throughout	the	mid-	to	late-1990s	it	was	increasingly	
recognised in international development circles that in all countries 
economic growth alone is insufficient to eradicate poverty. It was also 
increasingly recognised that what was also needed were improve-
ments in human rights, democracy and government accountability. 
The shifts in emphasis of the Swedish development co-operation with 
Vietnam in the third phase, from 1999 to 2011, were fully consistent 
with this thinking. More pertinently, they were consistent with press-
ing development needs in Vietnam. This is clearest, arguably, in the 
case of poverty. Despite the reductions in the number of people living 
in extreme income poverty, some 78 percent of the Vietnamese peo-
ple still lived on less than two dollars per day in 1998. A more direct 
approach to poverty was required, and this is precisely what the Chia 
Se poverty alleviation program provided.
Sub-question 2: To what extent has Sida’s development co­operation pro­
gram in Vietnam been effectively and efficiently delivered?
The evidence of effective and efficient delivery of Swedish devel-
opment co-operation in Vietnam is mixed.
Evidence of effective and efficient delivery is scarcest during the 
first phase of development co-operation. The AQEF has not, in this 
evaluation, been used to assign numerical scores against any of the 
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periods considered. But if it had been used in this way it is reasona-
bly obvious the lowest scores would be given to this phase. While it 
seems that Sida’s priorities were aligned with those of the Vietnam-
ese government, there is evidence of significant aid tying. This was 
noted in the previous chapter, through its reference to the Bai Bang 
Project (and the resultant cost overruns). There is also evidence of 
a lack of capacity in the health sector, which adversely impacted on 
the effectiveness of Swedish support to that sector.
The second and third phases clearly saw much more effective and 
efficient Swedish aid delivery in Vietnam. There was strong Vietnam-
ese government ownership of the activities supported by Sida. Also 
these activities were very closely aligned to Vietnamese government 
priorities. Both points have been made and supported in Chapter 6 
and there is little need for further elaboration. Additionally, Sweden’s 
participation in the like-minded donor group is clear evidence of 
donor harmonisation and its push into PDC is evidence of internation-
al best practice in this new and interesting mode of co-operation.
The strong evidence of effective and efficient delivery in the sec-
ond and third phases of Swedish development co-operation with 
Vietnam appears to outweigh the weaker evidence to the contrary in 
the first phase. The overall conclusion, despite this mixed evidence, 
is that this co-operation was delivered with high levels of effective-
ness and efficiency.
Sub-question 3: How and to what extent did Sida’s development co­opera­
tion nurture an enabling environment for poverty reduction Vietnam?
There is clear evidence that Sida’s development co-operation nur-
tured such an environment in Vietnam, or put differently, that it 
provided the pre-conditions for sustained poverty reduction.
There are many demonstrations of such nurturing in the preced-
ing chapters, in Chapters 2 and 6, in particular. Nothing, however, 
demonstrates this more clearly than Swedish support for Doi Moi. 
Dr Le Dang Doanh, Former Senior Economic Adviser to Prime 
Minister Pham Van Dong, was a key informant for this evaluation 
and was quoted a number of times above, in Chapter 4. There is an 
additional quote that reinforces how important Swedish efforts were 
in nurturing poverty reduction in Vietnam. In response to a ques-
tion on this issue, his response was as follows:
‘You ask about the role of Sweden in the Doi Moi reform process. We would 
have done it ourselves of course, we would not have collapsed, their help was not 
that vital, but it would have been at a higher cost for us. It would have been 
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difficult for us and would have been slower’. (Dr Le Dang Doanh, Former 
Senior Economic Adviser to Prime Minister Pham Van Dong, 
Hanoi, March 23, 2011)
Sub-question 4: What lessons can be learned from Sweden’s development 
co­operation with Vietnam to improve development effectiveness in the future?
A response to this question emanates directly from Chapter 6 and 
as such can be stated very succinctly. 
The three lessons learned, which if acted upon can improve 
future development effectiveness, are: 
1. To recognise the importance of relationships; 
2. To adopt a long term approach – pursue an effective balance 
between principles and pragmatism; and 
3. To be flexible and open to new ideas.
While the case for each of these lessons learned has been articulated 
in detail in Chapter 6, some additional comments on the importance 
of relationships are warranted. If there is a single observation that 
stands above all others not only from this evaluation, but also the 
accompanying evaluations of Swedish development co-operation 
with Laos and Sri Lanka, it is of the importance of relationships. 
Swedish achievements in Vietnam are disproportionate to the finan-
cial volume of its development activities in this partner country. To 
use a somewhat crude term, Sweden has achieved enormous “bang 
for its buck” in Vietnam, and this additionality has arisen from the 
strong relationship between the two countries.
Madam Pham Chi Lan, Former Director General, Vietnam 
Chamber of Commerce, who was also quoted in Chapter 4, made 
the following observation:
‘Money is important, but what is more important is the support across our 
entire history with Sweden, this has nothing to do with money, other countries 
give us more money but we don’t have the same relationship with them’. (Mad-
am Pham Chi Lan, Former Director General, Vietnam Chamber of 
Commerce, Hanoi, March 23, 2011)
Madam Lam refers to the ‘entire history’ between Sweden and 
Vietnam. On this point it is appropriate to make one final comment 
on the Bai Bang Project. Less than positive comments were made 
about this project, on specific technical criteria, above. The true sig-
nificance of this project, along with support for building hospitals 
early in the first phase of development co-operation between Sweden 
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and Vietnam, is that they provided a basis for building an extremely 
productive relationship between the two countries, providing a basis 
for much more effective interventions that followed.
The clear message to the international donor community from 
this evaluation is that the nature of the relationship is an important 
prerequisite for effective development co-operation. The relationship 
needs to be supportive, understanding and honest, in which poten-
tially difficult issues can be discussed and acted upon in a pro-devel-
opment manner. This is what has characterised Swedish co-opera-
tion with Vietnam, and made it so successful.
Primary Evaluation Question: How, and to what extent, did Sida’s 
development assistance contribute to poverty reduction in Vietnam?
This	is	rarely	an	easy	question	to	answer.	Yet	is	has	already	been	
answered in large part given the comments made above. Prior to 
answering finally and more directly, consider some more evidence, 
in particular that concerning the big picture outlined in Chapter 2.
In Chapter 2 it was noted that there had been relatively high lev-
els of volatility in aid to Vietnam, including that from Sweden. 
There was increasing proliferation of aid activities, as well as a wor-
rying level of fragmentation. These are worrying for aid effective-
ness, yet there was other evidence that points to the contrary. There 
was evidence that aid levels where within the capacity of the Viet-
namese economy to efficiently absorb. There was also evidence of 
reasonably high levels of aid relative to key national aggregates, 
meaning that one could expect some sort of impact to be observed 
from them. There were the impressive development achievements of 
Vietnam, the huge reductions in income poverty in particular. In 
addition there was evidence of these achievements being associated 
statistically with aid to the country: it is a stylised fact that aid to 
Vietnam is positively associated with higher levels of achievement in 
income, health, education and, more broadly, human development 
in this country. While causality between these variables cannot be 
attributed on the basis of simple associations, there are a number of 
reasons for judging that causality might exist based on the evidence 
presented not only in Chapter 2 but elsewhere in this report. 
What does this mean for Swedish aid and poverty reduction in 
Vietnam? Two points can be made in response to this question. 
First, there is already strong evidence of the poverty reducing 
impacts of the Chia Se, suggesting that Sweden has indeed 
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contributed positively to the international effort to reduce poverty in 
Vietnam. The second point concerns the level of Swedish aid and 
what it has financed. Recall that in Chapter 2 it was noted that 
Swedish aid to Vietnam is of a level that one might expect it to have 
impacts at the national level if there is evidence that Sweden sup-
ported highly strategic, pivotal activities that were efficiently deliv-
ered. Do Moi is such an activity. While the exact extent to which 
Swedish development assistance has reduced poverty is a matter for 
speculation, it would appear to be beyond doubt that Sweden has 
worked with the Government of Vietnam to lift many millions of 
Vietnamese out of income poverty. The benefits of this assistance are 
almost certainly not limited to income dimension poverty alone, but 
to gains in other dimensions. It is a general rule, based on interna-
tional research, that higher growth facilitates gains in health and 
education. There is no reason to believe that this rule does not apply 
in Vietnam. It can reasonably be concluded, therefore, that the 
Swedish development co-operation has improved the health and 
education and overall human development levels of millions of 
 Vietnamese citizens.
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Appendix A: research Methodology
Introduction
The analytical framework and evaluation questions addressed in 
this study are outlined in Section 1.3 of the report. In this Appendix, 
further details are provided on case selection and data collection and 
analysis. 
The evaluation study deploys a mixed-methods approach, using 
qualitative and quantitative methods in a complementary way (Sale 
et al., 2002) to interrogate different types of evidence about the con-
text, evolution and outcomes of Swedish development assistance in 
Vietnam (and similar studies covering Laos and Sri Lanka). This 
approach has enabled robust and credible historical analysis of Sida’s 
programs, while providing the necessary flexibility to overcome spe-
cific data limitations. 
At the macro-level both quantitative and qualitative data were 
used to prepare Country Development Profiles, which outline the 
context for Swedish development co-operation. These profiles outline 
the major development trends (including progress in poverty reduc-
tion) and trends in aid delivery over the period of the evaluation, and 
the international political and economic circumstances that influ-
enced development and aid in Vietnam. Qualitative data from key 
informant interviews with experts and document analysis (including 
political-economic theories of aid delivery) augmented the quantita-
tive data and shed light on why these patterns of aid delivery arose. 
Similarly, quantitative and qualitative data were used in tandem 
at the meso level to provide empirical and contextual information on 
issues such as the sectoral and geographical distribution of aid. At 
the micro-level, quantitative and qualitative data were used to pro-
vide descriptive and contextual information on particular projects 
and programs. 
Quantitative Analysis
Quantitative analysis drew on available sources of data, such as 
Sida’s own databases, data provided by the government of Vietnam, 
the World Bank’s World Development Indicators, the UNDP’s 
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Human Development Report and the OECD DAC’s International 
Development Statistics. 
Such data informed the macro analysis of development and aid 
trends in the Country Development Profile. The data enabled 
assessment of changes in various dimensions of the quality of life, 
income poverty in particular. Chapter 2 analyses change in indica-
tors such as per capita income and its annual rates of growth, on life 
expectancy, adult literacy, child and infant mortality, maternal mor-
tality and the percentage of people living below the income poverty 
line. Key multidimensional indicators as also presented, such as the 
UNDP’s Human Development Index (HDI). Comprehensive infor-
mation on this index has been published by the UNDP since 1990, 
with HDI scores being available from 1970 onwards. Recognising 
that economic performance is an important driver of poverty reduc-
tion, GDP growth rates are also examined and key economic 
reforms and structural changes identified. 
The Country Development Profile also charts aid to Vietnam. 
Annual levels of Swedish and total official development assistance 
are shown, both in gross amounts, relative to GDP or GNI and the 
population size. These figures are also presented by sector. Data on 
aid proliferation and volatility (or predictability) were also assessed.
The quantitative analysis, while rigorous, did not involve econo-
metric modelling. This was ruled out in the TOR, but was difficult 
in any case owing to data availability and quality problems particu-
larly for the early years of Swedish development co-operation to the 
three focal countries. Qualitative data were used to gain a picture of 
trends and their causes during the early periods of Swedish aid. 
Qualitative Analysis
The qualitative component of this evaluation involved thematic 
and longitudinal case studies, with flexible exploration of the evalua-
tion questions through the use of semi-structured interviews, focus 
groups and analysis of existing documentation. 
Case studies – specific units of analysis with clearly defined 
boundaries – were used to explore the evaluation questions in a con-
text specific way. Case studies were used for their potential to pro-
vide an in-depth understanding of events and trends in Sweden’s aid 
in the three countries through the perspective of key actors. 
Qualitative approaches usually work with small samples that are 
selected purposively rather than randomly (Miles and Huberman, 
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1994). Purposive sampling, i.e. selecting cases for their richness of 
information in relation to key time periods, people, events and 
impacts, is relevant here for two reasons. First, such sampling is con-
sistent with the adaptive theory approach, where cases are selected 
for their value in exploring predefined questions and concepts (Den-
zin and Lincoln, 2000). Cases are therefore selected for their likely 
contribution to understanding the impacts of Sida’s changing devel-
opment strategies over time. Second, purposive sampling enables the 
richest access to data given the available time and resources. 
The historical nature of this evaluation, which must evaluate the 
cumulative impact of many activities over several decades, distin-
guishes it from a typical project or program evaluation. Initial analysis 
of Sida documentation and meetings during the inception visit helped 
the evaluation team to develop a working understanding of key histor-
ical phases in Sweden’s aid delivery and its relationship to changes in 
the broader development context. Based on this analysis, it became 
clear that two different categories of case studies would be relevant:
Longitudinal case studies were used to illustrate the changing 
nature and impact of Sida’s involvement in a particular sector. Lon-
gitudinal cases exposed the drivers behind, and outcomes of changes 
in, Sweden’s development co-operation within a selected sector. 
Analysing one connected set of interventions in this way spoke to 
questions of responsiveness, relevance and effectiveness. Longitudi-
nal cases were identified based on sectors where Sida has had a very 
long-standing engagement; in each country, only a very limited 
number of sectors or areas of operation met this requirement. 
In short, longitudinal case studies assessed long term involvement in 
a sector, to understanding why and how Sida changed its approach to 
development co-operation over time, and the impacts of such change.
Thematic case studies were used to assess the nature and impact 
of a package of interventions during different historical phases. 
Drawing on the provisional historical phases of Swedish develop-
ment co-operation defined in the inception phase (see Table A.1 
below), a set of 2 to 3 case studies were selected in each major phase 
to gain a deeper understanding of critical impacts and themes dur-
ing each period. There was a large number of potential thematic 
cases to select from. An initial set was selected during the inception 
phase, based on the information gained from initial interviews and 
data analysis about Sida’s thematic foci in Vietnam. This initial set 
was first expanded through discussion with Sida, and then adjusted 
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slightly during fieldwork if logistical constraints were faced in access-
ing particular field sites or informants. The final cases addressed in 
the study are outlined in Table A.1. 
The combination of longitudinal and thematic analysis is an inno-
vative approach to longitudinal evaluation; it has enabled a compre-
hensive understanding of how Sida’s aid effort evolved, as well as an 
understanding of impacts and lessons in key thematic areas. 
Key data sources for the longitudinal and thematic cases include 
existing Sida documentation (provided to the team by Sida), other sec-
ondary research, and interviews and focus groups with informants. 
The Sida documentation was analysed for information on: (i) case stud-
ies; (ii) inter-country relationships and planning/decision-making pro-
cesses; and (iii) existing knowledge on lessons and impact. In addition, 
existing research publications were used in the analysis of the develop-
ment context, the political economy of each country, and the interna-
tional political economic context and its influence on donor practice.
Field visits were made to Ha Giang and Quang Tri provinces to 
gain a more detailed understanding of relationships with provincial 
and local government, and the sustainability and impacts of previ-
ous Sida-funded interventions. These field visits built upon previous 
evaluative work commissioned by Sida.
Key Informant Interviews and Group Discussions
Interviews were conducted with key informants that were associ-
ated in various ways with Sida’s programs. Some were identified 
during the inception phase for their historical and institutional 
memory. Further informants were then identified through a ‘snow-
ball’ approach (i.e. through referrals and following up names that 
recurred in other interviews), as well as targeting specific categories 
of stakeholders including:
•	 Government	policy	makers	at	central	and	sector	levels;
•	 Provincial	and	districts	authorities;
•	 Sida	HQ	departments	and	teams;
•	 Swedish	MFA;
•	 Members	of	Parliament	(MPs)	in	Sweden	and	government	offi-
cals in Vietnam;
•	 Other	donors	and	international	partners;
•	 Civil	society,	academia/research	organisations,	media,	private	
sector;
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•	 Implementing	partners	and	project/technical	assistance	teams;	
and
•	 End	beneficiaries	at	provincial	and	district	level.	In	summary,	the	
selected cases and informants provided a detailed overview of 
Sida’s phases of operation and key sectoral initiatives. The sam-
pling strategy was workable, while providing assurance that key 
categories of informants were covered. A limitation with the 
approach was the limited scope to interview program beneficiaries, 
due to resource and time constraints. To address this gap, the team 
have drawn on past program and project evaluations, which have 
addressed beneficiary views to varying extents. This was a neces-
sary sacrifice to gain the breadth of coverage required in the TOR, 
but meant that the study was constrained in gaining in-depth, lon-
gitudinal insights to local level project and program impacts.
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Appendix b: key informants
Fransson, Anna., Head of Unit, KEMI
Bien (Dr), Directorate of Forestry, MARD
Ljunggren, Börje., (Dr), Former Swedish Ambassador to Vietnam
Bruhin, Brigitte., Deputy Country Director, SDC
Junker, Brigitte., Evaluation Department, Sida
Bui Duc Tho (Dr)., Dept of Research Management, National 
 Economics University
Bui Thi Thanh Tam., Expert International Co-operation,  
Vietnam University of Fine Art
Bui Thi Thanh Thuy., Civil Society, Centre for Development of 
Community Initiative and Empowerment
Cao Manh Cuong., Head Aid Effectiveness, MPI
Cao Viet Chinh., Chia Se Poverty Alleviation Programme 
 Management Unit, Quang Tri
Lindahl, Claes., Consultant
Cu Thuy Trang., Expert, International Co-operation, Hanoi Law 
University
Dang Hoang Oanh., DDG, DIC, MoJ
Dang Kim Son (Dr)., General Director, IPSARD
Dang Van Thuy., Vice Chair of Bac Me District People’s Commit-
tee, Ha Giang
Dao Manh Hung., Vice Director of District People’s Committee-
Cam Lo District, Quang Tri
Dao Thi Le My., Staff of DPI, Ha Giang
Bourson, David., EU Delegation
Dinh Thi Thuy Hang (Dr)., Former Current Affairs Dept,  
Vietnam TV
Do Duc Doi., Director, General Dept of Land Administration
Do Ngoc Tien., Head of ‘Group 9’ village, Ha Giang
Do Thi Huyen., Former Sida NPO
Duong Ba Cuong,. Secretary of Communist Party, GioHoa 
 Commune, Quang Tri
Duong Quang Long., Legal Aid Agency
Haastad, Elsa., First Secretary, Swedish Embassy, Hanoi
Edgren, Gösta., Former Swedish Ambassador to Vietnam
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Ha (Dr)., Former Sida NPO
Ha Phuong Lan., DDG, ICD, MoJ
Ha Van Pham., Official, District People’s Committee
Ha Van Sy., Head of One Stop Shop – Cam Thanh Commune, 
Quang Tri
Hang Duong Thanh., Vice Chairman, District People’s Committee, 
Quan Ba, Ha Giang
Hiep., Department Of Tax
Hieu Ngoc., Chairman of the Swedish-Vietnam Fund for the Pro-
motion of Culture
Ho Quang Minh (Dr)., DG Foreign Economic Relations Dept, MPI
Ho Thi Duong., Beneficiary of Chia Se Poverty Alleviation 
Programme
Ho Thi Kim Ngoc., Second Secretary of Communist Party, Gio 
Chau Commune, Quang Tri
Ho Thi Rai., Chairwoman of Women’s Union, Commune People’s 
Committee, VinhKhe Commune, Quang Tri
Ho Thi Xuong., Chairman of Fatherland Front, VinhKhe Com-
mune, Quang Tri
Ho	Thi	Yen	Thu.,	Deputy	Director,	Centre	for	Marine	Life	Conser-
vation and Community Development (MCD)
Ho Van Cuong., Chairman of People’s Council, VinhKhe Com-
mune, Quang Tri
Ho Van Dong., Chairman of Farmer’s Union, Commune People’s 
Committee, VinhKhe Commune, Quang Tri
Ho Van Nhuong., Head of Commune Clinic, VinhKhe, Quang Tri
Ho Van Tao., Chairman of Commune People’s Committee, Vin-
hKhe Commune, Quang Tri
Ho Van Tu., Vice Chairman of Commune People’s Committee, Gio 
Chau, Quang Tri
Hoang Dung Tien., Customer, One Stop Shop, Dong Ha Munici-
pality, Quang Tri
Hoang Duong Phuc., Beneficiary of Chia Se Poverty Alleviation 
Programme, Quang Tri
Hoang Hiep (Dr)., Former DDG MoH
Hoang Kinh Chieu., Gio Chau Commune People’s Committee, 
Quang Tri
Hoang Minh Man., Chairman of Commune People’s Council, Gio 
Chau Commune, Quang Tri
Hoang Phuoc Hiep (Prof)., DG, International Law, MoJ
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Hoang Thanh Tam., Civil Society, Centre for Development of 
Community Initiative and Empowerment
Hoang Thanh., Deputy Director of Commune Programme Man-
agement Unit, Chia Se Poverty Alleviation Programme
Hoang Thi Luy., Accountant, Commune Programme Management 
Unit, Chia Se Poverty Alleviation Unit
Hoang Van Canh., Department of Planning and Investment, 
Quang Tri
Hoang Van Suu., Director of Chia Se Poverty Alleviation Provincial 
Programme Management Unit, Quang Tri
Hoang Van Thuan., Vice Chairman of Minh Son Commune Peo-
ple’s Committee, Ha Giang
Hoang Van Tuan., Vice Chairman of Minh Son Commune People’s 
Committee, Ha Giang
Hoang Van Xuan., Secretary of Party, Vinh Chap Commune, 
Quang Tri
Ho Trong Hao., Customer, One Stop Shop, Dong Ha Municipality, 
Quang Tri
Hua Chien Thang., Deputy Director, Coastal and Marine Planning 
Studies Centre, MONRE
Huong., Department of Animal Health, MARD
Lopez Jordie Galbe., Programme Director, AECID (Spanish Agen-
cy for International Development Co-operation)
Kien., Dept of Europe, MoFA
Kim Thi Thuy Ngoc., Dept of International Co-operation, 
ISPONRE
La Khanh Tung., Lecturer, Centre for Human Rights, University  
of Hanoi
Birgegaard, Lars-Erik., Consultant
Le Dang Doanh (Dr)., Former senior economic adviser to Vietnam-
ese Prime Minister
Le Duc Nam., Chairman of Commune People’s Committee, Vinh 
Chap Commune, Quang Tri
Le Duy Hao., Provincial Advisor, Provincial Programme Manage-
ment Unit, Chia Se Poverty Alleviation Programme, Quang Tri
Le Quang Vinh., District People’s Committee, Cam Lo, Quang Tri
Le Quynh Hoa., Civil Society, Action Centre for City Development
Le Thanh Quy., Chairman of Gio Hoa Commune People’s Com-
mittee, Gio Hoa Commune, Quang Tri
Le Thi (Prof )., Chairwoman of the Swedish Gender Equality Fund
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Le Thi Hong Giang., Centre for the Studies and Applied Sciences in 
Gender, Family, Women and Adolescents
Le Thi Linh., Department of Home Affairs, Quang Tri
Le Thi Phuong., District People’s Committee, Cam Lo, Quang Tri
Le Thi Thuy Kieu., VinhLinh District People’s Committee, Quang 
Tri
Le Thu Huong., Expert, Dept of International Co-operation, 
National Economics University
Le Van Minh (Dr)., Former DG, DIC, MARD
Le Van Phuc., Dong Ha Municipality People’s Committee
Le Van Thinh., Head of Trade and Industry Division, VinhLinh 
District, Quang Tri
Le Van Tu., Vice Chairman, Farmer’s Union-CPC
Le Viet Thai., Director for Economic Institutions, CIEM
Le Xuan Ba (Prof)., President, CIEM
Le Xuan Bich., Gio Chau Commune People’s Committee, Gio 
Chau Commune, Quang Tri
Lien Nguyen., Governance Adviser DfID
Long Dinh., Beneficiary of SEMLA, Ngoc Duong, Ha Giang
Lu Hanh Van., Official, Commune People’s Committee
De Backer, Luc., Head of Co-operation, Belgium Development 
Agency (BTC)
Luong (Dr)., MoH
Luong The Phiet., DG, DIC, MARD
Luong Thi An., DDG, International Relations Dept – EVN
Luu Hoang Ngoc (Dr)., Deputy Director General, Vinachemia
Luu Van Vinh., Deputy Director, International Co-operation Dept, 
General Statistics Office
Pham Chi Lan., Former Director General of Vietnam Chamber of 
Commerce
Ostman, Margareta., Principal Scientific Officer, KEMI
Ottosson, Marie., Minister, Swedish Embassy Hanoi
Salomon, Matthieu., International Senior Adviser, Towards 
Transparency
von Bonsdorff, Max., Ministry for the Foreign Affairs of Finland 
(FORMIN)
Tedengren, Michael (Dr)., Dept of Systems Ecology, Stockholm 
University
Nguyen Anh Tuan., Director, Dept of International Co-operation, 
General Statistics Office
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Nguyen Dinh Luong., Beneficiary of Strengthening Environment 
Management and Land Administration (SEMLA) Programme, 
Nguoc Duong, Ha Giang
Nguyen Dinh Trung., Head, Bilateral Co-operation, DIC, MoIC
Nguyen Duc Dien., Vice Chairman, Fatherland Front, Vinh Chap 
Commune, Quang Tri
Nguyen Duc Kien., Forestry Science Institute of Vietnam
Nguyen Duc Tan., Staff of International Co-operation 
Division-PPC
Nguyen	Duc	Thuy.,	Official-Yen	Pong	Commune	People’s	
 Committee, Ha Giang
Nguyen Duy Chuye (Dr)., Former Project Director of MRDP
Nguyen Hoang Long., DDG, Europe Dept, MoFA
Nguyen	Hong	Khanh.,	Secretary	of	Party	Commune-Yen	Phong	
Commune, Ha Giang
Nguyen Huu Do., Vice Chairman of People’s Council, GioHoa 
Commune, Quang Tri
Nguyen Minh Cuong., Deputy Director, ISD, Vietnam Environ-
ment Administration
Nguyen Minh Hieu., Civil Society, Action Centre for City 
Development
Nguyen Phuong Hoa., Head of Europe Bureau, ICD, MoCST
Nguyen Quang Cong., Head of One Stop Shop – Dong Ha 
 Municipality, Quang Tri
Nguyen Quoc Hoan (Dr)., Head of Office, International  
Co-operation Dept, Hanoi Law University
Nguyen Quoc Tuan., Deputy Director of Department of  
Planning and Investment, Quang Tri
Nguyen Thai Thien., DDG, Press Department, MoIC
Nguyen Thanh Do (Dr)., Director General, Dept of Debt 
 Management and External Finance, MoF
Nguyen Thanh Hai., Head of Europe and Africa Division, MPI
Nguyen Thanh Hieu., Staff of DPI, Ha Giang
Nguyen Thanh Hoa., Head of Environmental Management 
Division-DONRE
Nguyen Thanh Liem (Prof)., Director, The National Childrens 
 Hospital, Hanoi
Nguyen Thanh Que., Head, ICD, Hanoi Academy of Cinema  
and Theatre
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Nguyen Thi Hai., Vice Chairman, Vinh Linh District People’s 
Committee, Quang Tri
Nguyen Thi Hanh., Director, Informatic Centre and Library,  
Hanoi Law University
Nguyen Thi Hoa., Staff member, One Stop Shop, Dong Ha 
 Municipality, Quang Tri
Nguyen Thi Kieu Vien., Executive Director, Towards Transparency
Nguyen Thi Kim Phung (Prof)., Vice Director, Hanoi Law 
University
Nguyen Thi Lan Huong., NPO, Swedish Embassy
Nguyen Thi Lan, Director., Vietnam Film Institute
Nguyen Thi Mai., Justice Partnership Programme, MoJ
Nguyen Thi My Huong., Vinh Linh District People’s Committee, 
Quang Tri
Nguyen Thi Ngoc Huye., Vice Head of Home Affairs Division, 
Dong Ha Municipality, Quang Tri
Nguyen Thi Phuong Nga., Former Manager, ISG Secretariat, 
MARD
Nguyen Thi Tan., Chairwoman, Women’s Union-CPC
Nguyen Thi Thu Hong., Deputy Director, DIC, MONRE
Nguyen Thi Thu Trang., Centre for Marine Life Conservation and 
Community Development
Nguyen Thi Vinh., Beneficiary of Chia Se Poverty Alleviation 
 Programme, Quang Tri
Nguyen Thoi., Vice Chairman of Dong Ha Municipal People’s 
Committee, Quang Tri
Nguyen Thu Hang., Expert, ICD, MARD
Nguyen Thu Hue., Centre for Marine Life Conservation and Com-
munity Development
Nguyen Thuong Huyen., Deputy Head of Foreign Economic Divi-
sion, Department of Planning and Investment, Quang Tri
Nguyen Thuy Linh., Desk Officer, Europe Dept, MoFA
Nguyen Tien Thanh., Dept of Debt Management and External 
Finance, MoF
Nguyen Truong Van., Deputy Director, Dept of Science, 
 Technology and International Co-operation, Vietnam 
 Administration of Forestry, MARD
Nguyen Van Hai., Deputy Director of Commune Programme 
 Management Unit, Chia Se Poverty Alleviation Programme
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Nguyen	Van	Hung.,	Chairman	of	Yen	Phong	Commune	People’s	
Committee, Ha Giang
Nguyen Van Lieu., Deputy Director General, General Statistics 
Office
Nguyen Van Linh., Vinh Linh District People’s Committee,  
Quang Tri
Nguyen Van Mai., Deputy Director of Home Affair Department 
(DHA), Quang Tri
Nguyen Van Nghiem., Head of Farmer Organizations Division, 
MARD
Nguyen Van Ngoan., Beneficiary of Chia Se Poverty Alleviation 
Programme, Ha Giang
Nguyen Van Phuc., Vice Chairman of Commune People’s Council
Nguyen Van Sang., Beneficiary of Chia Se Poverty Alleviation 
Programme
Nguyen Van Thanh., Deputy Director General (DDG) Energy 
Department – Ministry of Industry and Trade (MOIT)
Nguyen Van Tinh (Dr)., Director General, ICD, MoCST
Nguyen Van Tuyen., Director of AgriBank in Cam Lo District, 
Quang Tri
Nguyen Viet Tien (Prof)., Vice Minister, MoH
Nhu., Project Management Office, National Assembly
Nong	Thi	Nhu.,	Chairwoman	of	Yen	Phong	Commune	 
People’s Committee, Ha Giang
Pham Anh Phuong., Director, Vietnam National Opera Ballet
Pham Bich Ngoc., DDG, DIC, National Assembly
Pham Khac Lam., Editor in Chief Viet-My
Pham Quang Hung., Provincial Programme Management Unit, 
Chia Se Poverty Alleviation Programme, Quang Tri
Pham Thi Hoa., Beneficiary of Chia Se Poverty Alleviation 
 Programme, Quang Tri
Pham Thi Hong Hanh., Deputy Director, ICD, MARD
Pham Thi My Linh (Dr)., Director, Centre for Agricultural Policy, 
IPSARD
Pham Thi Than., Agricultural Division Official of Bac Me District 
People’s Committee
Pham Troung Hoang (Dr)., Director, Dept of International 
 Co-operation, National Economics University
Pham Van Thanh., Vice Chairman of Gio Hoa Commune  
People’s Committee, Quang Tri
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Phan Hoang Mai (Dr)., DDG, Foreign Economic Relations Dept, 
MPI
Phan Phu Binh (Dr)., Deputy Director General, International Co-
operation Dept, MONRE
Phan Quang Trung (Prof)., Vice Rector, National Economics 
University
Phan Thi Nhu Lan., Accountant, Commune Programme Manage-
ment Unit, Chia Se Poverty Alleviation Programme
Phan Thi., Secretary to SVFC
Phan Van Trieu., Head, Division of Environment. Quan Ba District 
People’s Committee
Phong., Institute of Law Science
Phung Ha (Dr)., Director General, Vinachemia
Quach Cong Huan., Acting Director, Centre for Land Communica-
tion and Training
Quan., Aid Effectiveness, MPI
Tang Van Phuong., Beneficiary of Chia Se Poverty Alleviation Pro-
gramme, Ha Giang
Thai Ba Tan., Official of Commune People’s Committee
Thai Van Minh., Accountant
Thao Chien Giang., Beneficiary of Chia Se Poverty Alleviation 
Programme
Thao Cho Sau., Beneficiary of Chia Se Poverty Alleviation 
Programme
Thao Mi Chu., Chairman of Lung Tam Commune People’s Com-
mittee, Quan Ba, Ha Giang
Thong., Retired Desk officer (Vietnam – Sweden relations), MPI
Ockermann, Trobjorn., Chief Technical Adviser, Chia Se Poverty 
Alleviation Programme
Tran Dinh Ha., Beneficiary of Chia Se Poverty Alleviation Pro-
gramme, Quang Tri
Tran Duc Minh., Expert, International Relations Dept – EVN
Tran Hong Ha (Dr)., Vice Minister, MONRE
Tran Kim Long., DDG, DIC, MARD
Tran Luong., Official, Energy Dept, MOIT
Tran Nam Binh., Former Sida NPO
Tran Ngoc Ca (Dr)., Director of Secretariat, National Council for 
Science and Technology Policy
Tran Ngoc Hao., Chairman of Gio Chau Commune Fatherland 
Front, Gio Chau Commune, Quang Tri
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Tran Ngoc Quan., DDG Dept of Europe - MOIT
Tran Quang Thanh., Head of Home Affairs, Cam Lo District Peo-
ple’s Committee, Quang Tri
Tran Thi Giang Huong (Dr)., DG, ICD, MoH
Tran Thi Hien., Community Facilitator, Chia Se Poverty Allevia-
tion Programme
Tran Thi Khanh Hoa., Director, Media Training Centre, MoIC
Tran Thi Quynh Chi., Acting Director, Information Centre for 
Agriculture and Rural Development, IPSARD
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Appendix C: The Aid Quality 
Evaluation Framework
Introduction
The AQEF is comprised of five components; each of these com-
ponents contains various sub-components. Assessments of aid qual-
ity can be made against each of the AQEF components, using a mix 
of qualitative and qualitative data. The collection of these data is 
guided by a purposive sampling framework that emphasises the tri-
angulation of data sources. The interpretation of AQEF assessments 
must be preceded and informed by rigorous political-economic anal-
ysis in order to understand the context of aid delivery over time. 
The five components of the AQEF for the purposes of this evalua-
tion are:
1. absorptive capacity; 
2. quality of public sector financial management; 
3. consistency with Paris Declaration principles; 
4. consistency with partner country national sectoral priorities; and 
5. consistency with donor country programme strategies (or 
equivalents). 
The first three components are indicators of what contributes to effec-
tive aid delivery and are chosen according to state of the art, widely 
accepted knowledge of aid effectiveness.66 Assessments based on these 
elements are not used to criticise the aid delivery decisions made in the 
early years of Sweden’s co-operation with Vietnam as much of the 
knowledge of what contributes to effective aid was not known at that 
time. These assessments however indicate much about how effective 
aid might have been delivered based on contemporary thinking, and 
66 The Paris Declaration principles and their background are well known in donor 
agencies circles, being a product of lessons learned from decades of official aid 
delivery. Absorptive capacity and the quality of fiscal management are issues 
that have become prominent in aid policies more recently, owing largely to con-
cerns over scaled up aid in order to meet the Millennium Development Goals. 
It has been recognized, however, that these issues are relevant at all aid levels, 
large and small. A large literature has emerged on these topics and includes 
Guillaumont and Guillaumont (2006), Bourguignon and Sundberg (2006), Hel-
ler and Gupta (2002), Heller et al. (2006) and McGillivray and Morrissey (2001). 
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they provide good departure points to discuss changes in Sweden’s aid 
delivery over time and the various factors that shaped that delivery. 
Assessments for these early years are primarily assigned on the basis of 
qualitative information given the lack of quantitative data. 
AQEF Components
Absorptive capacity (AC) refers to the capacity of the partner 
country to use aid efficiently for development purposes. It is based on 
the simple recognition that there are limits to the amounts of aid that 
can be efficiently absorbed, with higher and higher levels of aid not 
necessarily associated with bigger and better development impacts. 
This recognition is based on observations from the field, but also on 
international research that shows that the incremental impact of aid 
falls as aid levels increase (see, for example, McGillivray and Feeny, 
2009 and Feeny and McGillivray, 2010).67 This occurs at all aid levels, 
large and small. Absorptive capacity is a critical determinant of the 
sustainability of aid impacts. There are many reasons why absorptive 
capacity constraints emerge within a partner country. They include 
the efficiency of partner government systems, the capacity of other 
agencies dealing with aid delivery, and the policy stance of partner 
governments. The absorptive capacity component captures these con-
ditions and includes policy quality and institutional performance, vari-
ous governance measures such as voice and accountability, rule of law 
and control of corruption, basic measures of the efficiency of public fis-
cal management such as the predictability and control of budget exe-
cution, and measures of the quality of donor practices such as the 
extent of proliferation of aid-funded activities and the predictability of 
support. Recognising that Swedish development co-operation has 
often been delivered through, or in partnership with NGOs, these 
measures can be augmented with indicators of the capacity of these 
organisations to absorb Swedish aid. These indicators are obtained by 
qualitative investigation, seeking to establish whether, on development 
effectiveness criteria, more aid could have been delivered efficiently 
through NGOs, whether the amount of aid allocated through them 
was appropriate to their absorptive capacities, or whether too much 
aid was allocated in partnership with them.
67 Note that the McGillivray and Feeny (2009) paper is primarily concerned 
with fragile states, but it also provides evidence that absorptive capacity con-
straints apply in all aid recipient countries.
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The public sector financial management component has 
profound consequences for the impact of donor aid and therefore 
warrants more thorough and additional investigation. While this 
component is also included under absorptive capacity (very generally 
and in the context of other key AC indicators), this framework 
acknowledges its crucial importance by applying more weighting to 
it as a standalone criteria. There is also overlap between this compo-
nent and the use of country system indicators under the Paris Decla-
ration. However these indicators are quite limited and do not suffi-
ciently encompass many important PFM issues, such as those 
addressed by the sub-components discussed below. An important 
point to make with regard to the use of country systems is that while 
a donor may use them, if they are of a poor quality, aid impact will 
be less than if those systems where of a higher quality. As such this 
component of the AQEF attempts to measure the quality of PFM in 
the partner country; the Paris principles are used to assess the extent 
to which Sida used partner systems. The sub-components include 
internationally agreed measures of the orderliness of and participa-
tion in annual budget processes, the presence of a multi-year per-
spective in fiscal planning and the effectiveness of tax payment col-
lection. The overall rationale for the inclusion of this component in 
the AQEF is that the absence of good quality public sector financial 
management constrains the extent to which a donor country pro-
gramme can achieve intended development outcomes and ultimately 
affects the sustainability of development co-operation activities. 
The consistency with Paris Declaration principles compo-
nent is based the donor community agreed measures of progress in 
each of the following five principles:
1. Ownership: Developing countries must lead their own development 
policies and strategies, and manage their own development work 
on the ground; 
2. Alignment: Donors must line up their aid firmly behind the priori-
ties outlined in developing countries’ national development strat-
egies, they should use partner country systems, their aid must be 
untied and be predictable;
3. Harmonisation: Donors must coordinate their development work 
better amongst themselves to avoid duplication and high transac-
tion costs for poor countries; 
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4. Managing for results: All parties in the aid relationship must place 
more focus on the result of aid, the tangible difference it makes in 
poor people’s lives; and 
Mutual accountability: Donors and developing countries must 
account more transparently to each other for their use of aid funds, 
and to their citizens and parliaments for the impact of their aid. 
Ownership, alignment and mutual accountability are acknowl-
edged to be important drivers of the sustainability of aid impacts and, 
therefore, of quality aid delivery. The incorporation of these princi-
ples in AQEF assessments serves to increase the framework’s focus on 
sustainability. The application of these principles are nuanced to take 
into account the political evolution of a country over time, its fragility, 
and conflict and post-conflict situations, all of which are important 
aspects of the present evaluation. To reiterate a point made above, 
particular care needs to be taken in the retrospective application of 
these principles, keeping in mind that they are based on thinking on 
aid effectiveness that has evolved over time and much of which was 
not known or accepted until well into the 1990s or later. 
The partner country national sectoral priorities compo-
nent is concerned with the focus of a donor programme within the 
partner country under consideration. The basic idea behind includ-
ing this component in the AQEF is that donor country programmes 
should be consistent with development needs in countries, and they 
should be sufficiently flexible to respond to changing development 
needs or priorities. These needs may or may not be recognised in 
partner development plans or priorities. As such the issue being 
addressed by this component is not necessarily one of alignment, in 
the context of the Paris principles. One approach is to adapt indices 
used to assess the consistency of global inter-country aid allocation to 
the relative needs of recipient countries to country level analysis. 
This would result in an index that would measure the extent to 
which the allocation of country programme funds, across sectors, is 
consistent with partner country achievement in these sectors. If, for 
example, a country was doing particularly poorly in health com-
pared to all other sectors, the percentage share of total country funds 
to this sector should be larger than that to other sectors. The index 
would provide a quantitative assessment based on such consistency. 
Similar investigation can be undertaken for the geographic alloca-
tion of donor support within a partner country.
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The donor country programme strategy component has 
been added to the AQEF for the specific purpose of this evaluation. 
The AQEF focuses on the prerequisites for effective, poverty-reduc-
ing aid. As such it does not focus directly on outcomes consistent 
with a focus on multidimensional poverty reduction or with other 
broadly developmental outcomes that donors might pursue. The 
inclusion of the donor country programme strategy component is 
intended to throw specific light on this issue. It is based on various 
assessments of what the country programme has achieved, assessed 
against the principal objective of these programmes, that being pov-
erty reduction. Whether other objectives identified in country pro-
gramme strategies have been achieved can also be considered.
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Figure D.1 Life Expectancy, Vietnam, 1960 to 2008
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Figure D.2 Adult Literacy, Vietnam, 1970 to 2008
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Figure D.3 School Enrolment, Vietnam, 1970 to 2008
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148
Appendix E: Development  
Co-operation Programs and Projects  
between Sweden and Vietnam
Specific Program Sector Period Activity expenditure
humanitarian
Humanitarian (War), Primarily 
through Swedish Red Cross
Humanitar-
ian
1965 Not known
Medical Supplies and Equipment 
(through Save the Children and 
Red Cross)
Humanitar-
ian
Mid 1960s Not known
health
Family Planning (commodity 
 imports)
Health 1970
Family Planning Health 1971–1974 12,000,000 SEK
Family Planning Health 1974–1975 5,700,000 SEK
Child Hospital, Hanoi Health 1975–1980 Not known
Hospital, Uong Bi Health 1975–1980 Not known
Provision of Drugs (POD) Health 1983 Not known
Yen Hung Rural Health Project Health 1983–1986 Not known
Medical Equipment Project (ME) Health 1986 Not known
Quang Ninh PHC Project (PHC I) Health 1986 Not known
Health Support Health 1983–1984 22,000,000 SEK
Health Support Health 1984–1985 60,000,000 SEK
Health Support Health 1985–1986 50,000,000 SEK
Health Support Health 1986–1990 196,600,000 SEK
Health Programme Health 1990–1993 175,000,000 SEK
Support to the Health Sector Health 1993–1994 14,000,000 SEK 
(extension of 
 programme)
Vietnamese-Swedish  
Health Cooperation (VSHC 1)
Health 1994–1999 250,000,000 SEK 
Vietnamese-Swedish  
Health Cooperation (VSHC II)
Health 1999–2002 90,000,000 SEK
Vietnamese-Swedish Health 
 Cooperation (VSHC III): Health 
Policy and Systems Development
Health 2002–2007 104,500,000 SEK
149
APPeNDIx e: DeVeloPmeNT Co-oPerATIoN ProgrAmS AND ProjeCTS BeTweeN SweDeN AND VIeTNAm 
Specific Program Sector Period Activity expenditure
Health Care in the Central High-
lands Project (through ADB)
Health 2004–2010 47,500,000 SEK
Community Based Drug Abuse 
Control Project in Vietnam 
Health 2005–2006 Not known
Strengthened Leadership for an 
effective national response to 
HIV/AIDS (through UNDP)
Health 2004 – 10,000,000 SEK
National Health Project (NHSP)  
in Vietnam (through the World 
Bank) Financing of 3.component
Health 1996–2003 36,700,000 SEK
education
Research Cooperation, SAREC Education 1976– Not known
Research Cooperation, SAREC Education 1982 –1983 4,000,000 SEK
Research Cooperation, SAREC Education 1987–1989 6,800,000 SEK
Research Cooperation, SAREC Education 1990s 3,500,000 SEK/year
Research Cooperation, SAREC Education 1997–2000 42,400,000 SEK
Research Cooperation, SAREC Education 2000–2003 54,300,000 SEK
Research Cooperation, SAREC Education 2004–2007 100,000,000 SEK
Strengthening Policy Research  
in Vietnam
Education 2002–2005 17,000,000 SEK 
Joint Learning Initiative Education 2003–2005 4,800,000 SEK
energy generation and Supply 
Energy: Electricity to  
Ho Chi Min City
Energy 1984–1985 Covered under 
Import Support 
(52,000,000 SEK)
Energy Support Energy 1985–1986 15,000,000 SEK
Energy Support Energy 1986–1987 45,000,000 SEK 
Energy Support Energy 1987–1990 60,000,000 SEK
Energy Programme Energy 1991–1993 83,000,000 SEK
Support to the Energy Sector in 
Vietnam: General Backstopping 
and Support 
Energy 1991–1994 12,500,000 SEK
Support to the Energy Sector (this 
programme also covers some of 
the below indicated projects)
Energy 1994–2002 259,000,000 SEK
Vietnamese-Swedish Energy 
 Cooperation: General Backstop-
ping and Support
Energy 1994 –1999 35,000,000 SEK
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Specific Program Sector Period Activity expenditure
Vietnamese-Swedish Energy 
 Cooperation: Management 
 Training
Energy 1991–1993 6,000,000 SEK
Vietnamese-Swedish Energy 
 Cooperation: Sister Cooperation 
Project (Twinning)
Energy 1994 –1999 10,000,000 SEK
Vietnamese-Swedish Energy 
 Cooperation: Capacity Building  
of Construction Companies in 
Management and Tunneling 
Energy 1994 –1999 27,000,000 SEK
Vietnamese-Swedish Energy 
 Cooperation: Support to feasibil-
ity Studies for the expansion of 
Hydro Power Generation (Se San)
Energy 1994 –1998 18,000,000 SEK
National Hydropower Project Energy 1998–2002 19,000,000 SEK
National Hydropower Project, II Energy 2003–2004 12,700,000 SEK
Danang Distribution Project, 
Phase I 
Energy 1995–2000 35,000,000 SEK
Power Distribution Energy 1998–2002 67,000,000 SEK
Song Minh MPP Energy 1996–2003 38,000,000 SEK
Energy Conservation Energy 1999–2001 400,000 SEK
Energy Conservation, Women Energy 2001–2003 3,800,000 SEK
Rural Energy Development Energy 2003–2007 48,000,000 SEK
Electrification, Provincial Towns Energy 1997–2000 110,000,000 SEK
Demand Side Management Energy 1998–2003 30,000,000 SEK
government and Civil Society
Support to Strengthening the 
Rule of Law, Phase I
Governance 1991–1995 13,100,000 SEK
Support to Strengthening the 
Rule of Law, Phase II
Governance 1995–1997 13,000,000 SEK
Legal Sector Support: 
 Strengthening the Rule of Law  
in Vietnam, Phase II
Governance 1997–2001 46,000,000 SEK
Support to Strengthening the 
Rule of Law, Phase III
Governance 2000–2002 48,000,000 SEK
Strengthening Legal Information 
(Sub-project)
Governance 2001–2004 11,000,000 SEK
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Specific Program Sector Period Activity expenditure
Strengthening Law Making and 
Law Implementing in Vietnam 
(Sub-project)
Governance 2001–2004 15,000,000 SEK
Support to the Legal Aid System 
in Vietnam (Sub-project)
Governance 2001–2004 11,500,000 SEK
Legal Education (Sub-project) Governance 2001–2004 24,000,000 SEK
Strengthening Legal Education, 
Phase III (Sub-project)
Governance 2005–2009 71,500,000 SEK
Direct Support to the Economic 
Reforms and of Strengthening of 
the Rule of Law
Economic 
and Admin-
istrative 
 Reform
1991–1994 Not known
Direct Support to the Economic 
Reforms and of Strengthening of 
the Rule of Law
Economic 
and Admin-
istrative 
 Reform
1994–1997 60,000,000 SEK
Support to the Economic Reform 
Programme 
Economic 
and Admin-
istrative 
 Reform
1998–2000 62,000,000 SEK
Economic Reforms Economic 
and Admin-
istrative 
 Reform
2001–2004 20,000,000 SEK
Economic Management  
(Sub-project)
Economic 
and Admin-
istrative 
 Reform
1991–1992 6,000,000 SEK 
Support to Center of Manage-
ment Education (Sub-project)
Economic 
and Admin-
istrative 
 Reform
1992–1995 10,000,000 SEK
Support to NEU’s Center for Mod-
ern Management Education 
(CMME) (Sub-project)
Economic 
and Admin-
istrative 
Reform
1995–1997 15,000,000 SEK
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Specific Program Sector Period Activity expenditure
Support to a Distance Education 
Course in Financial Economics at 
Master’s Degree level at the Na-
tional Economics University in 
Hanoi (Sub-project)
Economic 
and Admin-
istrative 
Reform
1993–1995 5,500,000 SEK
The Tax Project (Sub-project) Economic 
and Admin-
istrative 
Reform
1991–1994 9,000,000 SEK
The Tax Project (Sub-project) Economic 
and Admin-
istrative 
Reform
1995–1997 15,000,000 SEK
Cooperation of the Vietnamese-
Swedish Tax Administrations 
(Sub-project)
Economic 
and Admin-
istrative 
Reform
1998–2000 Not known
Support to the Capacity Building 
of the Central Institute of 
 Economic Management (CIEM) 
(Sub-project)
Economic 
and Admin-
istrative 
Reform
1996–1997 2,000,000 SEK
Support to General Statistics 
 Office of Vietnam (Sub-project)
Economic 
and Admin-
istrative 
Reform
1995–2005 66,000,000 SEK
Further Development of Vietnam 
Statistics within the Framework 
of Public Administration Reform 
Program
Economic 
and Admin-
istrative 
Reform
2006–2010 15,000,000 SEK
National Assembly Economic 
and Admin-
istrative 
Reform
1997–1998 10,000,000 SEK
Strengthening the Capacity of the 
Office of the Vietnam National 
 Assembly 
Economic 
and Admin-
istrative 
Reform
1998–2001 15,000,000 SEK
National Assembly, Phase II Economic 
and Admin-
istrative 
Reform
2003–2007 20,000,000 SEK
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Specific Program Sector Period Activity expenditure
Support of Public Financial 
 Management Modernization in 
 Vietnam (with IDRB)
Economic 
and Admin-
istrative 
Reform
2003 2,500,000 SEK
Strengthening the Legal Capacity 
in Vietnam (Through UNDP)
Governance 1994–1996 Not known
Support to Strengthening 
 Financial Policies and Institutions 
in Vietnam (through UNDP) 
Governance 1996–1997 4,250,000 SEK
UNDP Legal Facility Governance 2003–2007 15,500,000 SEK
Policy Development Forum, 
 Vietnam
Governance 2002–2005 2,997,000 SEK
Support to National Economics 
University (NEU)
Economic 
and Admin-
istrative 
Reform
1997–2000 35,000,000 SEK
Support to the Public Administra-
tion Reform (PAR)/ Government 
Committee on Organisation and 
Personnel (GCOP)
Economic 
and Admin-
istrative 
Reform
1996–1999 16,000,000 SEK
GCOP, Phase 2 Economic 
and Admin-
istrative 
Reform
1999–2004 35,023,000 SEK
Public Administration Reform 
(PAR)/ Prime Minister’s Research 
Group (PMRG)
Economic 
and Admin-
istrative 
Reform
1997–1999 3,327,683 SEK
Public Administration Reform 
(PAR) – Quang Tri 
Economic 
and Admin-
istrative 
Reform
1999–2003 20,000,000 SEK
Public Administration Ref, 
 Provinces
Economic 
and Admin-
istrative 
Reform
1997–2000 46,000,000 SEK
Public Administration Ref, Adv. 
Group
Economic 
and Admin-
istrative 
Reform
1997–1999 3,000,000 SEK
Corruption Study Governance 2002–2005 7,500,000 SEK
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Specific Program Sector Period Activity expenditure
Strengthening the Comprehen-
sive Capacity of the Inspectorate 
System 
Governance 2006–2010 16,000,000 SEK
Balance of Payment Support 
 Programme (World Bank 
 Structural Adjustment Credits)
Governance 1994–1997 60,000,000 SEK
RWI/HCMPA Governance 1997–1999 2,000,000 SEK
RWI/HCMPA, Phase II Governance 1999–2001 2,900,000 SEK
Democracy / MR projects Governance 1997–2000 1,700,000 SEK
Human Rights Training Human 
Rights
1997–2002 4,600,000 SEK
Human Rights Training Human 
Rights
2004–2008 10,000,000 SEK
Strengthening the implementa-
tion of the rights of Vietnamese 
children in contact with the law 
and those at risk of being in 
 contact with the law, 2005–2008 
through UNICEF
Human 
Rights
2005–2008 23,500,000 SEK
Support to Women’s Union Gender 1987–2000 12,250,000 SEK
Support to Women of Vietnam Gender 1991–1992 1,300,000 SEK
Support to Women of Vietnam Gender 1992–1993 700,000 SEK
Support to Women of Vietnam Gender 1995 1,300,000 SEK
Support to Women’s Union Gender 1993–1995 1,500,000 SEK
Banking and Financial Services
Support to the Banking System in 
Vietnam (With the World Bank)
Private 
Sector De-
velopment
1992–1997 54,000,000 SEK
Forestry 
Bai Bang (Mill and Forestry) (Bai 
Bang projects)
Forestry 1974 –1995 2.8 Billion (6.5 billion 
in 1996 prices)
VPPP – Mill + Forestry (Bai Bang 
projects)
Forestry 1985 –1990 575,000,000 SEK
VPPP Vocational School  (Bai 
Bang projects)
Forestry 1984 –1987
VPPP Vocational School (Bai 
Bang projects)
Forestry 1987–1992 20,000,000 SEK
VPPP Housing Area
(Bai Bang projects) Forestry 1984 –1990 31,000,000 SEK
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Specific Program Sector Period Activity expenditure
VPPP Transport project  
(Bai Bang projects)
Forestry 1984 –1989 63,000,000 SEK
VPPP Plantation and Soil 
 Conservation (Bai Bang projects)
Forestry 1986 –1990 40,000,000 SEK
VPPP Plantation and Soil 
 Conservation (Bai Bang projects)
Forestry 1990 –1991 37,000,000 SEK
Cogido & Cogivina (Bai Bang 
 projects)
Forestry 1985 –1990 101,000,000 SEK
Thu Duc I (Bai Bang projects) Forestry 1985 –1986 37,000,000 SEK
Thu Duc II (Bai Bang projects) Forestry 1986 –1990 45,000,000 SEK
Vietnam—Sweden Forestry 
 Cooperation Programme (FCP)
Forestry 1970s
Plantation and Soil Conservation 
Project
Forestry
Forestry, trees and People (with 
FAO)
Forestry 1986–1989
Forestry Sector Review (with 
FAO)
Forestry 1989–1992
Living Conditions Programme Forestry 1990–1992 5,000,000 SEK
Renovation of Strategies for 
 Forestry Development 
Forestry 1993–1996 8,000,000 SEK
Forestry Forestry 1990–1991 37,000,000 SEK
Vietnam—Sweden Forestry 
 Sector Support Programme 
(FCP), Phase I
Forestry 1991–1995 140,000,000 SEK
Mountain Rural Development 
Programme (MRDP), II
Forestry 1996–2002 158,000,000 SEK 
Ministry of Agriculture and Rural 
Development (MARD) – SIDA Co-
operation Programme (MSCP)
NRM 2005–2008 39,600,000 SEK
environment and Natural resource management
IFAD, Tuyen Quang RIDP Agric, For-
estry, Envi-
ronment
2002–2003 15,000,000 SEK
The Chia SE, Vietnam-Sweden 
Poverty Alleviation Programme 
Agric, For-
estry, Envi-
ronment
2003–2009 310,000,000 SEK
Provincial Coastal Management 
(PCM), Phase I & II
NRM 1995–2000 11,500,000 SEK
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Specific Program Sector Period Activity expenditure
Vietnam-Sweden Cooperation 
Programme for Land Adminis-
tration Reform (CPLAR)
NRM 1997–2003 65,000,000 SEK
Support to Ministry of Science 
Technology and Environment, 
MoSTE 
NRM 1994–1996 8,000,000 SEK
Environmental Administration 
MOSTE
NRM 1997–1999 25,000,000 SEK
National Environmental  
Agency (NEA)
NRM 1997–2001 33,000,000 SEK
Strengthening Environmental 
Management and Land 
 Administration (SEMLA)
NRM 2004–2009 200,000,000 SEK 
Support to the Environmentally 
Sustainable Development 
 Programme in Vietnam 
Environ-
ment
2004–2008 25,000,000 SEK
Environmentally Sustainable 
 Development Program (ESDP)
Environ-
ment
2008–2009 4,968,678 SEK
Reduction of Industrial Pollution 
in Ho Chi Minh City (Through 
 UNIDO), PhaseI
Environ-
ment
1995–? ?
HCMC Industrial Pollution,  
Phase III 
Environ-
ment
2001–2004 4,500,000 SEK
Greater Mekong Subregion (GMS) 
Core Environment Program / 
 Biodiversity Corridor Initiative 
(CEP/BCI). Regional Programme 
Environ-
ment
? ?
EEPSEA in Cambodia, Lao PDR 
and Vietnam. Regional Pro-
gramme
Environ-
ment
? ?
Environmental Fund NRM 1997–2001 3,500,000 SEK
Environmental Fund NRM 2002–2005 6,900,000 SEK
Environmental Fund NRM 2006–2008 6,500,000 SEK
other Social Infrastructure and Services
Emergency Relief Assistance Other 1987–1989 17,500,000 SEK
Swedish-Vietnamese Fund for 
the Promotion of Culture 
Culture 1992–1996 4,000,000 SEK
Culture Fund Culture 1997–2001 4,000,000 SEK
Culture Fund Culture 2001–2004 4,500,000 SEK
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Specific Program Sector Period Activity expenditure
Culture Fund Culture 2004–2007 4,500,000 SEK
Culture Sector Support Culture 1999–2000 10,000,000 SEK
Culture and Media Support Culture/
Media
1993–1995 8,000,000 SEK
Cultural and Media Sector 
 Support 
Culture/
Media
1996–1999 36,800,000 SEK
Cultural and Media Sector Sup-
port
Culture/
Media
2000–2004 39,000,000 SEK
Support to Media Sector Culture/
Media
2004–2007
Hanoi, 36 old streets Culture 1997–1998 3,000,000 SEK
Development of Public  
Library Performance in Laos  
and Vietnam
Culture 2003–2008
Business and other Services / Private Sector
Rehabilitation of Industries Business 1987–1991 45,000,000 SEK
Import Management and 
 Procurement in Vietnam,  
Phase II
Business 1995–1996 3,300,000 SEK (Fi-
nanced under the 
Consultancy Servic-
es Fund)
Start and Improve your  
business Program (SIYB)
Private 
Sector De-
velopment
1998–2004 24,700,000 SEK
MPDF/IFC (Outside the  
Country Allocation)
Business 1996–2001 14,000,000 SEK
Environmental Improvement – 
mining (Outside the Country 
 Allocation)
Business 1999–2003 8,100,000 SEK
Trade Promotion and  
Export Development
Trade 2004–2006 5,500,000 SEK
Import and Commodity Support
Import Support Other 1972–1978 660,000,000 SEK
Import Support Other 1977–1979 120,000,000 SEK
Import Support Other 1979–1980 100,000,000 SEK
Import Support Other 1980–1981 60,000,000 SEK
Import Support Other 1981–1982 100,000,000 SEK
Import Support Other 1982–1983 50,000,000 SEK
Import Support Other 1983–1984 165,000,000 SEK
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Specific Program Sector Period Activity expenditure
Import Support Other 1984–1985 100,000,000 SEK
Import Support Other 1985–1987 50,000,000 SEK
Import Support Other 1987–1989 100,000,000 SEK
Commodity Support Other 1989–1990 138,000,000 SEK
Commodity Support Other 1990–1993 350,000,000 SEK
other
External Debt Relief Other 1988–1990 7,450,121 SEK
(mainly funded under the  
Import Support)
Consultancy Fund Other 1982–1983 6,000,000 SEK
Consultancy Fund Other 1983–1984
Consultancy Fund Other 1984–1985 5,000,000 SEK
Consultancy Fund Other 1985–1987 4,000,000 SEK
Consultancy Fund Other 1989–1990 5,000,000 SEK
Consultancy Fund Other 1990–1992 5,000,000 SEK
Consultancy Fund Other 1994–1997 22,000,000 SEK
Consultancy Fund Other 1998 10,000,000 SEK
Consultancy Fund Other 1999–2006 86,000,000 SEK
Household Living Standard 
 Survey Strategy in Vietnam 
(Through UNDP)
Other 2003–2005 4,000,000 SEK
u-Credits (Outside the Country Allocation)
Ha Hinh Transformer Station “U” Credits 1997–2002 39,200,000 SEK
Creditline Transformer Stations “U” Credits 1997–2001 20,420,000 SEK
VNM Transformer Station II “U” Credits 2000–2004 31,600,000 SEK
Bai Bang “U” Credits 2001–2003 34,000,000 SEK
Source: Annex B, Country Report: Vietnam, Long Term Development Cooperation between Laos/ Sri 
Lanka/ Vietnam and Sweden, Part One: Documentation, 9 July 2010.
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